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SUMMARY
While Artificial Intelligence (AI) has tremendous potential as a defense against real-
world cybersecurity threats, understanding the capabilities and robustness of AI remains a
fundamental challenge. This dissertation tackles problems essential to successful deployment
of AI in security settings and is comprised of the following three interrelated research thrusts.
(1) Adversarial Attack and Defense of Deep Neural Networks: We discover vulner-
abilities of deep neural networks in real-world settings and the countermeasures to mitigate
the threat. We develop ShapeShifter, the first targeted physical adversarial attack that fools
state-of-the-art object detectors. For defenses, we develop SHIELD, an efficient defense
leveraging stochastic image compression, and UnMask, a knowledge-based adversarial
detection and defense framework.
(2) Theoretically-Principled Defense via Game Theory and ML: We develop new
theories that guide defense resources allocation to guard against unexpected attacks and
catastrophic events, using a novel online decision-making framework that compels players
to employ “diversified” mixed strategies. Furthermore, by leveraging the deep connection
between game theory and boosting, we develop a communication-efficient distributed
boosting algorithm with strong theoretical guarantees in the agnostic learning setting.
(3) Using AI to Protect Enterprise and Society: We show how AI can be used in real
enterprise environment with a novel framework called Virtual Product that predicts potential
enterprise cyber threats. Beyond cybersecurity, we also develop the Firebird framework to
help municipal fire departments prioritize fire inspections.
Our work has made multiple important contributions to both theory and practice: our
distributed boosting algorithm solved an open problem of distributed learning; ShaperShifter
motivated a new DARPA program (GARD); Virtual Product led to two patents; and Firebird





Internet-connected devices, such as mobile phones and smart home systems, have become
ubiquitous in our everyday lives. The increased connectivity also presents new cybersecurity
challenges and creates significant national risks. The number of cyber incidents on federal
systems reported to the U.S. Department oF Homeland Security increased more than ten-fold
between 2006 and 2015 [1].
To defend against these daunting and ever-increasing attacks, artificial intelligence (AI)
and machine learning (ML) have been explored and employed by cybersecurity researchers
and practitioners. However, even today, researchers have not yet fully understood the
complex ML models and their capabilities in solving various real-world tasks. The goal
of this thesis is to gain a deeper understanding of the capabilities and limitations of AI
in security-critical tasks, so that we can develop resilient AI-powered next-generation
cybersecurity defenses.
1.1 Thesis Overview and Main Ideas
Many cybersecurity scenarios can be modeled as a
game between the defender and the attacker. To de-
sign the best security solution, we need to fully un-
derstand the capabilities and limitations from both the
defense and attack point of views, and how they in-
teract with each other. Recent advances in AI provide
great opportunities to fortify security-critical applications. However, AI may also pose new
threats and challenges. To solve these challenges, my research innovates at the intersection
of AI, cybersecurity, and algorithmic game theory. My thesis includes three parts of research,
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spanning the theory and application parts of cybersecurity. I make contributions to both the
defensive and attacking sides of cybersecurity. Table 1.1 provides a brief overview of my
dissertation.
Table 1.1: Thesis outline, and publications contributing to each part.
Part I: Adversarial Attack and Defense of Deep Neural Networks (Chapter 3, 4, 5)
§ ShapeShifter: Robust Physical Adversarial Attack on Faster R-CNN Object Detector.
Shang-Tse Chen, Cory Cornelius, Jason Martin, Duen Horng Chau. In Proceedings of the European
Conference on Machine Learning and Principles and Practice of Knowledge Discovery in Databases
(ECML-PKDD), 2018.
§ Shield: Fast, Practical Defense and Vaccination for Deep Learning using JPEG Compression.
Nilaksh Das, Madhuri Shanbhogue, Shang-Tse Chen, Fred Hohman, Siwei Li, Li Chen, Michael
E. Kounavis, Duen Horng Chau. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGKDD Conference on Knowledge
Discovery and Data Mining (KDD), 2018.
§ Extracting Knowledge For Adversarial Detection and Defense in Deep Learning.
Scott Freitas, Shang-Tse Chen, Duen Horng Chau. In KDD 2019 Workshop on Learning and Mining
for Cybersecurity (LEMINCS), 2019.
Part II: Theoretically-Principled Defense via Game Theory and ML (Chapter 6, 7)
§ Diversified Strategies for Mitigating Adversarial Attacks in Multiagent Systems.
Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Shang-Tse Chen. In Proceedings of the International Conference
on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), 2018.
§ Communication Efficient Distributed Agnostic Boosting.
Shang-Tse Chen, Maria-Florina Balcan, Duen Horng Chau. In Proceedings of the International
Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics (AISTATS), 2016.
Part IV: Applying AI to Protect Enterprise and Society (Chapter 8, 9)
§ Predicting Cyber Threats with Virtual Security Products.
Shang-Tse Chen, Yufei Han, Duen Horng Chau, Christopher Gates, Michael Hart, Kevin Roundy. In
Proceedings of the Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC), 2017.
§ Firebird: Predicting Fire Risk and Prioritizing Fire Inspections in Atlanta.
Michael Madaio, Shang-Tse Chen, Oliver Haimson, Wenwen Zhang, Xiang Cheng, Matthew Hinds-
Aldrich, Duen Horng Chau, and Bistra Dilkina. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGKDD Conference on
Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (KDD), 2016.
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Figure 1.1: My work on physical adversarial attack discovers a serious vulnerability of
DNNs in a more realistic threat model where the attacker does not need to have control over
the internal computer vision system pipeline. The crafted physical adversarial objects (e.g.,
fake stop signs) can fool the state-of-the-art object detectors.
1.1.1 Part I: Adversarial Attack and Defense of Deep Neural Networks
Recent advances in deep neural networks (DNNs) have generated much optimism about
deploying AI in safety-critical applications, such as self-driving cars. However, it has
recently been discovered that given the ability to directly manipulate image pixels in the
digital input space, an adversary can easily generate imperceptible perturbations to fool a
DNN image classifier [2].
Although many adversarial attack algorithms have been proposed [3, 4], attacking
a real-world computer vision system is difficult, because attackers usually do not have
the ability to directly manipulate data inside such systems (Figure 1.1). To understand
the vulnerabilities of DNN-based computer vision systems, I collaborated with Intel and
developed ShapeShifter [5], the first targeted physical adversarial attack on the state-
of-the-art Faster R-CNN object detectors.
Attacking an object detector is more difficult than attacking an image classifier, as the
attack needs to mislead the classifications of multiple bounding boxes at different scales.
Extending a digital attack to the physical world adds another layer of difficulty; this requires
the perturbation to be sufficiently robust to survive real-world distortions due to different
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Figure 1.2: Snapshots of a drive-by test result. The real stop sign is correctly predicted by
Faster R-CNN with high confidence. The adversarial stop sign crafted by ShapeShifter is
detected as the target class “person.”
viewing distances and angles, lighting conditions, and camera limitations.
ShapeShifter generates adversarial stop signs that were consistently mis-detected by
Faster R-CNN as the target objects in real drive-by tests (Figure 1.2), posing a potential
threat to autonomous vehicles and other safety-critical computer vision systems. Our code
is open-sourced and the drive-by test videos are publicly available1. ShapeShifter was
highlighted as the state-of-the-art physical adversarial attack in the recent DARPA
program “Guaranteeing AI Robustness against Deception” (GARD) that focuses on
defending against such kind of attacks.
there have been many attempts to mitigate the threat.
Although there have been many attempts to mitigate adversarial attacks, completely
protecting a DNN model from adversarial attacks remains an open problem. Most methods
suffer from significant computational overhead or sacrifice accuracy on benign data. In
collaboration with Intel, we developed SHIELD [6], a practical defense leveraging stochastic
compression that removes adversarial perturbations. SHIELD makes multiple positive
impacts on Intel’s research and product development plans. Utilizing Intel’s Quick Sync
Video (QSV) technology with dedicated hardware for high-speed video processing, we
pave the way for real-time defense in safety-critical applications, such as autonomous
vehicles. Our research sparked insightful discussion at Intel about secure deep learning

















Figure 1.3: UnMask combats adversarial attacks (in red) by extracting building-block
knowledge (e.g., wheel) from the image (top, in green), and comparing them to expected
features of the classification (“Bird” at bottom) from the unprotected model. Low feature
overlap signals attack. UnMask rectifies misclassification using the image’s extracted
features. Our approach detects 92.9% of gray-box attacks (at 9.67% false positive rate) and
defends the model by correctly classifying up to 92.24% of adversarial images crafted by
the strongest attack, Projected Gradient Descent.
hardware accelerators. Our work will accelerate the industry’s emphasis on this important
topic. Both ShapeShifter and SHIELD have been incorporated into MLsploit [7], an open-
sourced ML evaluation and fortification framework designed for education and research.
These two works are also part of the Intel AI Academy course.
Shield is best suited for defending against imperceptible perturbations. To defend against
ShapeShifter-style attacks, we developed UnMask, a knowledge-based adversarial detection
and defense framework. UnMask protects models by verifying that an image’s predicted
class (e.g., “bird”) contains the expected building blocks (e.g., beak, wings, eyes). For
example, if an image is classified as “bird”, but the extracted building blocks are wheel,
seat and frame, the model may be under attack. When UnMask detects such attacks, it
can rectify the misclassification by re-classifying the image based on its extracted building
blocks (Figure 1.3).
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Figure 1.4: For ε ∈ [ 1
n
, 1], we define a probability distribution P to be ε-diversified if
P (i) ≤ 1
εn
for all i. A distribution can be diversified through a Bregman projection onto the
set of all ε-diversified distributions. A mixed strategy determined by a diversified distribution
is called a diversified (mixed) strategy. We explore properties of such diversified strategies
in both zero-sum and general-sum games as well as give algorithmic guarantees.
1.1.2 Part II: Theoretically-Principled Defense via Game Theory and ML
Defense resource allocation is a well-known and critical task in security. For example, a
company that wants to implement security controls with a limited budget needs to make
trade-offs in its deployment. I modeled this problem as a two-player zero-sum game between
a defender and an attacker, and introduced a novel solution concept called diversified mixed
strategy [8].
Inspired by the proverb “don’t put all your eggs in one basket,” my new solution concept
compels players to employ a “diversified” strategy that does not place too much weight
on any one action. I systematically studied properties of diversified strategies in multiple
games, and designed efficient algorithms that asymptotically achieve the optimum reward
within the family of diversified strategies. As a result, these algorithms limit the exposure to
adversarial or catastrophic events while still performing successfully in typical cases.
Leveraging the deep connection between game theory, online learning, and boosting, I
proved that the proposed diversified strategy concept can also be used to help learn robust
and efficient ML models. Specifically, I solved an open problem listed in [9] by developing
a boosting-based approach [10] in one of the hardest and most general settings in distributed
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Figure 1.5: Our distributed SmoothBoost algorithm. In each iteration, (1) each machine
samples its own data based on the current data distribution and sends it to the Center;
(2) Center trains an ML model by using some weak learning algorithm and broadcasts
the trained model to all the machines; (3) each machine updates its data distribution (i.e.,
example weights) based on received model, and performs distributed Bregman projection to
ensure the distribution is diversified. All the weak models are combined at the end to obtain
a strong model.
learning, where data is adversarially partitioned and distributed across multiple locations,
and can have arbitrary forms of noise (Figure 1.5). Succinctly, since boosting algorithms
tend to place too much weight on outliers, we can project the weights back to the set of
diversified distributions at the end of each boosting iteration. Our algorithm is simultaneously
noise tolerant, communication efficient, and computationally efficient. This is a significant
improvement over prior works that either were only communication efficient in noise-free
scenarios or were computationally prohibitive. Our distributed boosting algorithm is not
only theoretically principled but also demonstrates excellent accuracy on real-world datasets.
1.1.3 Part III: Applying AI to Protect Enterprise and Society
Part I and II provide theories, algorithms, and insight of the capabilities and limitations
of AI. But how can we put AI into practice and utilize it to provide solutions that solve
real enterprise security problems and create positive societal impacts? In collaboration
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Figure 1.6: Virtual Product helps our user Sam discover and understand cyber-threats, and
informs deployment decisions (e.g., add firewall?) through semi-supervised non-negative
matrix factorization on telemetry data from other users (with firewalls deployed). In the data
matrix, each row represents a machine-day, and each column a security event’s occurrences.
Missing events from undeployed products are shown as gray blocks. The last column
indicates whether the firewall has detected an incident. Our virtual firewall serves as a proxy
to the actual firewall and predicts the occurrence of security events and incidents Sam might
observe (dark green block) if he deploys the firewall.
with Symantec, we develop the patented Virtual Product framework, the first method to
predict security events and high-severity incidents that would have been identified by a
security product if it had been deployed. This is made possible by learning from the vast
amounts of telemetry data produced by the prevalent defense-in-depth approach to computer
security, wherein multiple security products are deployed alongside each other, producing
highly correlated alert data. By studying this data, we are able to accurately predict which
security alerts a product would have triggered in a particular situation, even though it was
not deployed. See Figure 1.6 for the overview of our approach.
Beyond cybersecurity, I further explored novel applications of AI in various domains that
create positive societal impacts. In collaboration with the Atlanta Fire Rescue Department,
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Figure 1.7: Firebird Framework Overview. By combining 8 datasets, Firebird identifies
new commercial properties for fire inspections. Its fire risk predictive models (SVM, random
forest) and interactive map help AFRD prioritize fire inspections and personnel allocation.
we developed the Firebird framework [11] (Figure 1.7) that helps municipal fire departments
identify and prioritize commercial property fire inspections. Firebird computes fire risk
scores for over 5, 000 buildings in Atlanta, and correctly predicts 71% of fires. Firebird won
the Best Student Paper Award Runner-up at KDD 2016 and was highlighted by National
Fire Protection Association as a best practice for using data to inform fire inspections.
1.2 Thesis Statement
Uniquely combining techniques from AI, cybersecurity, and algorithmic game theory,
enables the development of next-generation strong cybersecurity defenses, contributing to:
1. New theory that guide defense resources allocation to guard against surprise attacks
and catastrophic events;
2. New scalable and robust machine learning algorithms for a variety of threat models;




The goal of this thesis is to develop robust AI, and apply AI to solve security-critical and
high-stakes problems. Our research contributes in multiple facets of AI and cybersecurity.
New Algorithms:
• Our ShapeShifter attack is the first robust targeted attack that can fool a state-of-the-art
Faster R-CNN object detector. (Chapter 3)
• Our SHIELD defense combines image compression and randomization to protect
neural networks from adversarial attacks in real-time. (Chapter 4)
• Our distributed boosting algorithm is simultaneously noise tolerant, communication
efficient, and computationally efficient. (Chapter 7)
New Theories:
• We introduce a new online decision-making setting in game theory where players
are compelled to play “diversified” strategies, and give strong guarantees on both the
price of anarchy and the social welfare in this setting. (Chapter 6)
• Our distributed boosting algorithm requires exponentially less communication com-
plexity in the agnostic setting, solving an open problem in distributed learning [9].
(Chapter 7)
New Applications:
• Our Virtual Product framework (Chapter 8) is the first method to predict security
events and high-severity incidents identifiable by a security product as if it had been
deployed.
• Our Firebird framework (Chapter 9) computes fire risk scores for over 5, 000 buildings
in the city, with true positive rates of up to 71% in predicting fires.
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1.4 Impact
This thesis work has made significant impact to society:
• My thesis ideas in developing theoretically principled, practical techniques to defend
ML-based systems directly contributed to two funded competitive grant awards:
– Our theory-guided decision making framework (Chapter 6) laid the foundation of
the $1.2M medium NSF grant Understanding and Fortifying Machine Learning
Based Security Analytics (NSF CNS 1704701);
– ShapeShifter and SHIELD (Chapter 3) were two highlights of the $1.5M In-
tel “gift” grant for Intel Science & Technology Center for Adversary-Resilient
Security Analytics (ISTC-ARSA);
• Our ShapeShifter attack, developed with Intel, reveals serious vulnerabilities for
autonomous vehicles that use pure vision-based input, and was highlighted as the state-
of-the-art physical adversarial attack in the recent DARPA program “Guaranteeing
AI Robustness against Deception” (GARD). Our work appeared in the media 2 and
is open-sourced at https://github.com/shangtse/robust-physical-
attack.
• ShapeShifter and SHIELD have been integrated into the Intel AI Academy course.
• Our Virtual Product framework, developed with Symantec, has led to two patents.
• Our Firebird project is open-sourced3 and has been used by the Atlanta Fire Rescue
Department to prioritize fire inspections. Firebird won the Best Student Paper Award
Runner-up at KDD 2016 and was highlighted by National Fire Protection Association










Our survey focuses on two important areas of research related to this thesis: security of ML
and applications of ML in cybersecurity.
2.1 Security of Machine Learning
We briefly survey robust machine learning algorithms under various threat models.
Random Classification Noise. This is one of the most basic threat models studied in
classic learning theory [12]. In this setting, the training and testing data come from the same
fixed but unknown distribution. However, the label of each training example presented to the
learning algorithm is randomly flipped with probability 0 ≤ η < 1/2. Here we only consider
the binary classification case, and η is a parameter called the classification error rate. It is
known that if a training algorithm is in the family of Statistical query (SQ) learning, it can
be converted into a noise-tolerant algorithm in the random classification noise setting [13].
Malicious Noise. This setting is similar to the random classification noise model, where
η fraction of the training examples are changed by the adversary. The only difference is
that the adversary can arbitrarily change not only the label but also the features of the
training examples, making it a notoriously difficult setting [14]. It has been proved that it is
information-theoretically impossible to learn to accuracy 1− ε if η > ε/(1 + ε) [15]. Most
of the positive results require strong assumptions on the underlying data distribution or the
target function [16, 17]. For learning linear separators, the current state-of-the-art method is
developed by Awasthi et al. [18].
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Agnostic Learning. This is the setting that we will study in Chapter 7. In the two
aforementioned settings, with probability 1− η the examples are labeled by an unknown
target function from a known hypothesis set. For example, in the case of learning a linear
classifier, 1− η fraction of the examples are linearly separable, and the remaining examples
are contaminated by random classification noise or malicious noise, respectively. In contrast,
in the agnostic learning setting, we do not make any assumptions on the data distribution nor
the target function [19]. Since the target function may not be from the hypothesis set that
the training algorithm uses, the goal is to achieve accuracy as close to the best hypothesis in
our hypothesis set as possible.
Adversarial Machine Learning. This line of research was first studied by cybersecurity
researchers in applications such as spam filtering [20], network intrusion detection [21],
and malware detection [22]. Depending on the stage at which an attacker can manipulate
data, adversarial attacks can be further categorized into causative attacks and exploratory
attacks [23].
Causative attack, also known as poisoning attack, refers to the setting where the attacker
can manipulate the training data in order to decrease the accuracy on all or a subset of
the test examples. For example, the attacker can add backdoors to a maliciously trained
traffic sign image classifier such that it achieves high overall test accuracy but classifies stop
signs as speed limit signs when a special sticker is attached to the stop sign [24]. Similarly,
one can also train networks for face recognition and speech recognition that only perform
malicious behaviors when a specific “trojan” trigger is presented [25].
In an exploratory attack, also called an evasion attack, the attacker can only change the
test examples to fool a trained ML model. The success of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs)
in computer vision does not exempt them from this threat. It is possible to reduce the
accuracy of a state-of-the-art DNN image classifier to zero percent by adding imperceptible
adversarial perturbations [2, 26]. Many new attack algorithms have been proposed [27,
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28, 29, 30] and applied to other domains such as malware detection [31, 32], sentiment
analysis [33], and reinforcement learning [34, 35]. In Chapter 3, we demonstrate a new
attack in a slightly different setting called physical adversarial attacks. There have been
various attempts to mitigate the threat of adversarial attacks [4, 36], but immunizing a
DNN model to adversarial attacks remains an open problem and an active research area. In
Chapter 4 and 5, we propose new methods toward this goal.
2.2 Applications of Machine Learning to Cybersecurity
Malware Detection. Traditional anti-malware software depends heavily on signature-
based methods, which use static fingerprints of known malware to detect future malicious
files [37]. However, it can only identify “known” malware for which the signatures have
been created, and hence can be easily evaded by more advanced attacking techniques like
polymorphism and obfuscation [38, 39]. Many machine learning based approaches, using
various feature extraction techniques and learning algorithms, have thus been explored [40,
41, 42, 43]. Reputation-based approaches using graph mining is another popular line of
research [44, 45].
Intrusion Detection System. The main task of an intrusion detection system (IDS) is to
monitor a system’s vulnerability exploits and attacks. Similar to malware detection, early
work on IDS used signature-based approaches [46], which has limited ability to detect
zero-day attacks. Anomaly-based detection models the normal internet traffic or system
behavior using machine learning and data mining methods, and detects deviations from the
baseline behavior [47, 48].
Online Fraudulent Behavior Detection. AI helps many websites provide better services,
but it also creates new vulnerabilities. For example, an adversary can create fake accounts
and write fraudulent reviews to manipulate reputation-based recommendation system. Re-
searchers have used data mining and machine learning techniques to detect fake reviews [49,
15
50], internet bots [51], auction fraud [52], insider trading [53], and credit card fraud [54].
A good defense requires a combination of several techniques such as natural language
processing, graph mining, and time series analysis.
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Part I




Deep neural networks (DNNs), although very powerful, are known to be vulnerable to
adversarial attacks. In computer vision applications, such attack can be achieved by adding
carefully crafted but visually imperceptible perturbations to input images.
The threat of adversarial attack casts a shadow over deploying DNNs in security- and
safety-critical applications, such as self-driving cars. To better understand and fix the
vulnerabilities, there is a growing body of research on both designing stronger attacks and
making DNN models more robust. However, many existing works are “impractical” either
because they assume an unrealistic threat model, or the defense is too computationally
expensive to be used in practice. In Part I of my thesis, we present the following practical
attack and defenses.
• ShapeShifter (Chapter 3) is the first “physical” adversarial attack that fools the
state-of-the-art object detector.
• SHIELD (Chapter 4) is an efficient defense leveraging stochastic image compression




SHAPESHIFTER: ROBUST PHYSICAL ADVERSARIAL ATTACK ON OBJECT
DETECTOR
Given the ability to directly manipulate image pixels in the digital input space, an adversary
can easily generate imperceptible perturbations to fool a Deep Neural Network (DNN) image
classifier, as demonstrated in prior work. In this work, we propose ShapeShifter, an attack
that tackles the more challenging problem of crafting physical adversarial perturbations to
fool image-based object detectors like Faster R-CNN. Attacking an object detector is more
difficult than attacking an image classifier, as it needs to mislead the classification results in
multiple bounding boxes at different scales. Extending a digital attack to the physical world
adds another layer of difficulty, because it requires the perturbation to be robust enough to
survive real-world distortions like different viewing distances and angles, lighting conditions,
and camera limitations. We show that the Expectation over Transformation technique, which
was originally proposed to enhance the robustness of adversarial perturbations in image
classification, can be adapted to the object detection setting. ShapeShifter can generate
adversarially perturbed stop signs that Faster R-CNN consistently mis-detects as other
objects, posing a potential threat to autonomous vehicles and other safety-critical computer
vision systems.
3.1 Introduction
Adversarial examples are input instances that are intentionally designed to fool a machine
learning model into producing a chosen prediction. The success of DNNs in computer vision
does not exempt it from this threat. It is possible to bring the accuracy of a state-of-the-art
DNN image classifier down to zero percent by adding imperceptible adversarial perturba-
tions [2, 26]. The existence of adversarial examples not only reveals intriguing theoretical
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Figure 3.1: Illustration motivating the need of physical adversarial attack, because attackers
typically do not have full control over the computer vision system pipeline.
properties of DNN, but also raises serious practical concerns about their deployment in
security- and safety-critical systems. Autonomous vehicle is an example application that
cannot be fully trusted until DNNs are robust to adversarial attacks. The need to understand
robustness of DNNs attracts tremendous interest among machine learning, computer vision,
and security researchers.
Although many adversarial attack algorithms have been proposed, using them to attack
a real-world computer vision systems is difficult. First of all, many of these existing attack
algorithms focus on the image classification task, yet for many real-world use cases there
will be more than one object in an image. Object detection, which recognizes and localizes
multiple objects in an image, is a more suitable model for many vision-based real-world use
cases. Attacking an object detector is more difficult than attacking an image classifier, as it
needs to mislead the classification results in multiple bounding boxes at different scales [55].
Further difficulty comes from the fact that a DNN is usually only one component in
a complete computer vision system pipeline. For many applications, attackers do not
have the ability to directly manipulate data inside the pipeline. Instead, they can only
manipulate the things outside of the system, i.e., those things in the physical environment.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the intuition behind physical adversarial attacks. To be successful
attacks, physical adversarial attacks must be robust enough to survive real-world distortions
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like different viewing distances and angles, lighting conditions, and camera limitations.
Prior work can either attack object detectors digitally [56], or attack image classifiers
physically [3, 57, 58]. However, existing attempts to physically attack object detectors
remain unsatisfactory. The perturbed stop sign shown in [59] cannot be detected by the
Faster R-CNN object detector [60]. However, the perturbation is very noticeable. The
authors tested it against a background with poor texture contrast, making the perturbed stop
sign difficult to see even by humans. A concurrent work [61] claims to be able to generate
some adversarial stickers that, when attached to a stop sign, can fool the YOLO object
detector [62] and Faster R-CNN.
In this work, we propose ShapeShifter, the first robust targeted attack that can fool a state-
of-the-art Faster R-CNN object detector. To make the attack robust, we adopt the Expectation
over Transformation technique [63, 64], and adapt it from the image classification task to the
object detection task. As a case study, we created adversarial stop signs that are mis-detected
by Faster R-CNN in real drive-by tests. Our contributions are summarized below.
3.1.1 Our Contributions
• To the best of knowledge, our work presents the first reproducible and robust targeted
attack against Faster R-CNN [55]. We have open-sourced our code on GitHub1.
• We show that the Expectation over Transformation technique [63], originally pro-
posed for image classification, can be adapted to the object detection task and can
significantly enhance the robustness of the resulting perturbation.
• By carefully studying the Faster R-CNN object detector algorithm, we overcome non-
differentiable components in the model, and successfully perform optimization-based
attacks using gradient descent and backpropogation.
• We generate perturbed stop signs that can consistently fool Faster R-CNN in real
1https://github.com/shangtse/robust-physical-attack
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drive-by tests (videos available on the GitHub repository), demonstrating for the need
to improve and fortify vision-based object detectors.
3.2 Background
This section provides background information of adversarial attacks and briefly describes
the Faster R-CNN object detector that we attack in this work.
3.2.1 Adversarial Attacks
Given a trained machine learning model C and a benign instance x ∈ X that is correctly
classified by C, the goal of the untargeted adversarial attack is to find another instance
x′ ∈ X , such that C(x′) 6= C(x) and d(x, x′) ≤ ε for some distance metric d(·, ·) and
perturbation budget ε > 0. For targeted attacks, we further require C(x′) = y′ where
y′ 6= C(x) is the target class. Common distance metrics d(·, ·) in the computer vision
domain are `2 distance d(x, x′) = ||x− x′||22 and `∞ distance d(x, x′) = ||x− x′||∞.
The work of [2] was the first to discover the existence of adversarial examples for DNNs.
Several subsequent works have improved the computational cost of creating adversarial
examples and made the perturbations highly imperceptible to humans [27, 28]. Many
adversarial attack algorithms assume that the model is differentiable, and use the gradient of
the model to change the input towards the desired model output [26]. Sharif et al. [57] first
demonstrated a physically realizable attack to fool a face recognition model by wearing an
adversarially crafted pair of glasses.
3.2.2 Faster R-CNN
Faster R-CNN [60] is a state-of-the-art general object detector. It adopts a two-stage
detection strategy. In the first stage, a region proposal network generates several class-
agnostic bounding boxes, called region proposals, that may contain objects. In the second
stage, a classifier and a regressor output a classification result and refined bounding box
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coordinate for each region proposal, respectively. The computation cost is reduced by
sharing the convolutional layers between the two stages. Faster R-CNN is difficult to attack,
because a single object can be covered by multiple region proposals of different sizes and
aspect ratios, and one needs to mislead the classification results in all overlapping region
proposals to fool the detection.
3.3 Threat Model
Existing methods that generate adversarial examples typically yield imperceptible pertur-
bations that fool a given machine learning model. Our work, following [57], generates
perturbations that are perceptible but constrained such that a human would not be easily
fooled by such a perturbation. We examine this kind of perturbation in the context of object
detection. We chose this use case because of object detector’s possible uses in security-
related and safety-related settings (e.g., autonomous vehicles). For example, attacks on
traffic sign recognition could cause a car to miss a stop sign or travel faster than legally
allowed.
We assume the adversary has white-box level access to the machine learning model. This
means the adversary has access to the model structure and weights such that the adversary
can compute both outputs (i.e., the forward pass) and gradients (i.e., the backward pass). It
also means that the adversary does not have to construct a perturbation in real-time. Rather,
the adversary can study the model and craft an attack for that model using methods like
Carlini-Wagner attack [26]. This kind of adversary is distinguished from one with black-box
level of access which is defined as having no access to the model architecture or weights.
While our choice of adversary is the most knowledgeable one, existing research has shown
it is possible to construct imperceptible perturbations without white-box level access [65].
Whether our method is capable of generating perceptible perturbations with only black-box
access remains an open question. Results from Liu et al. [66] suggest that iterative attacks
(like ours) tend not to transfer well to other models.
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Unlike previous work, we restrict the adversary such that they cannot manipulate the
digital values of pixels gathered by the camera used to sense the world. This is an important
distinction from existing imperceptible perturbation methods. Because those methods create
imperceptible perturbations, there is a high likelihood such imperceptible perturbations
would not fool our use cases when physically realized. That is, when printed and then
presented to the systems in our use cases, those imperceptible perturbations would have to
survive both the printing process and camera sensing pipeline in order to fool the system.
This is not an insurmountable task as Kurakin et al. [3] have constructed such imperceptible
yet physically realizable adversarial perturbations for image classification systems.
Finally, we also restrict our adversary by limiting the shape of the perturbation the
adversary can generate. This is important distinction for our use cases because one could
easily craft an oddly-shaped “stop sign” that does not exist in the real world. We also do not
give the adversary the latitude of modifying all pixels in an image like Kurakin et al. [3],
but rather restrict them to certain pixels that we believe are physically realistic, and whose
change is inconspicuous.
3.4 Attack Method
Our attack method, ShapeShifter, is inspired by the iterative, change-of-variable attack
described in [26] and the Expectation over Transformation technique [63, 64]. Both methods
were originally proposed for the task of image classification. We describe these two methods
in the image classification setting before showing how to extend them to attack the Faster
R-CNN object detector.
3.4.1 Attacking an Image Classifier
Let F : [−1, 1]h×w×3 → RK be an image classifier that takes an image of height h and
width w as input, and outputs a probability distribution over K classes. The goal of the
attacker is to create an image x′ that looks like an object x of class y, but will be classified
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as another target class y′.
Change-of-variable Attack
Denote LF (x, y) = L(F (x), y) as the loss function that calculates the distance between the
model output F (x) and the target label y. Given an original input image x and a target class




′), y′) + c · || tanh(x′)− x||22. (3.1)
The use of tanh ensures that each pixel is between [−1, 1]. The constant c controls the
similarity between the modified object x′ and the original image x. In practice, c can be
determined by binary search [26].
Expectation over Transformation
The Expectation over Transformation [63, 64] idea is simple: adding random distortions
in each iteration of the optimization makes the resulting perturbation more robust to these
distortions. Given a transformation t like translation, rotation, or scaling, Mt(xb, xo) is an
operation that transforms an object image xo using t and then overlays it onto a background
image xb. Mt(xb, xo) can also include a masking operation that only keeps a certain area of
xo. Masking is necessary when one wants to restrict the shape of the perturbation. After
incorporating the random distortions, equation (3.1) becomes
arg min
x′∈Rh×w×3
Ex∼X,t∼T [LF (Mt(x, tanh(x′)), y′)] + c · || tanh(x′)− xo||22, (3.2)
where X is the training set of background images. When the model F is differentiable,
this optimization problem can be solved by gradient descent and back-propagation. The
expectation can be approximated by the empirical mean.
25
3.4.2 Extension to Attacking Faster R-CNN
An object detector F : [−1, 1]h×w×3 → (RN×K ,RN×4) takes an image as input and outputs
N detected objects. Each detection includes a probability distribution over K pre-defined
classification classes as well as the location of the detected object, represented by its 4
coordinates. Note that it is possible for an object detector to output more or fewer detected
objects, depending on the input image, but for simplicity we select top-N detected objects
ranked by confidence.
As described in subsection 3.2.2, Faster R-CNN adopts a 2-stage approach. The re-
gion proposal network in the first stage outputs several region proposals, and the sec-
ond stage classifier performs classification within each of the region proposals. Let
rpn(x) = {r1, . . . , rm}, where each ri is a region proposal represented as its four co-
ordinates, and let xr be a sub-image covered by region r. Denote LFi(x, y) = L(F (xri), y),
i.e., the loss of the classification in the i-th region proposal. We can simultaneously attack










+ c · || tanh(x′)− xo||22, (3.3)
where we abuse the notation Mt(x′) = Mt(x, tanh(x′)) for simplicity. However, for
computational reasons, Faster R-CNN prunes the region proposals by using non-maximum
suppression [60]. The pruning operations are usually non-differentiable, making it hard to
optimize equation (3.3) end to end. Therefore, we approximately solve this optimization
problem by first running a forward pass of the region proposal network, and then fixing
the pruned region proposals as constants to the second stage classification problem in each
iteration. We empirically find this approximation sufficient to find a good solution.
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3.5 Evaluation
We evaluate our method by fooling a pre-trained Faster R-CNN model with Inception-
v2 [67] convolutional feature extraction component. The model was trained on the Microsoft
Common Objects in Context (MS-COCO) dataset [68] and is publicly available in the
Tensorflow Object Detection API [69] model zoo repository2.
The MS-COCO dataset contains 80 general object classes ranging from people and
animals, to trucks and cars, and other common objects. Although our method can potentially
be used to attack any class, we chose to focus on attacking the stop sign class due to its
importance and relevance to self-driving cars, where a vision-based object detector is used to
help make driving decisions. An additional benefit of choosing the stop sign is its flat shape
that can easily be printed on paper. Other classes, like dogs, are less likely to be perceived
as real objects by human when printed on a paper. While 3D printing adversarial examples
for image recognition is possible [63], we leave 3D-printed adversarial examples against
object detectors as future work.
3.5.1 Digitally Perturbed Stop Sign
We generate adversarial stop signs by performing the optimization process described in
Equation 3.3. The hyperparameter c is crucial in determining the perturbation strength. A
smaller value of c will result in a more conspicuous perturbation, but the perturbation will
also be more robust to real-world distortions when we do the physical attack later.
However, it is hard to choose an appropriate c when naively using the `2 distance to a
real stop sign as regularization. To obtain a robust enough perturbation, a very small c needs
to be used, which has the consequence of creating stop signs that are difficult for humans
to recognize. The `2 distance is not a perfect metric for human perception, which tends




we only allowed the perturbation to change the red part of the stop sign, while leaving the
white text intact. This allows us to generate larger and more robust perturbation, while
providing enough contrast between the lettering and red parts so that a human can recognize
the perturbation as a stop sign. The adversarial stop sign generated in [59] does not consider
this and is visually more conspicuous. Automating this procedure for other objects we leave
as future work.
We performed two targeted attacks and one untargeted attack. We choose person
and sports ball as the two target classes because they are relatively similar in size and
shape to stop signs. Our method allows attackers to use any target classes, however the
perturbation needs to fool the object detector. For some target classes, this may mean
creating perturbations so large in deviation that they may appear radically different from
the victim class. We also noticed that some classes are easier to be detected at small scales,
such as kite, while other classes (e.g., truck) could not be detected when the object was too
small. This may be an artifact of the MS-COCO dataset that the object detector was trained
on. Nevertheless, the attacker has a choice in target class and, for many applications, can
find the target class that best fools the object detector according to their means.
For each attack, we generated a high confidence perturbation and a low confidence
perturbation. The high confidence perturbations were generated using a smaller value of c,
thus making them more conspicuous but also more robust. Depending upon the target class,
it may be difficult to generate an effective perturbation. We manually chose c for each target
class so that the digital attack achieves high success rate while keeping the perturbation not
too conspicuous, i.e., we tried to keep the color as red as possible. We used c = 0.002 for
the high confidence perturbations and c = 0.005 for the low confidence perturbations in the
“sports ball” targeted attack and the untargeted attack. We used c = 0.005 and c = 0.01 for
the high and low confidence perturbations in the “person” targeted attack, respectively. The
6 perturbations we created are shown in Figure 3.2.
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(a) Person (low) (b) Sports ball (low) (c) Untargeted (low)
(d) Person (high) (e) Sports ball (high) (f) Untargeted (high)
Figure 3.2: Digital perturbations we created using our method. Low confidence perturbations
on the top and high confidence perturbations on the bottom.
3.5.2 Physical Attack
We performed physical attacks on the object detector by printing out the perturbed stop
signs shown in Figure 3.2. We then took photos from a variety of distances and angles in
a controlled indoor setting. We also conducted drive-by tests by recording videos from a
moving vehicle that approached the signs from a distance. The lightning conditions varied
from recording to recording due to the weather at the time.
Equipment
We used a Canon Pixma Pro-100 photo printer to print out signs with high-confidence
perturbations, and an HP DesignJet to print out those with low-confidence perturbations3.
For static images, we used a Canon EOS Rebel T7i DSLR camera, equipped with a EF-S
18-55mm IS STM lens. The videos in our drive-by tests were shot using an iPhone 8 Plus
3We used two printers to speed up our sign production, since a sign can take more than 30 minutes to
produce.
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Figure 3.3: Indoor experiment setup. We take photos of the printed adversarial sign, from
multiple angles (0◦, 15◦, 30◦, 45◦, 60◦, from the sign’s tangent), and distances (5’ to 40’).
The camera locations are indicated by the red dots, and the camera always points at the sign.
mounted on the windshield of a car.
Indoor Experiments
Following the experimental setup of [58], we took photos of the printed adversarial stop
sign, at a variety of distances (5’ to 40’) and angles (0◦, 15◦, 30◦, 45◦, 60◦, from the sign’s
tangent). This setup is depicted in Figure 3.3 where camera locations are indicated by red
dots. The camera always pointed at the sign. We chose these distance-angle combinations
to mimic a vehicle’s points of view as it would approach the sign [59]. Table 3.1 and
Table 3.2 summarize the results for our high-confidence and low-confidence perturbations,
respectively. For each distance-angle combination, we show the detected class and the
detection’s confidence score. If more than one bounding box was detected, we report the
highest-scoring one. Confidence values lower than 30% were considered undetected; we
decided to use the threshold of 30%, instead of the default 50% in the Tensorflow Object
Detection API [69], to impose a stricter requirement on ourselves (the “attacker”). Since
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Table 3.1: Our high-confidence perturbations succeed at attacking at a variety of distances
and angles. For each distance-angle combination, we show the detected class and the
confidence score. If more than one bounding boxes are detected, we report the highest-
scoring one. Confidence values lower than 30% is considered undetected.
Distance Angle person (Conf.) sports ball (Conf.) untargeted (Conf.)
5’ 0◦ person (.77) sports ball (.61) clock (.35)
5’ 15◦ person (.91) cake (.73) clock (.41)
5’ 30◦ person (.93) cake (.66) cake (.39)
5’ 45◦ person (.69) cake (.61) stop sign (.62)
5’ 60◦ stop sign (.93) stop sign (.70) stop sign (.88)
10’ 0◦ person (.55) cake (.34) clock (.99)
10’ 15◦ person (.63) cake (.33) clock (.99)
10’ 30◦ person (.51) cake (.55) clock (.99)
15’ 0◦ undetected — cake (.49) clock (.99)
15’ 15◦ person (.57) cake (.53) clock (.99)
20’ 0◦ person (.49) sports ball (.98) clock (.99)
20’ 15◦ person (.41) sports ball (.96) clock (.99)
25’ 0◦ person (.47) sports ball (.99) stop sign (.91)
30’ 0◦ person (.49) sports ball (.92) undetected —
40’ 0◦ person (.56) sports ball (.30) stop sign (.30)
Targeted success rate 87% 40% N/A
Untargeted success rate 93% 93% 73%
an object can be detected as a stop sign and the target class simultaneously, we consider
our attack to be successful only when the confidence score of the target class is the highest
among all of the detected classes.
Table 3.1 shows that our high-confidence perturbations achieve a high attack success
rate at a variety of distances and angles. For example, we achieved a targeted success rate
87% in misleading the object detector into detecting the stop sign as a person, and an even
higher untargeted success rate of 93% when our attack goal is to cause the detector to either
fail to detect the stop sign (e.g., at 15’ 0◦) or to detect it as a class that is not a stop sign. The
sports ball targeted attack has a lower targeted success rate but achieves the same untargeted
success rate. Our untargeted attack consistently misleads the detection into the clock class
in medium distances, but is less robust for longer distances. Overall, the perturbation is less
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Table 3.2: As expected, low-confidence perturbations achieve lower success rates.
Distance Angle person (Conf.) sports ball (Conf.) untargeted (Conf.)
5’ 0◦ stop sign (.87) cake (.90) cake (.41)
5’ 15◦ stop sign (.63) cake (.93) cake (.34)
5’ 30◦ person (.83) cake (.84) stop sign (.48)
5’ 45◦ stop sign (.97) stop sign (.94) stop sign (.82)
5’ 60◦ stop sign (.99) stop sign (.99) stop sign (.89)
10’ 0◦ stop sign (.83) stop sign (.99) undetected —
10’ 15◦ stop sign (.79) stop sign (.94) undetected —
10’ 30◦ stop sign (.60) stop sign (.98) stop sign (.78)
15’ 0◦ stop sign (.52) stop sign (.94) stop sign (.31)
15’ 15◦ stop sign (.33) stop sign (.93) undetected —
20’ 0◦ stop sign (.42) sports ball (.73) undetected —
20’ 15◦ person (.51) sports ball (.83) cell phone (.62)
25’ 0◦ stop sign (.94) sports ball (.87) undetected —
30’ 0◦ stop sign (.94) sports ball (.95) stop sign (.79)
40’ 0◦ stop sign (.95) undetected — stop sign (.52)
Targeted success rate 13% 27% N/A
Untargeted success rate 13% 53% 53%
robust to very high viewing angle (60◦ from the sign’s tangent), because we did not simulate
this high viewing angle distortion in the optimization.
The low-confidence perturbations (Table 3.2), as expected, achieve a much lower attack
success rate, which informed our use of higher-confidence perturbations when we conducted
the more challenging drive-by tests. Table 3.3 shows some high-confidence perturbations
from our indoor experiments.
Drive-by Tests
We performed drive-by tests at a parking lot so as not to disrupt other vehicles with our
stop signs. We used a real stop sign as a control and put our printed, perturbed stop sign by
its side. Starting from about 200 feet away, we slowly drove (between 5 mph to 15 mph)
towards the signs while simultaneously recording video from the vehicle’s dashboard at
4K resolution and 24 FPS using an iPhone 8 Plus. We extracted all video frames, and for
32
Table 3.3: Sample high-confidence perturbations from indoor experiments. For complete
experiment results, please refer to Table 3.1.





each frame, we obtained the detection results from Faster R-CNN object detection model.
Because our low confidence attacks showed relatively little robustness indoors, we only
include the results from our high-confidence attack. Similar to our indoor experiments, we
only consider detections that had a confidence score of at least 30%.
In Figure 3.4, we show sample video frames (rectangular images) to show the size of the
signs relative to the full video frame; we also show zoomed-in views (square images) that
more clearly show the Faster R-CNN detection results.
The person-perturbation in Figure 3.4a drive-by totaled 405 frames. The real stop sign
in the video was correctly detected in every frame with high confidence. On the other hand,
the perturbed stop sign was only correctly detected once, while 190 of the frames identified
the perturbed stop sign as a person with medium confidence. For the rest of the 214 frames
the object detector failed to detect anything around the perturbed stop sign.
The video we took with the sports-ball-perturbation shown in Figure 3.4b had 445
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frames. The real stop sign was correctly identified all of the time, while the perturbed
stop sign was never detected as a stop sign. As the vehicle (video camera) moved closer
to the perturbed stop sign, 160 of the frames were detected as a sports ball with medium
confidence. One frame was detected as apple and sports ball and the remaining 284 frames
had no detection around the perturbed stop sign.
Finally, the video of the untargeted perturbation (Figure 3.4c) totaled 367 frames. While
the unperturbed stop sign was correctly detected all of the time, the perturbed stop sign was
detected as bird 6 times and never detected in the remaining 361 frames.
Exploring Black-box Transferability
We also sought to understand how well our high-confidence perturbations could fool other
object detection models. For image recognition, it is known that high-confidence targeted
attacks fail to transfer to other models [66].
To this end, we fed our high-confidence perturbations into 8 other MS-COCO-trained
models from the Tensorflow detection model zoo4. Table 3.4 shows how well our pertur-
bation generated from the Faster R-CNN Inception-V2 transfer to other models. To better
understand transferability, we examined the worse case. That is, if a model successfully
detects a stop sign in the image, we say the perturbation has failed to transfer or attack that
model. We report the number of images (of the 15 angle-distance images in our indoor
experiments) where a model successfully detected a stop sign with at least 30% confidence.
We also report the maximum confidence of all of those detected stop sign.
Table 3.4 shows the lack of transferability of our generated perturbations. The untargeted
perturbation fails to transfer most of the time, followed by the sports ball perturbation, and
finally the person perturbation. The models most susceptible to transferability were the
Faster R-CNN Inception-ResNet-V2 model, followed by the SSD MobileNet-V2 model.




Figure 3.4: Snapshots of the drive-by test results. In (a), the person perturbation was
detected 47% of the frames as a person and only once as a stop sign. The perturbation in
(b) was detected 36% of the time as a sports ball and never as a stop sign. The untargeted
perturbation in (c) was detected as bird 6 times and never detected as a stop sign or anything
else for the remaining frames.
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Table 3.4: Black-box transferability of our 3 perturbations. We report the number of images
(of the 15 angle-distance images) that failed to transfer to the specified model. We consider
the detection of any stop sign a “failure to transfer.” Our perturbations fail to transfer for
most models, most likely due to the iterative nature of our attack.
Model person (conf.) sports ball (conf.) untargeted (conf.)
Faster R-CNN Inception-V2 3 (.93) 1 (.70) 5 (0.91)
SSD MobileNet-V2 2 (.69) 8 (.96) 15 (1.00)
SSD Inception-V2 11 (1.00) 14 (.99) 15 (1.00)
R-FCN ResNet-101 4 (.82) 10 (.85) 15 (1.00)
Faster R-CNN ResNet-50 13 (.00) 15 (1.00) 15 (1.00)
Faster R-CNN ResNet-101 15 (.99) 13 (.97) 15 (1.00)
Faster R-CNN Inc-Res-V2 1 (.70) 0 (.00) 12 (1.00)
Faster R-CNN NASNet 14 (1.00) 15 (1.00) 15 (1.00)
that our attacks fail to transfer as well. We leave the thorough exploration of transferability
as future work.
3.6 Discussion & Future Work
Figure 3.5: Example stop signs from the MS-COCO dataset. Stop signs can vary by
language, by degree of occlusion by stickers or modification by graffiti, or just elements of
the weather. Each stop sign in the images is correctly detected by the object detector with
high confidence (99%, 99%, 99%, and 64%, respectively).
There is considerable variation in the physical world that real systems will have to
deal with. Figure 3.5 shows a curated set of non-standard examples of stop signs from the
MS-COCO dataset5. The examples show stop signs in a different language, or that have
graffiti or stickers applied to them, or that have been occluded by the elements. In each of





these cases, it is very unlikely a human would misinterpret the sign as anything else but
a stop sign. They each have the characteristic octagonal shape and are predominantly red
in color. Yet, against our stop signs with similar perturbations, the object detector sees
something else.
Unlike previous work on adversarial examples for image recognition, our adversarial
perturbations are overt. They, like the examples in Figure 3.5, exhibit large deviations
from the standard stop sign. A human would probably notice these large deviations, and a
trained human might even guess they were constructed to be adversarial. But they would
not be fooled by our perturbations. However an automated-system using an off-the-shelf
object detector would be fooled, as our results show. Our perturbation shown in Figure 3.2e
does look like a baseball or tennis ball has been painted on the upper right hand corner.
Figure 3.4b shows how the object detector detects this part of the image as a sports ball with
high confidence. This might seem unfair, but attackers have much more latitude to change
the environment when these kind of models are deployed in automated systems. Even in
non-automated systems, a human might not think anything of Figure 3.2d because it does
not exhibit any recognizable person-like features.
Attackers might also generate perturbations without restricting the shape and color, and
attach them to some arbitrary objects, like a street light or a trash bin. An untrained eye
might see these perturbations as some kind of artwork, but the autonomous system might
see something completely different. This attack, as described in [70], could be extended to
object detectors using our method.
Defending against these adversarial examples has proven difficult. Many defenses fall
prey to the so-called “gradient masking” or “gradient obfuscating” problem [71]. The most
promising defense, adversarial training, has yet to scale up to models with good performance
on the ImageNet dataset. Whether adversarial training can mitigate our style of overt,
large-deviation (e.g., large `p distance) perturbations is left as future work.
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3.7 Conclusion
We show that a state-of-the-art Faster R-CNN object detector, while previously considered
more robust to physical adversarial attacks, can actually be attacked with high confidence.
Our work demonstrates vulnerability in MS-COCO-learned object detectors and posits that
security- and safety-critical systems need to account for the potential threat of adversarial
inputs to object detection systems.
Many real-world systems probably do not use an off-the-shelf pre-trained object detector
as we do in our work. Why would a system with safety or security implications care to
detecting sports balls? Most probably do not. Although it remains to be shown whether
our style of attack can be applied to safety or security critical systems that leverage object
detectors, our attack provides the means to test for this new class of vulnerability.
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CHAPTER 4
SHIELD: FAST, PRACTICAL DEFENSE AND VACCINATION FOR DEEP
LEARNING USING JPEG COMPRESSION
In the previous chapter, we showed that deep neural networks (DNNs) are highly vulnerable
to adversarially generated images. This underscores the urgent need for practical defense
techniques that can be readily deployed to combat attacks in real-time. Observing that many
attack strategies aim to perturb image pixels in ways that are visually imperceptible, we
use JPEG compression at the core of our proposed SHIELD defense framework, utilizing
its capability to effectively “compress away” such pixel manipulation. To immunize a
DNN model from artifacts introduced by compression, SHIELD “vaccinates” the model by
retraining it with compressed images, where different compression levels are applied to
generate multiple vaccinated models that are ultimately used together in an ensemble defense.
On top of that, SHIELD adds an additional layer of protection by employing randomization
at test time that compresses different regions of an image using random compression levels,
making it harder for an adversary to estimate the transformation performed. This novel
combination of vaccination, ensembling, and randomization makes SHIELD a fortified multi-
pronged defense. We conducted extensive, large-scale experiments using the ImageNet
dataset, and show that our approaches eliminate up to 98% of gray-box attacks delivered
by strong adversarial techniques such as Carlini-Wagner’s L2 attack and DeepFool. Our
approaches are fast and work without requiring knowledge about the model.
4.1 Introduction
In computer vision applications, an attacker can add visually imperceptible perturbations to
an image and mislead a DNN model into making arbitrary predictions. When the attacker
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Figure 4.1: SHIELD Framework Overview. SHIELD combats adversarial images (in red)
by removing perturbation in real-time using Stochastic Local Quantization (SLQ) and
an ensemble of vaccinated models which are robust to the compression transformation.
Our approach eliminates up to 98% of gray-box attacks delivered by strong adversarial
techniques such as Carlini-Wagner’s L2 attack and DeepFool.
the gradient information of the model. This guides the adversary toward vulnerable regions
of the input space that would most drastically affect the model output [27, 30]. But even
in a black-box scenario, where the attacker does not know the exact network architecture,
one can use a substitute model to craft adversarial perturbations that are transferable to the
target model [65].
To better understand and fix these vulnerabilities, there is a growing body of research
on defending against various attacks and making DNN models more robust [72, 73, 74].
However, the progress of defense research lags behind the attack side. Moreover, research
on defenses rarely focuses on practicality and scalability, both essential for real-world
deployment. For example, total variation denoising and image quilting are image prepro-
cessing techniques that have potential in mitigating adversarial perturbations [75], but they
incur significant computational overhead, calling into question whether they can be used in
practical applications, which often require a fast, real-time defense [58, 76].
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4.1.1 Our Contributions and Impact
1. Compression as Fast, Practical, Effective Defense. We leverage the idea that compres-
sion — a central concept that underpins numerous successful data mining techniques —
can offer a powerful, scalable, practical, and real-time protection for deep learning models
against adversarial image perturbations. Motivated by the observation that many attack
strategies aim to perturb images in ways that are visually imperceptible to the naked eye,
we show that systematic adaptation of the widely available JPEG compression technique
can effectively compress away such pixel “noise”, especially since JPEG was designed to
remove image details that are imperceptible to humans. (Section 4.3.1)
2. SHIELD: Multifaceted Defense Framework. Building on our principal idea of com-
pression, we contribute the novel SHIELD defense framework that combines randomization,
vaccination and ensembling into a fortified multi-pronged defense:
1. We exploit JPEG’s flexibility in supporting varying compression levels to develop
strong ensemble models that span the spectrum of compression levels;
2. We “vaccinate” a model by training it on compressed images, increasing its robustness
towards compression transformation for both adversarial and benign images;
3. SHIELD employs stochastic quantization that compresses different regions of an image
using randomly sampled compression levels, making it harder for the adversary to
estimate the transformation performed.
SHIELD does not require any change in the model architecture, and can recover a significant
amount of model accuracy lost to adversarial instances, with little effect on the accuracy for
benign inputs. SHIELD stands for Secure Heterogeneous Image Ensemble with Localized
Denoising. (Sections 4.3.2 & 4.3.3)
3. Extensive Evaluation Against Major Attacks. We perform extensive experiments using
the full ImageNet benchmark dataset with 50K images, demonstrating that our approach
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is fast, effective and scalable. Our approaches eliminate up to 98% of gray-box attacks
delivered by some of the most recent, strongest attacks, such as Carlini-Wagner’s L2 attack
[26] and DeepFool [28]. (Section 4.4)
4. Impact to Intel and Beyond. This work is making multiple positive impacts on Intel’s
research and product development plans. Introduced with the Sandy Bridge CPU microar-
chitecture, Intel’s Quick Sync Video (QSV) technology dedicates a hardware core for
high-speed video processing, performs JPEG compression up to 24X faster than TensorFlow
implementations, paving the way for real-time defense in safety-critical applications, such
as autonomous vehicles. This research has sparked insightful discussion among research
and development teams at Intel, on the priority of secure deep learning that necessitates
tight integration of practical defense strategies, software platforms and hardware accel-
erators. We believe our work will accelerate the industry’s emphasis on this important
topic. To ensure reproducibility of our results, we have open-sourced our code on GitHub
(https://github.com/poloclub/jpeg-defense). (Section 4.5)
4.2 Background: Adversarial Attacks
In this section, we describe the major, well-studied attacks in the literature, against which
we will evaluate our approach.
Carlini-Wagner’s L2 (CW-L2) [26] is an optimization-based attack that adds a relaxation
term to the perturbation minimization problem based on a differentiable surrogate of the
model. They pose the optimization as minimizing:
‖x− x′‖2 + λmax
(
− κ, Z(x′)k −max{Z(x′)k′ : k′ 6= k}
)
(4.1)
where κ controls the confidence with which an image is misclassified by the DNN, and Z(·)
is the output from the logit layer (i.e., last layer before the softmax function is applied for
prediction) of C.
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DeepFool (DF) [28] constructs an adversarial instance under an L2 constraint by assuming
the decision boundary to be hyperplanar. The authors leverage this simplification to compute
a minimal adversarial perturbation that results in a sample that is close to the original
instance but orthogonally cuts across the nearest decision boundary. In this respect, DF is
an untargeted attack. Since the underlying assumption about the decision boundary being
completely linear in higher dimensions is an oversimplification of the actual case, DF keeps
reiterating until a true adversarial instance is found. The resulting perturbations are harder
for humans to detect compared to perturbations introduced by other attacks.
Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method (I-FGSM) [3] is the iterative version of the Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [27], which is a fast algorithm that computes perturbations
subject to an L∞ constraint. FGSM simply takes the sign of the gradient of loss function J
w.r.t. the input x,
x′ = x+ ε · sign(∇Jx(θ, x, y)) (4.2)
where θ is the set of parameters of the model and y is the true label of the instance. The
parameter ε controls the magnitude of per-pixel perturbation. I-FGSM iteratively applies
FGSM in each iteration i after clipping the values appropriately at each step:
x(i) = x(i−1) + ε · sign(∇Jx(i−1)(θ, x(i−1), y)) (4.3)
4.3 Proposed Method: Compression as Defense
We present our compression-based approach for combating adversarial attacks. In Section
4.3.1, we begin by describing the technical reasons why compression can remove pertur-
bations. As compression modifies the distribution of the input space by introducing some
artifacts, in Section 4.3.2, we propose to “vaccinate” the model by training it with com-
pressed images. This increases its robustness towards the compression transformation for
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both adversarial and benign images. Finally, in Section 4.3.3, we present our multifaceted
SHIELD defense framework that combines random quantization, vaccination and ensembling
into a fortified multi-pronged defense.
4.3.1 Preprocessing Images using Compression
Our main idea on rectifying the prediction of a trained model C, with respect to a perturbed
input x′, is to apply a preprocessing operation g(·) that brings back x′ closer to the original
benign instance x, which implicitly aims to make C(g(x′)) = C(x). Constructing such a
g(·) is application dependent. For the image classification problem, we show that JPEG
compression is a powerful preprocessing defense technique. JPEG compression mainly
consists of the following steps:
1. Convert the given image from RGB color space to Y CbCr (chrominance + luminance)
color space.
2. Perform spatial subsampling of the chrominance channels, since the human eye is less
susceptible to these changes and relies more on the luminance information.
3. Transform 8× 8 blocks of the Y CbCr channels to a frequency domain representation
using Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT).
4. Quantize the blocks in the frequency domain representation according to a quantization
table which corresponds to a user-defined quality factor for the image.
The last step is where the JPEG algorithm achieves the majority of compression at the
expense of image quality. This step suppresses higher frequencies since these frequencies
contribute less to the human perception of the image. Adversarial attacks do not maintain the
spectral signature of the image, and they tend to introduce more high frequency components
which can be removed via compression. This step also renders the JPEG compression
non-differentiable, which makes it non-trivial for an adversary to optimize against, allowing
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Figure 4.2: SHIELD uses Stochastic Local Quantization (SLQ) to remove adversarial
perturbations from input images. SLQ divides an image into 8 × 8 blocks and applies a
randomly selected JPEG compression quality (20, 40, 60 or 80) to each block to mitigate
the attack.
only estimations to be made of the transformation [77]. We show in our evaluation (Section
4.4.2) that JPEG compression effectively removes adversarial perturbation across a range of
compression levels.
4.3.2 Vaccinating Models with Compressed Images
Applying too much compression reduces the model’s accuracy on benign images, due to the
artifacts introduced by JPEG compression. We propose to “vaccinate” the model by training
it with compressed images, especially at lower JPEG qualities, to increase the model’s
robustness towards the compression transformation for both adversarial and benign images.
With vaccination, we can apply more aggressive compression to remove more adversarial
perturbation. In our evaluation (Section 4.4.3), we show the advantage that our vaccination
strategy provides, as it recovers more than 7 absolute percentage points in model accuracy
for high-perturbation attacks.
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4.3.3 SHIELD: Multifaceted Defense Framework
To leverage the effectiveness of JPEG compression as a preprocessing technique along with
the benefit of vaccinating with JPEG images, we propose a stochastic variant of the JPEG
algorithm that introduces randomization to the quantization step. This makes it difficult for
the adversary to estimate the preprocessing transformation.
Figure 4.2 illustrates our proposed strategy, where we vary the quantization table for
each 8× 8 block in the frequency domain to correspond to a random quality factor from a
provided set of qualities, such that the compression level does not remain uniform across the
image. This is equivalent to breaking up the image into disjoint 8× 8 blocks, compressing
each block with a random quality factor, and putting the blocks together to re-create the
final image. We call this method Stochastic Local Quantization (SLQ). As the adversary
is free to craft images with varying amounts of perturbation, our defense should offer
protection across a wide spectrum. We selected the set of qualities {20, 40, 60, 80} as our
randomization candidates, uniformly spanning the range of JPEG qualities from 1 (most
compressed) to 100 (least compressed).
Comparing our stochastic approach to taking an average over JPEG compressed images,
our method maintains the original semantics of the image in the blocks compressed to higher
qualities, while performing localized denoising in the blocks compressed to lower qualities.
In the case of an average, perturbations may not be removed at higher qualities and so they
could shift the average, and remain adversarial. Introducing localized stochasticity reduces
this expectation.
In our evaluation (Section 4.4.3), we show that by using a variety of JPEG compression
levels as in SLQ, our model can simultaneously attain a high accuracy on benign images,
while being more robust to adversarial perturbations than using a single JPEG quality. Our
method is further fortified by using an ensemble of vaccinated models individually trained
on the set of qualities picked for SLQ. We show in Section 4.4.3 that our method achieves
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Figure 4.3: Carlini-Wagner-L2 (CW-L2) and DeepFool, two recent strong attacks, introduce
perturbations that lowers model accuracy to around 10% (∅). JPEG compression recov-
ers up to 98% of the original accuracy (with DeepFool), while SHIELD achieves similar
performance, recovering up to 95% of the original accuracy (with DeepFool).
4.4 Evaluation
In this section, we show that our approach is scalable, effective, and practical at removing
adversarial image perturbations. In our experiments, we consider the following scenarios:
• The adversary has access to the full model, including its architecture and parameters.
(Section 4.4.2)
• The adversary has access to the model architecture, but not the exact parameters.
(Section 4.4.3)
• The adversary does not have access to the model architecture. (Section 4.4.4)
4.4.1 Experiment Setup
We performed experiments on the full validation set of the ImageNet benchmark image
classification dataset [78], which consists of 1,000 classes, totaling 50,000 images. We show
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the performance of each defense on the ResNet-v2 50 model obtained from the TF-Slim
module in TensorFlow. We construct the attacks using the popular CleverHans package1,
which contains implementations from the authors of the attacks.
• For Carlini-Wagner-L2 (CW-L2), we set its parameter κ = 0, a common value used in
studies [75], as larger values (higher confidence) incur prohibitively high computation
cost.
• DeepFool (DF) is a non-parametric attack that optimizes the amount of perturbation
required to misclassify an image.
• For FGSM and I-FGSM, we vary ε from 0 to 8 in steps of 2.
We compare JPEG compression and SHIELD with two popular denoising techniques that
have potential in defending against adversarial attacks [79, 75]. Median filter (MF) collapses
a small window of pixels into a single value, and may drop some of the adversarial pixels in
the process. Total variation denoising (TVD) aims to reduce the total variation in an image,
and may undo the artificial noise injected by the attacks. We varied the parameters of each
method to evaluate how their values affect defense performance.
• For JPEG compression, we varied the compression level from quality 100 (least
compressed) to 20 (greatly compressed), in decrements of 10.
• For median filter, we used window sizes of 3 (smallest possible) and 5. We tested
larger window sizes (e.g., 7), which led to extremely poor model accuracies, thus we
ruled them out as parameter candidates.
• For total variation denoising, we varied its weight parameter from 10 through 40, in
increments of 10. Reducing the weight of TVD further produces blurry images that
lead to poor model accuracy.
1https://github.com/tensorflow/cleverhans
48
.00 .02 .04 .06 .08 .10
| L2 |
FGSM


























SHIELD and JPEG Compression
Recover and Boost Model AccuracyModel
Accy.
SHIELD
Figure 4.4: SHIELD recovers the accuracy of the model when attacked with I-FGSM (left)
and FGSM (right). Both charts show the accuracy of the model when undefended (gray
dotted curve). Applying varying JPEG compression qualities (purple curves) helps recover
accuracy significantly, and SHIELD (orange curve) is able to recover more than any single
JPEG-defended model.
4.4.2 Defending Gray-Box Attacks with Image Preprocessing
In this section, we investigate the setting where an adversary gains access to all parameters
and weights of a model that is trained on benign images but is unaware of the defense
strategy. This constitutes a gray-box attack on the overall classification pipeline.
We show the results of applying JPEG compression at various qualities on images
attacked with Carlini-Wagner-L2 (CW-L2) and DeepFool (DF) in Figure 4.3, and on images
attacked with I-FGSM and FGSM in Figure 4.4.
Combating Carlini-Wagner-L2 (CW-L2) & DeepFool (DF). Although CW-L2 and DF,
both considered strong attacks, are highly effective at lowering model accuracies, Figure 4.3
shows that even applying mild JPEG compression (i.e., using higher JPEG qualities) can
recover much of the lost accuracy. Since both methods optimize for a lower perturbation to
fool the model, the noise introduced by these attacks is imperceptible to the human eye and
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lies in the high frequency spectrum, which is destroyed in the quantization step of the JPEG
algorithm. SHIELD performs well, and comparably, for both attacks. We do not arbitrarily
scale the perturbation magnitude of either attack as in [75], as doing so would violate the
attacks’ optimization criteria.
Combating I-FSGM & FGSM. As shown in Figure 4.4, JPEG compression also achieves
success in countering I-FGSM and FGSM attacks, which introduce higher magnitudes of
perturbation than CW-L2 and DeepFool attacks.
As the amount of perturbation increases, the accuracies of models without any protection
(gray dotted curves in Figure 4.4) rapidly falls beneath 19%. JPEG recovers significant por-
tions of the lost accuracies (purple curves); its effectiveness also gradually and expectantly
declines as perturbation becomes severe. Applying more compression generally recovers
more accuracy (e.g., dark purple curve, for JPEG quality 20), but at the cost of losing some
accuracy for benign images. SHIELD (orange curve) offers a desirable trade-off, achieving
good performance under severe perturbation while retaining accuracies comparable to the
original models. Applying less compression (light purple curves) performs well with benign
images but is not as effective when perturbation increases.
Effectiveness and Runtime Comparison against Median Filter (MF) and Total Varia-
tion Denoising (TVD). We compare JPEG compression and SHIELD with MF and TVD,
two popular denoising techniques, because they too have potential in defending against
adversarial attacks [79, 75]. Like JPEG, both MF and TVD are parameterized. Table 4.1
summarizes the performance of all the image preprocessing techniques under consideration.
While all techniques are able to recover accuracies from CW-L2 and DF, both strongly
optimized attacks with lower perturbation strength, the best performing settings are from
JPEG (bold font in Table 4.1). When faced with large amount of perturbation generated by
the I-FGSM and FSGM attacks, SHIELD benefits from the combination of Stochastic Local
Quantization, vaccination, and ensembling, outperforming all other techniques.
As developing practical defense is our primary goal, effectiveness, while important, is
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No Attack CW-L2 DF I-FGSM FGSM
Defense |L2| = 0 |L2| = .0025 |L2| = .0020 |L2| = .0533 |L2| = .0597
No Defense 75.59 10.29 9.78 7.49 18.40
SHIELD 72.11 71.85 71.88 65.63 59.29
JPEG [quality=100] 74.95 74.37 74.41 52.52 44.00
JPEG [quality=90] 74.83 74.43 74.36 55.18 45.12
JPEG [quality=80] 74.23 73.92 73.88 57.86 46.66
JPEG [quality=70] 73.61 73.11 73.17 59.53 47.96
JPEG [quality=60] 72.97 72.46 72.52 60.74 49.33
JPEG [quality=50] 72.32 71.86 71.91 61.47 50.53
JPEG [quality=40] 71.48 71.03 71.05 62.14 51.81
JPEG [quality=30] 70.08 69.63 69.67 62.52 53.51
JPEG [quality=20] 67.72 67.32 67.34 62.43 55.81
MF [window=3] 71.05 70.44 70.42 60.09 51.06
MF [window=5] 58.48 58.19 58.06 53.59 49.71
TVD [weight=10] 69.14 68.69 68.74 62.40 53.56
TVD [weight=20] 71.87 71.44 71.45 61.90 50.26
TVD [weight=30] 72.82 72.34 72.37 60.70 48.18
TVD [weight=40] 73.31 72.90 72.91 59.60 47.07
Table 4.1: Summary of model accuracies (in %) for all defenses: SHIELD [20, 40, 60, 80],
JPEG, median filter (MF), and total variation denoising (TVD); v/s all attacks: Carlini-
Wagner L2 (CW-L2), DeepFool (DF), I-FGSM and FGSM. While all techniques are able to
recover accuracies from CW-L2 and DF attacks with lower perturbation strength, the best
performing settings are from JPEG (in bold font). SHIELD benefits from the combination
of SLQ, vaccination and ensembling, and outperforms all other techniques when facing
high perturbation delivered by I-FGSM and FGSM. We use κ = 0 in CW-L2 and ε = 4 in
FGSM and I-FGSM.
only one part of our desirable solution. Another critical requirement is that our solution be
fast and scalable. Thus, we also compare the runtimes of the image processing techniques.
Our comparison focuses on the most computationally intensive parts of each technique,
ignoring irrelevant overheads (e.g., disk I/O) common to all techniques. All runtimes are
averaged over 3 runs, using the full 50k ImageNet validation images, on a dedicated desktop
computer equipped with an Intel i7-4770K quad-core CPU clocked at 3.50GHz, 4x8GB
RAM, 1TB SSD of Samsung 840 EVO-Series and 2x3TB WD 7200RPM hard disk, running
Ubuntu 14.04.5 LTS and Python 2.7. We used the most popular Python implementations of
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the image processing techniques. We used JPEG and MF from Pillow 5.0, and TVD from
scikit-image.
As shown in Figure 4.5, JPEG is the fastest, spending no more than 107 seconds to
compress 50k images (at JPEG quality 80). It is at least 22x faster than TVD, and 14x faster
than median filter. We tested the speed of the TensorFlow implementation of SHIELD, which
also compresses all images at high speed, taking only 150s.
4.4.3 Black-Box Attack with Vaccination and Ensembling
We now turn our attention to the setting where an adversary has knowledge of the model
being used but does not have access to the model parameters or weights. More concretely,
we vaccinate the ResNet-v2 50 model by retraining on the ImageNet training set and
preprocessing the images with JPEG compression while training. This setup constitutes a
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Figure 4.5: Runtime comparison for three defenses: (1) total variation denoising (TVD), (2)
median filter (MF), and (3) JPEG compression, timed using the full 50k ImageNet validation
images, averaged over 3 runs. JPEG is at least 22x faster than TVD, and 14x faster than MF.
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We denote the original ResNet-v2 50 model asM, which the adversary has access to. By
retraining on images of a particular JPEG compression quality q, we transformM toMq,
e.g., for JPEG-20 vaccination, we retrainM on JPEG-compressed images at quality 20 and
obtainM20. When retraining the ResNet-v2 50 models, we used stochastic gradient descent
(SGD) with a learning rate of 5× 10−3, with a decay of 94% over 25× 104 iterations. We
conducted the retraining on a GPU cluster with 12 NVIDIA Tesla K80 GPUs. We trained 8
models from quality 20 through quality 90 in increments of 10 (M20,M30,M40...M90) to
cover a wide spectrum of JPEG qualities. Figure 4.6 shows the results of model vaccination
against FGSM attacks, whose parameter ε ranges from 0 (no perturbation) to 8 (severe
perturbation), in steps of 2. The plots show that retraining the model helps recover more
model accuracy than using JPEG preprocessing alone (compare the unvaccinated gray
dotted curve vs. the vaccinated orange and purple curves in Figure 4.6). We found that a
given modelMq performed best when tested with JPEG-compressed images of the same
quality q.
We tested these models in an ensemble with two different voting schemes. The first
ensemble scheme, denoted asMq × q, corresponds to each modelMq casting a vote on
every JPEG quality q from q ∈ {20, 30, 40, ..., 90}. This has a total cost of 64 votes from
which we select the majority vote. In the second scheme, denoted byMq − q, each model
Mq votes only on q, the JPEG quality it was trained on. This incurs a cost of 8 votes.
Table 4.2 compares the accuracies (against FGSM) and computation costs of these two
schemes with those of SHIELD, which also utilizes an ensemble (M20,M40,M60,M80)
with a total of 4 votes. SHIELD achieves very similar performance as compared to the
vaccinated models, at half the cost when compared toMq − q. Hence, SHIELD offers a




.00 .12 .00 .12 .00 .12 .00 .12
| L2 |
Compress (preprocess)







...at JPEG quality 60
Vaccinating Models with
Compressed Images Improves Accuracies
... at JPEG quality 40 ... at JPEG quality 20
No vaccination
Figure 4.6: Vaccinating a model by retraining it with compressed images helps recover its
accuracy. Each plot shows the model accuracies when preprocessing with different JPEG
qualities with the FGSM attack. Each curve in the plot corresponds to a different model.
The gray dotted curve corresponds to the original unvaccinated ResNet-v2 50 model. The
orange and purple curves correspond to the models retrained on JPEG qualities 80 and 20
respectively. Retraining on JPEG compressed images and applying JPEG preprocessing
helps recover accuracy in a gray-box attack.
4.4.4 Transferability in Black-Box Setting
In this setup, we evaluated the transferability of attacked images generated using ResNet-v2
50 on ResNet-v2 101 and Inception-v4. The attacked images were preprocessed using
JPEG compression and Stochastic Local Quantization. In Table 4.3, we show that JPEG
compression as a defense does not significantly reduce model accuracies on low perturbation
attacks like DF and CW-L2. For higher-perturbation attacks, the accuracy of Inception-v4
lowers by a maximum of 10%.
Ensemble Cost ε = 0 ε = 2 ε = 4 ε = 6 ε = 8
Mq × q 64 73.90 67.72 60.13 54.44 49.84
Mq − q 8 73.54 67.06 59.86 53.91 49.40
SHIELD 4 72.11 66.30 59.29 53.60 48.63
Table 4.2: Comparison of two ensemble schemes with SHIELD, when defending against
FGSM. Mq × q corresponds to each model Mq voting on each JPEG quality q from
q ∈ {20, 30, 40, ..., 90}. InMq − q, each modelMq votes only on q, the JPEG quality
it was trained on. SHIELD offers a favorable trade-off, providing at least 2x speed-up as
compared to larger ensembles, while delivering comparable accuracies.
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Inc-v4 (80.2%) RN-v2 101 (77.0%)
Attack Defense Accuracy (Qual.) Accuracy (Qual.)
None JPEG 79.05 (100) 76.48 (100)
SLQ 75.90 - 73.70 -
CW-L2 JPEG 79.00 (100) 76.20 (100)
SLQ 75.80 - 73.60 -
DF JPEG 78.91 (100) 76.19 (100)
SLQ 76.29 - 73.70 -
I-FGSM JPEG 74.84 (100) 70.06 (70)
SLQ 73.20 - 69.40 -
FGSM JPEG 71.00 (100) 64.18 (40)
SLQ 70.01 - 64.64 -
Table 4.3: JPEG compression as defense does not reduce model accuracy significantly on
transferred attacks with low perturbation. Adversarial images crafted using the ResNet-v2
50 model are protected using JPEG alone and Stochastic Local Quantization (SLQ), before
being fed into two other models: Inception-v4 (Inc-v4) and ResNet-v2 101 (RN-v2 101).
4.4.5 NIPS 2017 Competition Results
In addition to the experiment results shown above, we also participated in the NIPS 2017
competition on Defense Against Adversarial Attack using a version of our approach that
included JPEG compression and vaccination to defend against attacks “in the wild.” With
only an ensemble of three JPEG compression qualities (90, 80, 70), our entry received a
silver badge in the competition, ranking 16th out of more than 100 submissions.
4.5 Significance and Impact
This work has been making multiple positive impacts on Intel’s research and product
development plans. In this section, we describe such impacts in detail, and also describe
how they may more broadly influence deep learning and cybersecurity. We then discuss our
work’s scope, limitations, and additional practical considerations.
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4.5.1 Software and Hardware Integration Milestones
As seen in Section 4.4, JPEG compression is much faster than other popular preprocessing
techniques; even commodity implementations from Pillow are fast. However, in order to
be deployed into a real defense pipeline, we need to evaluate its computational efficiency
with tighter software and hardware integration. Fortunately, JPEG compression is a widely-
used and mature technique that can be easily deployed in various platforms, and due to its
widespread usage, we can use off-the-shelf optimized software and hardware for such testing.
One promising milestone we reached, utilized Intel’s hardware Quick Sync Video (QSV)
technology: a hardware core dedicated and optimized for video encoding and decoding. It
was introduced with Sandy Bridge CPU microarchitecture and exists currently in various
Intel platforms. From our experiments, JPEG compression by Intel QSV is up to 24
times faster than the Pillow and TensorFlow implementations when evaluated on the same
ImageNet validation set of 50,000 images. This computational efficiency is desirable for
applications that need real-time defense, such as autonomous vehicles. In the future, we
plan to explore the feasibility of our approach on more hardware platforms, such as the Intel
Movidius Compute Stick2, which is a low power USB-based deep learning inference kit.
4.5.2 New Computational Paradigm: Secure Deep Learning
This research has sparked insightful discussion with teams of Intel QSV, Intel Deep Learning
SDK, and Intel Movidius Compute Stick. This work provides opportunities to advance deep
learning software and hardware development to incorporate adversarial machine learning
defenses. For example, almost all defenses incur certain levels of computational overhead.
This may be due to image preprocessing techniques [75, 80], using multiple models for
model ensembles [81], the introduction of adversarial perturbation detectors [74, 79], or
the increase in training time for adversarial training [27]. However, while hardware and
system improvement for fast deep learning training and inference remains an active area of
2https://developer.movidius.com
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research, secure machine learning workloads still receive relatively less attention, suggesting
room for improvement. We believe this will accelerate the positive shift of thinking in the
industry in the near future, from addressing problems like “How do we build deep learning
accelerators?” to problems such as “How do we build deep learning accelerators that are
not only fast but also secure?”. Understanding such hardware implications are important for
microprocessor manufacturers, equipment vendors and companies offering cloud computing
services.
4.5.3 Scope and Limitations
In this work, we focus on systematically studying the benefit of compression on its own. As
myriads of newer and stronger attack strategies are continuously discovered, limitations in
existing, single defenses are revealed. Our approach is not a panacea to defend all possible
(future) attacks. For example, because JPEG compression mainly removes imperceptible
noises, SHIELD is not the best defense against ShapeShifter attack introduced in the previous
chapter, which uses large and noticeable perturbations. We do not expect or intend for
SHIELD to be used in isolation of other techniques. Rather, our methods should be used
together with other defense techniques, to potentially develop an even stronger defense.
Using multi-layered protection is a proven, long-standing defense strategy that has been
pervasive in security research and in practice [45, 82]. Fortunately, since our approach
primarily involves preprocessing, it is easy to integrate it into many other defense techniques
such as adversarial retraining.
4.6 Related Work
Due to intriguing theoretical properties and practical importance, there has been a surge
in the number of papers in the past few years attempting to find countermeasures against
adversarial attacks. These include detecting adversarial examples before performing classifi-
cation [74, 36], modifying network architecture and the underlying primitives used [83, 84,
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85], modifying the training process [27, 72], and using preprocessing techniques to remove
adversarial perturbations [86, 73, 80, 75]. The preprocessing approach is most relevant
to our work. Below, we describe two methods in this category—median filter and total
variation denoising, which we compared against in Section 4.4. We then discuss some recent
attacks that claim to break preprocessing defenses.
4.6.1 Image Preprocessing as Defense
Median Filter. This method uses a sliding window over the image and replaces each pixel
with the median value of its neighboring pixels to spatially smooth the image. The size of
the sliding window controls the smoothness, for example, a larger window size produces
blurrier images. This technique has been used in multiple prior defense works [75, 79].
Total Variation Denoising. The method is based on the principle that images with higher
levels of (adversarial) noise tend to have larger total variations: the sum of the absolute
difference between adjacent pixel values. Denoising is performed by reducing the total
variation while keeping the denoised image close to the original one. A weighting parameter
is used as a trade-off between the level of total variation and the distance from the original
image. Compared with median filter, this method is more effective at removing adversarial
noise while preserving image details [75].
4.6.2 Attacks against Preprocessing Techniques
One reason why adding preprocessing steps increases attack difficulty is that many prepro-
cessing operations are non-differentiable, thus restricting the feasibility of gradient-based at-
tacks. In JPEG compression, the quantization in the frequency domain is a non-differentiable
operation.
Shin and Song [77] propose a method that approximates the quantization in JPEG with
a differentiable function. They also optimize the perturbation over multiple compression
qualities to ensure an adversarial image is robust at test time. We evaluated their attacking
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strategy against SHIELD under different threat models [87]. We found that SHIELD performs
best for defending against targeted attacks in the gray-box setting where the attacker does
not know all the models used in the ensemble.
Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation [71] is another potential approach to
bypass non-differentiable preprocessing techniques. To attack JPEG preprocessing, it
performs forward propagation through the preprocessing and DNN combination but in the
backward pass, the method differentiates with respect to the JPEG compressed image. This
is based on the intuition that the compressed image should look similar to the original one,
so the operation can be approximated by the identity function. However, we believe this
assumption only holds for higher compression qualities. Since the work did not report the
compression quality used in the experiments, the conclusion remains open for debate.
4.7 Conclusion
In this work, we highlighted the urgent need for practical defense for deep learning models
that can be readily deployed. We drew inspiration from JPEG image compression, a well-
known and ubiquitous image processing technique, and placed it at the core of our new deep
learning model defense framework: SHIELD. Since many attack strategies aim to perturb
image pixels in ways that are visually imperceptible, the SHIELD defense framework utilizes
JPEG compression to effectively “compress away” such pixel manipulation. SHIELD immu-
nizes DNN models from being confused by compression artifacts by “vaccinating” a model:
re-training it with compressed images, where different compression levels are applied to gen-
erate multiple vaccinated models that are ultimately used together in an ensemble defense.
Furthermore, SHIELD adds an additional layer of protection by employing randomization at
test time by compressing different regions of an image using random compression levels,
making it harder for an adversary to estimate the transformation performed. This novel
combination of vaccination, ensembling and randomization makes SHIELD a fortified multi-
pronged defense, while remaining fast and successful without requiring knowledge about
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the model. We conducted extensive, large-scale experiments using the ImageNet dataset,
and showed that our approaches eliminate up to 98% of gray-box attacks delivered by the
recent, strongest attacks. To ensure reproducibility of our results, we have open-sourced our
code on GitHub3.
Although we only tested SHIELD for the image classification task, it is possible to use
SHIELD for other computer vision tasks, such as object detection. However, as mentioned
in section 4.5.3, SHIELD works best in defending against perturbations that are visually
imperceptible. When defending against large and noticeable perturbations generated by
ShapeShifter, SHIELD needs to use aggressive compression, which can hurt the benign
accuracy. In the next chapter, we propose a different defense called UNMASK that uses




UNMASK: ADVERSARIAL DETECTION AND DEFENSE IN DEEP LEARNING
THROUGH BUILDING-BLOCK KNOWLEDGE EXTRACTION
Shield (Chapter 4) is best suited for defending against imperceptible perturbations. To
better defend against ShapeShifter-style attacks (Chapter 3), we further develop UNMASK,
a knowledge-based adversarial detection and defense framework. The core idea behind
UNMASK is to protect models by verifying that an image’s predicted class (e.g., “bird”)
contains the expected building blocks (e.g., beak, wings, eyes). For example, if an image is
classified as “bird”, but the extracted building blocks are wheel, seat and frame, the model
may be under attack. UNMASK detects such attacks and defends the model by rectifying
the misclassification, re-classifying the image based on its extracted building blocks. Our
extensive evaluation shows that UNMASK (1) detects up to 92.9% of attacks, with a false
positive rate of 9.67% and (2) defends the model by correctly classifying up to 92.24% of
adversarial images produced by the state-of-the-art Projected Gradient Descent attack in the
gray-box setting. UNMASK is architecture agnostic and fast.
5.1 Introduction
Adversarial attacks on deep neural networks highlight a critical issue with modern computer
vision systems: these deep learning systems do not distinguish objects in ways that humans
would [88, 89]. For example, when humans see a bicycle, we see its handlebar, frame,
wheels, chains, and pedals (Fig. 5.1, top). Through our visual perception and cognition,
we synthesize these detection results with our knowledge to determine that we are actually
seeing a bicycle. However, when an image of a bicycle is adversarially perturbed to fool
the model into misclassifying it as a bird (by manipulating pixels, as in Fig. 5.1, bottom),
















Figure 5.1: UNMASK framework overview. UNMASK combats adversarial attacks (in
red) by extracting building-block knowledge (e.g., wheel) from the image (top, in green),
and comparing them to expected features of the classification (“Bird” at bottom) from the
unprotected model. Low feature overlap signals attack. UNMASK rectifies misclassification
using the image’s extracted features. Our approach detects 92.9% of gray-box attacks (at
9.67% false positive rate) and defends the model by correctly classifying up to 92.24% of
adversarial images crafted by the state-of-the-art Projected Gradient Descent attack.
other hand, the attacked model fails to perceive these building blocks, and is tricked into
misclassifying the image. How do we incorporate this intuitive detection capability natural
to human beings, into deep learning models to protect them from harm?
There has been a rich body of research studying detection and defense for deep learning,
including adversarial training [3, 90], distillation [72] and image pre-processing [6, 73].
However, these approaches have not explicitly considered incorporating the extraction of
building-block knowledge from images to protect deep learning models. Furthermore, re-
search has shown that optimization based learning methods often fail to learn representations
of objects that strongly align with humans’ intuitive perception of those objects [27]. To fill
this critical research gap in adversarial machine learning, we propose UNMASK (Figure 5.1),
a novel method to protect deep learning models from adversarial perturbations by extracting
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building-block knowledge from images.
5.1.1 Contributions
1. Building-Block Knowledge Extraction. We contribute the major idea that building-
block knowledge extraction offers a powerful, explainable and practical method of detecting
and defending against adversarial perturbations in deep learning models. Building-block
knowledge extraction extracts higher-level information out of images—extending the core
concept of feature extraction that is central to numerous successful data mining techniques.
A significant advantage of our proposed knowledge extraction concept is that while an
attacker may be able to manipulate the class label by subtly changing pixel values, it is
much more challenging for such perturbation to simultaneously manipulate all the individual
features that jointly compose the image. We demonstrate that by adapting the Mask R-CNN
architecture [91], we can effectively extract higher-level building-block knowledge feature
contained in images to detect and defend against adversarial attacks.
2. UNMASK: Detection & Defense Framework. Building on our core concept of building-
block knowledge extraction, we propose UNMASK as a framework to detect and defeat
adversarial image perturbation by quantifying the similarity between the image’s extracted
features with the expected features of its predicted class. To the best of our knowledge,
UNMASK is the first framework that utilizes the concept of building-block knowledge
extraction to combat adversarial perturbations.
We illustrate how UNMASK works in Figure 5.1, where a bicycle image has been
perturbed such that it would fool an unprotected model into misclassifying it as a bird. For a
real “bird” image, we would expect to see features such as beak, wing and tail. However,
UNMASK would (correctly) extract bike features: wheel, frame, and pedals. UNMASK
quantifies the similarity between the extracted features (of a bike) with the expected features
(of a bird), in this case zero. This comparison gives us the dual ability to both detect
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adversarial perturbations by selecting a similarity threshold for which we classify an image
as adversarial, and to defend the model by predicting a corrected class that best matches
the extracted features. Since we are presenting a new category of detection and defense
research, our results are the first presented in this line of research.
3. Extensive Evaluation. We evaluate UNMASK’s effectiveness using the large UN-
MASK DATASET that we curated, with over 18k images in total. We test multiple factors,
including: 3 attacks, including the state-of-the-art Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) attack;
2 popular CNN architectures, VGG16 [92] and ResNet50 [93]; and multiple combinations
of varying numbers of classes and feature overlaps. Experiments demonstrate that our
approach detects up to 92.9% of gray-box attacks with a false positive rate of 9.67% and (2)
defends the model by correctly classifying up to 92.24% of adversarial images crafted by
PGD. (Section 5.3)
To enhance readability of this chapter, we list and define the terminology used throughout
the chapter in Table 5.1. We use the terms “adversarial attack” and “adversarial perturbation”
interchangeably to refer to attacks on images. We abbreviate “building-block features” as
“features”, and “building-block knowledge extraction model” (K) as “building-block model,”
when their meanings are clear from context.
5.2 UNMASK: Detection and Defense Framework
In this section, we present our building-block knowledge extraction based approach to
combating adversarial perturbations (Figure 5.1). The objective is to defend a vulnerable
deep learning model M (Figure 5.1, bottom) using our UNMASK defense framework D,
where the adversary has full access to M but is unaware of the defense strategy D. This
constitutes a gray-box attack on the overall classification pipeline [6].
In Section 5.2.1, we provide the intuition of why building-block knowledge extraction




Y Training classification labels
S Training building-block segmentation masks
C Set of possible classes
V Class-feature matrix
x Test image
ŷ class prediction from model M
K Building-block knowledge extraction model
M Unprotected model
D UNMASK Defense framework
fe Extracted building-block features from image, by K
fa Expected features of image classified by M
J(fe, fa) Jaccard similarity between fe and fa
s similarity score
d distance score (1-s)
t Adversarial-benign classification threshold
z Determination of adversarial or benign
p Class prediction, by UNMASK
Table 5.1: Symbols and Definition
describe how our UNMASK framework leverages this knowledge extraction concept as a
new way for detection and defense. We formally define the UNMASK detection & defense
problem as:
Given:
• Training imagesX , which contains corresponding classification labels Y and building-
block segmentation masks S.
• Set of classes C (e.g., bike,...) and class feature matrix V (see Table. 5.2). Each class
c ∈ C is associated with features V [c] (e.g., wheel,...).
Output:
• Detection: adversarial or benign determination z ∈ {0, 1}
• Defense: predicted class label p ∈ C
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5.2.1 Intuition: Protection via Building-Block Knowledge Extraction
Our main idea to combat adversarial image perturbations with respect to an input image
x, is to extract building-block features fe using a building-block knowledge extraction
model K, fe = K(x) (see Figure 5.2 for an example). These extracted building blocks, and
their collective composition, forges a layer of protection around the model by disrupting
the traditional pixel-centric attacks [4, 94, 95]. Our building-block defensive layer forces
the adversary to now solve a more complex problem of manipulating both the class label
and all of the image’s constituent parts. For example, in Figure 5.2 the attacker needs to
fool the defensive layer into misclassifying the bike as a bird by changing the class label
and manipulating the bike building-block features (e.g., wheel, seat, handlebar) into bird
features (e.g., beak, wing, tail).
5.2.2 Overview of UNMASK
Leveraging the concept of building-block knowledge extraction, we introduce UNMASK as
a detection and defense framework (D). Figure 5.1 summarizes how our method works at
the high level, for an unprotected model M (Figure 5.1, bottom). The adversary crafts an
attacked image by carefully manipulating its pixel values using an adversarial technique
(e.g., Projected Gradient Descent [4]). This attacked image then fools model M into
misclassifying the image, as shown in Figure 5.1. To guard against this kind of attack on
M , we use our UNMASK framework D in conjunction with the building-block knowledge
extraction model K (Figure 5.1, top). Model K processes the same image, which may be
benign or attacked, and extracts the building-block features from the image to compare to the
images’ expected features. Figure 5.2 shows an example, where an attacked bike image has
fooled the unprotected model M to classify it as a bird. We would expect the building-block
features to include head, claw, wing, and tail. However, from the same (attacked) image,
UNMASK’s building-block model K extracts wheels, handle and seat. Comparing the set of
























Figure 5.2: UNMASK guards against adversarial image perturbation by extracting building-
block features from an image and comparing them to its expected features using Jaccard
similarity. If the similarity is below a threshold, UNMASK deems the image adversarial and
predicts its class by matching the extracted features with the most similar class.
UNMASK determines the image was attacked, and predicts its class to be bike based on the
extracted features.
5.2.3 Technical Walk-Through of UNMASK
Now, we detail UNMASK’s technical operations and algorithm for detection and defense
(Algorithm 1). Its major steps are:
1. Classify input. Given an input image x, UNMASK obtains its class prediction ŷ from
(unprotected) model M , i.e., ŷ = M(x). At this point, UNMASK does not know if image x
is adversarial or not.
2. Extract building-block features. UNMASK extracts x’s features fe using building-block
knowledge extraction model K, i.e., fe = K(x). Armed with these features fe, UNMASK
can utilize them to both detect if model M is under attack, and to rectify misclassification
caused by the attack. We considered multiple approaches for K, and decided to adopt
Mask R-CNN for its ability to leverage image segmentation masks to learn and identify
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coherent image regions that closely resemble building-blocks that would appear semantically
and visually meaningful to humans [91]. Different from conventional image classification
models or object detectors, the annotations used to train our building-block extractor K are
segmented object parts instead of the whole objects. For example, for the wheel feature, an
instance of training data would consist of a bike image and a segmentation mask indicating
which region of that image represents a wheel. Technically, this means K uses only a part of
an image, and not the whole image, for training. Furthermore, while an image may consist
of multiple image parts, K treats them independently.
3. Detect attack. UNMASK measures the similarity between the set of extracted features
fe and the set of expected features of ŷ (obtained through matrix V [ŷ]), by calculating the
Jaccard similarity score s = J(fe, fa). If similarity score s is greater than the threshold
parameter t, input image x is deemed benign, otherwise adversarial. Adjusting t would
allow us to assess the trade-off between sensitivity and specificity, which we describe in
detail in Section 5.3.
4. Defend and rectify. Determining an image to be adversarial also means that model M
is under attack and is giving unreliable classification output. Thus, we need to rectify the
misclassification. UNMASK accomplishes this by comparing the extracted features fe to
every set of class features in V , outputting class ŷ that contains the highest feature similarity
s, 0 ≤ s ≤ 1.
5.3 Evaluation
We extensively evaluate UNMASK’s effectiveness in defending and detecting adversarial
perturbations, using:
• 3 attacks, including the state-of-the-art Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) attack;
• 2 popular CNN architectures, VGG16 [92] and ResNet50 [93], as unprotected models
M ; and
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• multiple combinations of varying numbers of classes and feature overlaps.
To the best of our knowledge, this work proposes the first building-block knowledge
extraction to detect and defend against adversarial perturbation for deep learning. We present
the first results in this new line of work.
5.3.1 Experiment Setup
Software and Hardware
We develop all experiment code in Python 3.6 on Linux. We use open-source libraries Keras,
Tensorflow, Foolbox [96] and Matterport [97]; and GPUs that include two Nvidia Titan X’s,
a Titan RTX and a cluster of 24 K40s.
Adversarial Attacks
We evaluated UNMASK against three attacks, where we detail the parameter selection below:
• DeepFool (DF) L2: a non-parametric attack that optimizes the amount of perturbation
required to misclassify an image[98]; we set the update steps to 100.
• Fast Gradient Sign (FGSM): we set ε = 8, 16—two common parameters for this
attack [3].
• Projected Gradient Descent with Random Start (PGD): PGD is the current strongest
first-order attack [4]. Its key parameter ε represents how much each pixel may be changed
by PGD in intensity, e.g., ε = 4 means changing up to 4 units of intensity (out of 255). It
is common to evaluate up to a value of 16 [3, 6] (as perturbation becomes visible) with a
stepsize of 0.01 and 40 iterations.
UNMASK DATASET
We curated the UNMASK DATASET for our evaluation, which consists of three component
datasets—PASCAL-Part, PASCAL VOC 2010 and a subset of ImageNet—as seen in Tables
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5.3 and 5.4. The impetus for our curation is to (i) collect all of the data used in our evaluation
as a single source to promote ease of reproducibility by our research community, and (ii) to
increase the number of images available for evaluating the performance of the deep learning
models and the UNMASK defense framework. We designed multiple class sets with varying
number of classes and feature overlap (e.g., CS3a, in Table 5.2, bottom; and Table 5.5), to
study how they would affect detection and defense effectiveness. We further discuss the
utilization of the data in Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.1 below.
Training Building-Block Model K
As illustrated in Figure 5.2 and Section 5.2.3, the building-block knowledge extraction
model K takes an image as input (e.g., bike) and outputs a set of building-block features
(e.g., wheel,...). To trainK, we use the PASCAL-Part dataset [99], which consists of 180,423
feature segmentation masks over 9,323 images across the 44 building-block features. The
original dataset contains very fine-grained features, such as 18 types of “legs” (e.g., right
front lower leg, left back upper leg), while for our purposes we only need the abstraction
of “leg”. Therefore, we combined these fine-grained features into more generalized ones
(shown as rows in Table 5.2).
We followed a similar procedure described in [97], training K for 40 epochs. We use a
ratio of 80/10/10 for training, validating and testing the model respectively (see Table 5.3).
Our work is the first adaptation of Mask R-CNN model for the PASCAL-Part dataset. As
such, there are no prior results for comparison. We computed model K’s mAP (mean
Average Precision), which estimates K’s ability to extract features. The model attains an
mAP of 0.56, in line with Mask R-CNN on other datasets [99]. Model K processes up to
4 images per second with a single Nvidia Titan X, matching the speeds reported in [97].
This speed can be easily raised through parallelism by using more GPUs. As building-block
extraction is the most time-intensive process of the UNMASK framework, its speed is












DeepFool FGSM ε=8 FGSM ε=16 PGD ε=8 PGD ε=16
False Positive Rate
UnMask Detection Against Multiple Adversaries
Figure 5.3: UNMASK’s effectiveness in detecting detecting three attacks: DeepFool, FGSM
(ε=8,16), and PGD (ε=8,16). UNMASK’s protection may not be affected strictly based on
the number of classes. Rather, an important factor is the feature overlap among classes.
UNMASK provides better detection when there are 5 classes (dark orange; 23.53% overlap)
than when there are 3 (light blue; 50% overlap). Keeping the number of classes constant and
varying their feature overlap also supports our observation about the role of feature overlap
(e.g., CS3a at 6.89% vs. CS3b at 50%).
Training Unprotected Model M
As described in Section 5.2, M is the model under attack, and is what UNMASK aims to
protect. Our evaluation studies two popular deep learning architectures — VGG16 [92] and
ResNet50 [93] — however, UNMASK supports other architectures. Training these models
from scratch is generally computationally expensive and requires large amount of data. To
reduce such need for computation and data, we adopt the approach described in [97], where
we leverage a model pre-trained on ImageNet images, and replace its dense layers (i.e., the
fully connected layers) to enable us to work with various class sets (e.g., CS3a) In detail,
the training process for M is as follows:
1. Load weights from model pre-trained on ImageNet data.
2. Replace dense layers of the model with new dense layers, allowing us to specify a
variable number of classes.
3. Freeze all of the model weights except for the newly-added dense layers, allowing us
to preserve the ImageNet features contained in the early layers while training the new
dense layers on our data.
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We chose to train the new dense layers using the PASCAL VOC 2010 dataset [100] for
its desirable connection to the Pascal-Part dataset — PASCAL-Part uses the images from
PASCAL VOC and adds segmentation masks for those images to describe image parts. Thus,
we can readily ensure that the classes of model M and model K are at parity. In practice,
other datasets containing the classes from Table 5.2 may also be used. Refer to Table 5.3,
for a full breakdown of the data used for training and evaluation.
5.3.2 Evaluating UNMASK Defense and Detection
The key research questions that our evaluation aims to address is how effectively UNMASK
can detect adversarial images, and defend against attacks by rectifying misclassification
through inferring the actual class label. Most image datasets containing the classes from
Table 5.2 may be used. However, we use ImageNet data (see Table 5.4) as it matches our
class sets and has a large number of available images. We note that the evaluation is focused
on images containing a single-class (i.e., no “person” and “car” in same image) as this
allows for a more controlled environment.
Evaluating Detection of Attacks
To evaluate UNMASK’s effectiveness in detecting adversarial images against attacks (DF,
FGSM, PGD), we use a contamination level of 0.5—meaning half of the images are benign
and the other half are adversarial. Figure 5.3 summarizes UNMASK’s detection effectiveness,
using receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curves constructed by varying the adversarial-
benign threshold t. The curves show UNMASK’s performances across operating points as
measured by the tradeoff between true positive (TP) and false positive (FP) rates.
An interesting characteristic of UNMASK’s protection is that its effectiveness may
not be affected strictly based on the number of classes in the dataset as in conventional
classification tasks. Rather, an important factor is how much feature overlap there is among
the classes. The ROC curves in Figure 5.3 illustrate this phenomenon, where UNMASK
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provides better detection when there are 5 classes (Figure 5.3, dark orange) than when there
are 3 classes (light blue). As shown in Table 5.5, the 5-class setup (CS5a—dark orange)
has a feature overlap of 23.53% across the 5 classes’ 34 unique features, while the 3-class
setup (CS3b—light blue) has 50% overlap. Keeping the number of classes constant and
varying their feature overlap also supports this observation about the role of feature overlap
(e.g., CS3a vs. CS3b in Figure 5.3). We call each combination of class count and feature
overlap a “class set,” abbreviated as “CS.” CS3 thus means a class set with 3 classes. CS3a
and CS3b have the same number of classes, with different feature overlap. Table 5.4 details
the number of images used across the four class sets we investigated.
For a given feature overlap level, UNMASK performs similarly across attack methods.
When examining feature overlap 6.89% (CS3a) on VGG16, UNMASK attains an AUC
scores of 0.952, 0.96, 0.959, 0.951 and 0.949 on attacks DF, FGSM (ε=8,16) and PGD
(ε=8,16), respectively. This result is significant because it highlights the ability of UNMASK
to operate against multiple strong attack strategies to achieve high detection success rate. As
a representative ROC operating point for the attack vectors, we use PGD (ε=8), on feature
overlap 6.89%. In this scenario, UNMASK is able to detect up to 92.67% of attacks with
a false positive rate of 9.67%. We believe that performing well in a low feature overlap
environment is all that is required. This is because in many circumstances it is not important
to distinguish the exact true class (e.g., dog or cat) of the image, but whether the image is
being completely misclassified (e.g., car vs. person). Therefore, in practice, classes can be
selected such that feature overlap is minimized.
Evaluating Defense and Rectification
Detecting an attack is only the first step of UNMASK’s protection. It also rectifies the
misclassification by comparing the extracted features fe to every set of class features in V ,
and outputting class c that contains the highest feature similarity. As the evaluation focus is
on rectifying misclassification, our test images have a contamination level of 1—meaning
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all of the images are adversarial. We evaluate UNMASK’s rectification capability on:
• 2 neural network models (VGG16, ResNet50)
• 3 attacks (DF, FGSM, PGD)
• 4 class sets (CS3a, CS3b, CS5a, CS5b)
Table 5.6 shows that UNMASK is agnostic to the deep learning model being protected,
as measured by the ability of UNMASK to infer an adversarial images’ actual class. This
can be seen when comparing the results across each attack on VGG16 and ResNet50.
In addition, we find that the results from Table 5.6 support our observation that feature
overlap is the dominant factor in determining the effectiveness of UNMASK, as opposed
to the number of classes. When examining DeepFool on class set CS3b (3 classes; feature
overlap 50%), UNMASK is able to determine the underlying class 85.62% of the time.
At class set CS5a (5 classes; feature overlap 23.53%) we obtain an accuracy of 91.11%,
highlighting the important role that feature overlap plays in UNMASK’s defense ability.
It is interesting to note that FGSM is more effective at attacking our UNMASK defense
than the other two attacks. We believe this is due to the single-step attacks’ better transfer-
ability, which has been reported in prior work [3]. Given this transferability property of
FGSM, we believe UNMASK provides a significant defense.
We also mention the fact that UNMASK’s accuracy can be higher than the un-attacked
model M due to the fact that, in some instances, model K learned a better representation of
the data through the feature masks as opposed to model M , which trained on the images
directly. This occurs on multiple occasions in Table 5.6.
5.4 Conclusion & Discussion
In this work, we have introduced a new fundamental concept of building-block knowledge
extraction, and showed how it protects deep learning models against adversarial attacks
through the UNMASK detection and defense framework. We draw inspiration from humans’
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natural ability to make robust classification decisions through the detection and synthesis of
contextual building-block knowledge contained in images. We designed and developed our
UNMASK framework to simulate such capability, so it can detect adversarial pixel-centric
manipulations targeting a deep learning model, and defend the model against attacks by
rectifying the classification. Through extensive evaluation on large-scale real-world image
data, we showcase the merits of our ideas through UNMASK’s ability to detect up to 92.9%
of attacks with a false positive rate of 9.67% and defend deep learning models by correctly
classifying up to 92.24% of adversarial images in the gray-box scenario. Our proposed
method is fast and architecture-agnostic.
In this work, we direct our efforts to studying the efficacy of UNMASK and the concept
of building-block knowledge extraction on their own. As myriads of newer and stronger
attack strategies are continuously discovered, our approach is not a panacea to defend
all possible (future) attacks, and we do not intend for it to be used in isolation of other
techniques. Rather, we believe that detection and defense strategies should be combined.
We expect our approach to be one of multiple techniques that are used in concert to provide
comprehensive protection. Multi-pronged protection is a proven, long-standing defense
strategy pervasive in security research and in practice [82, 45]. Fortunately, our proposed
technique can be readily integrated with many existing techniques, as it operates in parallel
to the deep learning model that it aims to protect (see Figure 5.1).
We note that UNMASK has the potential vulnerability to attacks that simultaneously
target and manipulate all building-block features, e.g., changing every “bike” parts in a
bike image, into “bird” parts (bike wheel→bird wing; bike handlebar→bird tail). Such
simultaneous, multi-part attack could be challenging to formulate and execute. To the best
of our knowledge, we have not yet encountered it in research or practice.
Future research directions include extending UNMASK to the object detection task. That
is, we protect an object detector with an auxiliary detector that detects object parts. Such
defense has the potential to mitigate ShapeShifter-style attacks in the black-box or gray-box
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settings. We did not evaluate UNMASK directly against ShapeShifter because ShapeShifter
currently only works in the white-box setting and has limited black-box transferability. We
also want to improve UNMASK by reducing the dependency on object part labeling.
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Algorithm 1: UNMASK
Input: Training images X , labels Y , segmentation masks S, set of possible classes C,
attribute matrix V , threshold t, test image x
Result: adversarial prediction z ∈ {0, 1}, predicted class p
Train unprotected classification model M :
M = NeuralNet(X , Y );
ŷ = M(x);
Train building-block extraction model K:
K = Mask-RCNN(X , S);
fe = K(x); (extracted building blocks)
fa = V [ŷ]; (expected building blocks)
Detection:
s = J(fe, fa); d = 1− s;
z =
{
0 (benign), if d < t




ŷ, if z = 0
argmin
c∈C

















































































































Table 5.2: Class-Feature Matrix. Top: dots mark classes’ features. Bottom: four class sets
with varying levels of feature overlap. 78
Setup PASCAL-Part PASCAL VOC 2010
Model Classes Train Val Test Train Val Test
K 44 7,457 930 936 - - -
M
CS3a - - - 1,750 350 1,400
CS3b - - - 2,104 421 1,684
CS5a - - - 2,264 452 1,812
CS5b - - - 2,501 500 2,001
Table 5.3: Number of images used in training models K and M .
Defense Detection
Class Set DF FGSM PGD All Attacks
CS3a 3,485 2,823 3,494 3,494
CS3b 4,749 4,161 4,764 4,764
CS5a 5,827 5,252 5,849 5,849
CS5b 6,728 5,883 6,747 6,747
Table 5.4: Number of ImageNet images used to evaluate UNMASK. Only the images that
can be successfully perturbed by the attack are used, thus the variations in numbers. We
report values for PGD and FGSM with ε=16. The numbers for ε=8 are similar.
Class Set Classes Unique Parts Overlap
CS3a 3 29 6.89%
CS3b 3 18 50.00%
CS5a 5 34 23.53%
CS5b 5 34 29.41%
Table 5.5: Four class sets investigated in our evaluation, with varying number of classes and
feature overlap.
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Model M Class Set Overlap No Attk DeepFool (No Def) DeepFool FGSM PGD
VGG16
CS3a 6.89% 87.00 5.13 94.33 73.44 89.89
CS3b 50.00% 89.13 3.47 85.62 60.11 75.19
CS5a 23.53% 80.35 3.91 91.11 65.86 82.65
CS5b 29.41% 81.36 3.04 87.17 62.88 77.02
ResNet50
CS3a 6.89 86.64 4.51 95.04 74.42 90.81
CS3b 50.00 85.75 3.28 86.12 66.71 78.55
CS5a 23.53 80.35 3.91 91.11 65.86 82.65
CS5b 29.41 79.91 3.33 87.57 65.19 80.01
Table 5.6: UNMASK’s accuracies (in %) in countering three attacks: DeepFool, FGSM, and
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD). We test two popular CNN architectures, VGG16 and
ResNet50, as unprotected model M , with four class sets with varying numbers of classes
and feature overlap. We use ε = 16 for FGSM and PGD in this experiment. We show the
models’ accuracies (1) when not under attack (“No Attk” column); (2) attacked without
defense (“DeepFool (No Def)”); for both FGSM and PGD, the accuracies drop to 0 without
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OVERVIEW
Most non-trivial security problems require some kind of decision making and resource
allocation. For example, a company that wants to implement security controls with a limited
budget needs to make trade-offs in its deployment. I modeled this problem as a two-player
zero-sum game between a defender and an attacker, and introduced a novel solution concept
called diversified mixed strategy (Chapter 6).
Inspired by the proverb “Don’t put all your eggs in one basket,” my new solution concept
compels players to employ a “diversified” strategy that does not place too much weight
on any one action. Furthermore, by leveraging the deep connection between game theory
and boosting, we develop a communication-efficient distributed boosting algorithm with
strong theoretical guarantees (Chapter 7) in the agnostic learning setting where the data can
contain arbitrary noise. Our algorithm achieves exponential improvement in communication
complexity over prior work and solves an open problem in distributed learning.
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CHAPTER 6
DIVERSIFIED STRATEGIES FOR MITIGATING ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS IN
MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS
In this chapter we consider online decision-making in settings where players want to guard
against possible adversarial attacks or other catastrophic failures. To address this, we
propose a solution concept in which players have an additional constraint that at each time
step they must play a diversified mixed strategy: one that does not put too much weight
on any one action. This constraint is motivated by applications such as finance, routing,
and resource allocation, where one would like to limit one’s exposure to adversarial or
catastrophic events while still performing well in typical cases. We explore properties of
diversified strategies in both zero-sum and general-sum games, and provide algorithms for
minimizing regret within the family of diversified strategies as well as methods for using
taxes or fees to guide standard regret-minimizing players towards diversified strategies. We
also analyze equilibria produced by diversified strategies in general-sum games. We show
that surprisingly, requiring diversification can actually lead to higher-welfare equilibria,
and give strong guarantees on both price of anarchy and the social welfare produced by
regret-minimizing diversified agents. We additionally give algorithms for finding optimal
diversified strategies in distributed settings where one must limit communication overhead.
6.1 Introduction
A common piece of advice when one needs to make decisions in the face of unknown future
events is “Don’t put all your eggs in one basket.” This is especially important when there
can be an adversarial attack or catatrophic failure. We consider game-theoretic problems
from this perspective, design online learning algorithms with good performance subject to
such exposure-limiting constraints on behavior, and analyze the effects of these constraints
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Figure 6.1: For ε ∈ [ 1
n
, 1], we define a probability distribution P to be ε-diversified if
P (i) ≤ 1
εn
for all i. A distribution can be diversified through Bregman projection into the set
of all ε-diversified distributions. A mixed strategy determined by a diversified distribution is
called a diversified (mixed) strategy. We explore properties of such diversified strategies in
both zero-sum and general-sum games as well as give algorithmic guarantees.
on the expected value obtained (in zero-sum games) and the overall social welfare produced
(in general-sum games).
As an example, consider a standard game-theoretic scenario: an agent must drive from
point A to point B and has n different routes it can take. We could model this as a game M
where rows correspond to the n routes, columns correspond to m possible traffic patterns,
and entry M(i, j) is the cost for using route i under traffic pattern j. However, suppose the
agent is carrying valuable documents and is concerned an adversary might try to steal them.
In this case, to reduce the chance of this happening, we might require that no route have
more than (say) 10% probability. The agent then wants to minimize expected travel time
subject to this requirement. Or in an investment scenario, if rows correspond to different
investments and columns to possible market conditions, we might have an additional worry
that perhaps one of the investment choices is run by a crook. In this case, we may wish to
restrict the strategy space to allocations of funds that are not too concentrated.
To address such scenarios, for ε ∈ [ 1
n
, 1] let us define a probability distribution (or
allocation) P to be ε-diversified if P (i) ≤ 1
εn
for all i. For example, for ε = 1
n
this is no
restriction at all, for ε = 1 this requires the uniform distribution, and for intermediate values
of ε this requires an intermediate level of diversification. We then explore properties of such
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diversified strategies in both zero-sum and general-sum games as well as give algorithmic
guarantees.
For zero-sum games, define vε to be the minimax-optimal value of the game in which
the row player is restricted to playing ε-diversified mixed strategies. Natural questions
we address are: Can one design adaptive learning algorithms that maintain ε-diversified
distributions and minimize regret within this class so they never perform much worse than
vε? Can a central authority “nudge” a generic non-diversified regret-minimizer into using
diversified strategies via fines or taxes (extra loss vectors strategically placed into the event
stream) such that it maintains low-regret over the original sequence? And for reasonable
games, how much worse is vε compared to the non-diversified minimax value v? We also
consider a dual problem of producing a strategy Q for the column player that achieves value
vε against all but an ε fraction of the rows (which an adversary can then aim to attack).
One might ask why not model such an adversary directly within the game, via additional
columns that each give a large loss to one of the rows. The main reason is that these would
then dominate the minimax value of the game. (And they either would not have values
within the usual [0, 1] range assumed by regret-minimizing learners, or, if they were scaled
to lie in this range, they would cause all other events to seem roughly the same). Instead, we
want to consider learning algorithms that optimize for more common events, while keeping
to the constraint of maintaining diversified strategies. We also remark that one could also
make diversification a soft constraint by adding a loss term for not diversifying.
We next consider general-sum games, such as routing games and atomic congestion
games, in which k players interact in ways that lead to various costs being incurred by
each player. We show that surprisingly, requiring a player to use diversified strategies can
actually improve its performance in equilibria in such games. We then study the ε-diversified
price of anarchy: the ratio of the social cost of the worst equilibrium subject to all players
being ε-diversified to the social cost of the socially-best set of ε-diversified strategies. We
show that in some natural games, even requiring a small amount of diversification can
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dramatically improve the price of anarchy of the game, though we show there also exist
games where diversification can make the price of anarchy worse. We also bring several
threads of this investigation together by showing that for the class of smooth games defined
by Roughgarden [101], for any diversification parameter ε ∈ [ 1
n
, 1], the ε-diversified price
of anarchy is no worse than the smoothness of the game, and moreover, players using
diversified regret-minimizing strategies will indeed approach this bound. Thus, we get
strong guarantees on the quality of interactions produced by self-interested diversified play.
Finally, we consider how much diversification can hurt optimal play, showing that in random
unit-demand congestion games, diversification indeed incurs a low penalty.
Lastly, we consider an information-limited, distributed, “big-data” setting in which the
number of rows and columns of the matrix M is very large and we do not have it explicitly.
Specifically, we assume the n rows are distributed among r processors, and the only access
to the matrix M we have is via an oracle for the column player that takes in a sample of
rows and outputs the column player’s best response. What we show is how in such a setting
to produce near optimal strategies for each player in the sense described above, from very
limited communication among processors.
In addition to our theoretical results, we also present experimental simulations for both
zero-sum and general-sum games.
6.1.1 Related Work
There has been substantial work on design of “no-regret” learning algorithms for repeated
play of zero-sum games [102, 103, 104]. Multiplicative Weight Update methods [105, 106]
are a specific type of no-regret algorithm that have received considerable attention in game
theory [102, 107], machine learning [102, 108], and many other research areas [109, 110],
due to their simplicity and elegance.
We consider the additional constraint that players play diversified mixed strategies,
motivated by the goal of reducing exposure to adversarial attacks. The concept of diversified
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strategies, sometimes called “smooth distributions”, appears in a range of different areas
[109, 111, 112]. [113] considers a somewhat related notion where there is a penalty for
deviation from a given fixed strategy, and shows existence of equilibria in such games. Also
related is work on adversarial machine learning, e.g., [114, 115, 116]; however, in this work
we are instead focused on decision-making scenarios.
Our distributed algorithm is inspired by prior work in distributed machine learning [117,
118, 108], where the key idea is to perform weight updates in a communication efficient way.
Other work on the impact of adversaries in general-sum games appears in [119, 120, 121].
6.2 Zero-Sum Games
We begin by studying two-player zero-sum games. Recall that a two-player zero-sum game
is defined by a n × m matrix M . In each round of the game, the row player chooses a
distribution P over the rows of M , and the column player chooses a distribution Q over the
columns of M . The expected loss of the row player is




where M(i, j) ∈ [0, 1] is the loss suffered by the row player if the row player plays row i
and the column player plays column j. The goal of the row player is to minimize its loss,











6.2.1 Multiplicative Weights and Diversified Strategies
We now consider row players restricted to only playing diversified distributions, defined as
follows.
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Definition 1. A distribution p ∈ ∆n is called ε-diversified if maxi pi ≤ 1εn .
Let Pε be the set of all ε-diversified distributions, and let vε be the minimax value of
the game subject to the row player restricted to playing in Pε. Note that the range of ε is
between 1/n and 1. It is easy to verify that Pε is a convex set. As a result, the minimax










The multiplicative weights update algorithm [105, 123] can be naturally adapted to
maintain diversified strategies by projecting its distributions into the class Pε if they ever
step outside of it. This is shown in Algorithm 2. By adapting the analysis of [123] to this
case, we arrive at the following regret bound.
Theorem 1. For any 0 < γ ≤ 1/2 and any positive integer T , Algorithm 2 generates
distributions P (1), . . . , P (T ) ∈ Pε to responses j1, . . . , jT , such that for any P ∈ Pε,
∑T
t=1M(P






where RE(p ‖ q) =
∑
i pi ln(pi/qi) is relative entropy.
By combining Algorithm 2 with a best-response oracle for the column player, and
applying Theorem 1 and a standard argument [107, 106] we have:
Theorem 2. Running Algorithm 2 for T steps against a best-response oracle, one can
construct mixed strategies P̄ and Q̄ s.t.
max
Q
M(P̄ , Q) ≤ vε + ∆T and min
P∈Pε
M(P, Q̄) ≥ vε −∆T ,













Algorithm 2 Multiplicative Weights Update algorithm with Restricted Distributions
Initialization: Fix a γ ≤ 1
2
. Set P (1) to be the uniform distribution.
For t = 1, 2, . . . , T :
1. Choose distribution P (t)
2. Receive the pure strategy jt for the column player










i (1− γ)M(i,jt) is the normalization factor.
4. Project P̂ (t+1) into Pε
P (t+1) = arg min
P∈Pε
RE(P ‖ P̂ (t+1))













































M(P,Q) + γ +
ln(1/ε)
γT











. The two inequalities in
the theorem follow by skipping the first and the last inequalities from the proof above,
respectively.
The next theorem shows that the distribution Q̄ in Theorem 2 is also a good mixed
strategy for the column player against any row-player strategy if we remove a small fraction
of the rows.
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Theorem 3. By running Algorithm 2 for T steps against a best-response oracle, we can
construct a mixed strategy Q̄ such that for all but an ε fraction of the rows i,M(i, Q̄) ≥ vε−γ.






Proof. We generate distributions P (1), . . . , P (T ) ∈ Pε by using Algorithm 2. Let jt be the






we set the mixed strategy Q̄ = 1
T
∑T
t=1 jt. Set E = {i|M(i, Q̄) < vε − γ}. Suppose for
contradiction that |E| ≥ εn. Let P = uE , the uniform distribution on E and 0 elsewhere. It
is easy to see that uE ∈ Pε, since |E| ≥ εn.
By the assumption of the oracle, we have vεT ≤
∑T
t=1M(P
(t), jt). In addition, by
Theorem 1, we have
T∑
t=1




RE(P ‖ P (1))
γ
.
For any i ∈ E,
∑T
t=1M(i, jt) = T · M(i, Q̄) < (vε − γ)T . Since P is the uniform
distribution on E, we have
∑T
t=1M(P, jt) < (vε − γ)T . Furthermore, since |E| ≥ εn, we
have
RE(P ‖ P (1)) = RE(uE ‖ u) ≤ ln(1/ε).
Putting these facts together, we get vεT ≤ (1 + γ)(vε − γ)T + ln(1/ε)γ , which implies
T ≤ ln(1/ε)
γ2(1+γ−vε) , a contradiction.
6.2.2 Diversifying Dynamics
Theorem 1 shows that it is possible for a player to maintain an ε-diversified distribution
at all times while achieving low regret with respect to the entire family Pε of ε-diversified
distributions. However, suppose a player, who is allocating an investment portfolio among n
investments, does not recognize the need for maintaining a diversified distribution and simply
uses the standard multiplicative-weights algorithm to minimize regret. For example, the
player might not realize that the matrix M only represents “typical” behavior of investments,
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Algorithm 3 Multiplicative Weights Update algorithm with Interventions
Initialization: Fix a γ ≤ 1
2
. Set P (1) to be the uniform distribution.
For t = 1, 2, . . . , T :
1. Choose distribution P (t)
2. Receive the pure strategy jt for the column player










i (1− γ)M(i,jt) is the normalization factor.
4. While P (t+1) is not (1− γ)ε-diversified, run multiplicative update (Step 3) on fake
loss vector ` defined as:
`i =
{
1 if P (t+1)i >
1
(1−γ)εn
0 if P (t+1)i ≤ 1(1−γ)εn
and that a crooked portfolio manager or clever hacker could cause an entire investment to be
wiped out. This player might quickly reach a dangerous non-diversified portfolio in which
nearly all of its weight is just on one row.
Suppose, however, that an investment advisor or helpful authority has the ability to
charge fees on actions whose weights are too high, that can be viewed as inserting fake
loss vectors into the stream of loss vectors observed by the player’s algorithm. We show
here that by doing so in an appropriate manner, this advisor or authority can ensure that the
player both (a) maintains diversified distributions, and (b) incurs low regret with respect
to the family Pε over the sequence of real loss vectors. Viewed another way, this can be
thought of as an alternative to Algorithm 2 with slightly weaker guarantees but that does not
require the projection. The algorithm remains efficient.
Theorem 4. Algorithm 3 generates distributions P (1), . . . , P (T ) such that
(a) P (t) ∈ P(1−γ)ε for all t, and
91
(b) for any P ∈ Pε we have
T∑
t=1




RE(P ‖ P (1))
γ
.
Proof. For part (a) we just need to show that the while loop in Step 4 of the algorithm halts
after a finite number of loops. To show this, we show that each time a fake loss vector is
applied, the gap between the maximum and minimum total losses (including both actual
losses and fake losses) over the rows i is reduced. In particular, the multiplicative-weights
algorithm has the property that the probability on an action i is proportional to (1− γ)Litotal
where Litotal is the total loss (actual plus fake) on action i so far; so, the actions of highest
probability are also the actions of lowest total loss. This means that in Step 4, there exists
some threshold τ such that `i = 1 for all i of total loss at most τ and `i = 0 for all i of
total loss greater than τ . Since we are adding 1 to those actions of total loss at most τ ,
this means that the gap between the maximum and minimum total loss over all the actions
is decreasing, so long as that gap was greater than 1. However, note that if P (t+1) is not
(1− γ)ε-diversified then the gap between maximum and minimum total loss must be greater
than 1, by definition of the update rule and using the fact that ε ≤ 1. Therefore, the gap
between maximum and minimum total loss is strictly reduced on each iteration (and reduced
by at least 1 if any row is ever updated twice) until P (t+1) becomes (1− γ)ε-diversified.
For part (b), define Lalgactual =
∑T
t=1M(P
(t), jt) to be the actual loss of the algorithm
and define LPactual =
∑T
t=1M(P, jt) to be the actual loss of some ε-diversified distribution
P . We wish to show that Lalgactual is not too much larger than L
P
actual. To do so, we begin
with the fact that, by the usual multiplicative weights analysis, the algorithm has low regret
with respect to any fixed strategy over the entire sequence of loss vectors (actual and









fake. We know that





which we can rewrite as:
Lalgactual + L
alg




Thus, to prove part (b) it suffices to show that Lalgfake ≥ (1 + γ)LPfake. But notice that on





probability mass on row i. In contrast, P has at most 1
εn
probability
mass on row i, since P is ε-diversified. Therefore Lalgfake ≥ (1 + γ)LPfake and the proof is
complete.
This analysis can be extended to the case of an advisor who only periodically monitors
the player’s strategy. If the advisor monitors the strategy every k steps, then in the meantime
the maximum probability that any row i can reach is 1
(1−γ)kεn . So, part (a) of Theorem 4
would need to be relaxed to P (t) ∈ P(1−γ)kε . However, part (b) of Theorem 4 holds as is.
6.2.3 How Close Is vε to v?
Restricting the row player to play ε-diversified strategies can of course increase its minimax
loss, i.e., vε ≥ v. In fact, it is not hard to give examples of games where the gap is quite
large. For example, suppose the row player has one action that always incurs loss 0, and the
remaining n− 1 actions always incur loss 1 (whatever the column player does). Then v = 0
but for ε ∈ [ 1
n
, 1], vε = 1− 1εn .
However, we show here that for random matrices M , the gap between the two is quite
small. I.e., the additional loss incurred due to requiring diversification is low. A related
result, in a somewhat different model, appears in [124].
Theorem 5. Consider a random n×n gameM where each entryM(i, j) is drawn i.i.d. from
some distribution D over [0, 1]. With probability ≥ 1 − 1
n
, for any ε ≤ 1, we have







Proof. Let µ = Ex∼D[x] be the mean of distribution D. We will show that v and vε are both
close to µ. To argue this, we will examine the value of the uniform distribution Punif for
the row player, and the value of the uniform distribution Qunif for the column player. In
particular, notice that v ≥ miniM(i, Qunif) because Qunif is just one possible strategy for
the column player, and by definition, v = miniM(i, Q∗) where Q∗ is the minimax optimal
strategy for the column player, and the row player’s loss under Q∗ is greater than or equal
to the row player’s loss under Qunif since the column player is trying to maximize the row
player’s loss. Similarly, vε ≤ maxjM(Punif , j) since Punif is just one possible diversified
strategy for the row player, and by definition vε = maxjM(P ∗, j) where P ∗ is the minimax




M(i, Qunif) ≤ v ≤ vε ≤ max
j
M(Punif , j).
Thus, if we can show that with high probability miniM(i, Qunif) and maxjM(Punif , j) are
both close to µ, then this will imply that v and vε are close to each other.
Let us begin with Punif . Notice that M(Punif , j) is just the average of the entries in the












where the probability is over the random draw of M . By the union bound, with probability
at least 1 − 1
2n
, this inequality holds simultaneously for all columns j. Since Punif is ε-
diversified, as noted above this implies that vε ≤ µ+ c
√




On the other hand, by the same reasoning, with probability at least 1− 1
2n
the uniform









. Therefore, with probability
at least 1− 1
n







We now consider k-player general-sum games. Instead of minimax optimality, the natural
solution concept now is a Nash equilibrium. We begin by showing that unlike zero-sum
games, it is now possible for the payoff of a player at equilibrium to actually be improved
by requiring it to play a diversified strategy. This is a bit peculiar because constraining a
player is actually helping it.
We then consider the relationship between the social cost at equilibrium and the optimal
social cost, when all players are required to use diversified strategies. We call the ratio of
these two quantities the diversified price of anarchy of the game, in analogy to the usual
price of anarchy notion when there is no diversification constraint. We show that in some
natural games, even requiring a small amount of diversification can significantly improve
the price of anarchy of the game, though there also exist games where diversification can
make the price of anarchy worse. Finally, we bring several threads of this investigation
together by showing that for the class of smooth games defined by Roughgarden [101], for
any diversification parameter ε ∈ [ 1
n
, 1], the ε-diversified price of anarchy is no worse than
the smoothness of the game, and moreover that players using diversified regret-minimizing
strategies (such as those in Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2) will indeed approach this bound.
6.3.1 The Benefits of Diversification
First, let us formally define the notion of a Nash equilibrium subject to a (convex) constraint
C, where C could be a constraint such as “the row player must use an ε-diversified strategy”.
Definition 2. A set of mixed strategies (P1, . . . , Pk) is a Nash equilibrium subject to con-
straint C if no player can unilaterally deviate to improve its payoff without violating con-
straint C. We will just call this a Nash equilibrium when C is clear from context.
We now consider the case of k = 2 players, and examine how requiring the row player to
diversify can affect its payoff at equilibrium. For zero-sum games, the value vε was always
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no better than the minimax value v of the game, since constraining the row player can never
help it. We show here that this is not the case for general-sum games: requiring a player to
use a diversified strategy can in some games improve its payoff at equilibrium.
Theorem 6. There exist 2-player general-sum games for which a diversification constraint
on the row player lowers the row player’s payoff at equilibrium, and games for which such
a constraint increases the row player’s payoff at equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the following two bimatrix games (entries here represent payoffs rather
than losses):
Game A :
2, 2 1, 1
1, 1 0, 0
Game B :
1, 1 3, 0
0, 0 1, 3
In Game A, the unique Nash equilibrium has payoff of 2 to each player, and requiring
the row player to be diversified strictly lowers both player’s payoffs. On the other hand,
diversification helps the row player in Game B. Without a diversification constraint, in
Game B the row player will play the top row and the column player will therefore play the
left column, giving both players a payoff of 1. However, requiring the row-player to put
probability 1
2
on each row will cause the column player to choose the right column, giving
the row player a payoff of 2 and the column player a payoff of 1.5.
Routing games [125] are an interesting class of many-player games where requiring
all players to diversify can actually improve the quality of the equilibrium for everyone.
An example is Braess’ paradox [126] shown in Figure 6.2. In this example, k players
need to travel from s to t and wish to take the cheapest route. Edge costs are given in the
figure, where ke is the number of players using edge e. At Nash equilibrium, all players
choose the route s-a-b-t and incur a cost of 2. However, if they must put equal probability
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Figure 6.2: Braess’ paradox. Here, k players wish to travel from s to t, and requiring all
players to use diversified strategies improves the quality of the equilibrium for everyone.
higher average loss, overall, diversification can actually improve the quality of the resulting
equilibrium state. In the next section, we discuss the social cost of diversified equilibria in
many-player games in more detail, analyzing what we call the diversified price of anarchy
as well as the social cost that results from all players using diversified regret-minimizing
strategies.
6.3.2 The Diversified Price of Anarchy
We now consider structured general-sum games with k ≥ 2 players. In these games, each
player i chooses some strategy si from a strategy space Si. The combined choice of the
players s = (s1, . . . , sk), which we call the outcome, determines the cost that each player
incurs. Specifically, let costi(s) denote the cost incurred by player i under outcome s, and
let cost(s) =
∑k
i=1 costi(s) denote the overall social cost of s. Let s
∗ = argminscost(s),
i.e., the outcome of optimum social cost. The price of anarchy of a game is defined as the
maximum ratio cost(s)/cost(s∗) over all Nash equilibria s. A low price of anarchy in a
game means that all Nash equilibria have social cost that is not too much worse than the
optimum. We can analogously define the ε-diversified price of anarchy:
Definition 3. Let s∗ε denote the outcome of optimum social cost subject to each player
choosing an ε-diversified strategy. The ε-diversified price of anarchy is the maximum ratio
cost(sε)/cost(s
∗
ε) over all outcomes sε that are Nash equilibria subject to all players playing
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ε-diversified strategies.
Note that for any game, the 1-diversified price of anarchy equals 1, because players
are all required to play the uniform distribution. This suggests that as we increase ε, the
ε-diversified price of anarchy should drop, though as we show, in some games it is not
monotone.
Examples. In consensus games, each player i is a distinct node in a k-node graph G.
Players each choose one of two colors, red or blue, and the cost of player i is the number of
neighbors it has of color different from its own. The social cost is the sum of the players’
costs, and to keep ratios finite we add 1 to the total. The optimal s∗ is either “all blue” or
“all red” in which each player has a cost of 0, so the social cost is 1. However, if the graph is
a complete graph minus a matching, then there exists an equilibrium in which half of the
players choose red and half the players choose blue. Each player has k
2
− 1 red neighbors
and k
2
− 1 blue neighbors, so the social cost of this equilibrium is Θ(k2). This means the
price of anarchy is Θ(k2). However, if we require players to play ε-diversified strategies for
any constant ε > 1
2
(i.e., they cannot play pure strategies), then for any m-edge graph G,
even the optimum outcome has cost Ω(m) since every edge has a constant probability of
contributing to the cost. So the diversified price of anarchy is O(1).
As another example, consider atomic congestion games [127]. Here, we have a set R of
resources (e.g., edges in a graph G) and each player i has a strategy set Si ⊆ 2R (e.g., all
ways to select a path between two specified vertices in G). The cost incurred by a player
is the sum of the costs of the resources it uses (the cost of its path). Each resource j has
a cost function cj(kj) where kj is the number of players who are using resource j. The
cost functions cj could be increasing, such as in packet routing where latency increases
with the number of users of an edge, or decreasing, such as players splitting the cost of
a shared printer. When examining diversified strategies, we sometimes view players as
making fractional choices, such as sending half their packets down one path and half of
them down another. The quantity kj then denotes the total fractional usage of resource j (or
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equivalently, the expected number of users of that resource).
Non-monotonicity. An example of an atomic congestion game where some diversifi-
cation can initially increase the price of anarchy is the following. Suppose there are four
resources, and each player just needs to choose one of them. The costs of the resources
behave as follows:
c1(k1) = 1, c2(k2) = 5, c3(k3) = 6/k3, c4(k4) = 6/k4.
Assume the total number of players k is at least 13. The optimal outcome s∗ is for all players
to choose resource 3 (or all choose resource 4) for a total social cost of 6. The optimal
ε-diversified outcome for ε = 1
2
(i.e., each player can put weight at most 1
2
on any given
resource) is for all players to put half their weight on strategy 3 and half their weight on
strategy 4, for a total cost of 12. The worst Nash equilibrium is for all players to choose
strategy 1, for a total cost of k, giving a price of anarchy of k/6. However if we require
players to be ε-diversified for ε = 1
2
, there is now a worse equilibrium where each player
puts half its weight on strategy 1 and half its weight on strategy 2, for a total cost of 3k and





price of anarchy, and then increasing ε further to 1 will then decrease the price of anarchy to
1.
General Bounds
We now present a general bound on the diversified price of anarchy for games, as well as
for the social welfare when all players use diversified regret-minimizing strategies such as
given in Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2, using the smoothness framework of Roughgarden [101].





i , s−i) ≤ λ cost(s∗) + µ cost(s).
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Here, (s∗i , s−i) means the outcome in which player i plays its action in s
∗ but all other
players play their action in s.
Theorem 7. If a game is (λ, µ)-smooth, then for any ε, the ε-diversified price of anarchy is
at most λ
1−µ .
Proof. Let s = sε be some Nash equilibrium subject to all players playing ε-diversified
strategies, and let s∗ = s∗ε be an outcome of optimum social cost subject to all players
choosing ε-diversified strategies. Since s is an equilibrium, no player wishes to deviate to
their action in s∗; here we are using the fact that s∗ includes only ε-diversified strategies, so




i , s−i) ≤ λ cost(s∗) +
µ cost(s). Rearranging, we have (1 − µ)cost(s) ≤ λ cost(s∗), so cost(s)/cost(s∗) ≤
λ
1−µ .
Roughgarden [101] shows that atomic congestion games with affine cost functions, i.e.,
cost functions of the form cj(kj) = ajkj + bj , are (53 ,
1
3
)-smooth. So, their ε-diversified
price of anarchy is at most 2.5. We now adapt the proof in [101] to show that players
with vanishing regret with respect to diversified strategies will also approach the bound of
Theorem 7.
Theorem 8. Suppose that in repeated play of a (λ, µ)-smooth game, each player i uses
a sequence of mixed strategies s(1)i , . . . , s
(T )

















−i) + ∆T .











In particular, if ∆T → 0 then the average social cost approaches the bound of Theorem 7.
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Proof. Combining the assumption of the theorem, the definition of social cost, and the




























































cost(s(t)) ≤ λ cost(s∗) + k∆T ,
which immediately yields the result of the theorem.
6.3.3 The Cost of Diversification
We now complement the above results by considering how much worse cost(s∗ε) can be
compared to cost(s∗) in natural games. We focus here on unit-demand congestion games
where each strategy set Si ⊆ R; that is, each player i selects a single resource in Si. In
particular, we focus on two important special cases: (a) cj(kj) = 1/kj ∀j (players share
the cost of their resource equally with all others who make the same choice; this can be
viewed as a game-theoretic distributed hitting-set problem), and (b) cj(kj) = kj ∀j, i.e.,
linear congestion games. To avoid unnecessary complication, we assume all Si have the
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same size n, i.e., every player has n choices. We will also think of the number of choices
per player n as O(1), whereas the number of players k and the total number of resources R
may be large.
Unfortunately, in both cases (a) and (b), the cost of diversification can be very high in
the worst case. For case (a) (cost sharing), a bad scenario is if there is a single element j∗
such that Si ∩ Si′ = j∗ for all pairs i 6= i′. Here, cost(s∗) = 1 since all players can choose
j∗, but for any ε ∈ [ 2
n
, 1], we have E[cost(s∗ε)] = Ω(k), since even in the best solution
each player has a 50% chance of choosing a resource that no other player chose. For case
(b) (linear congestion), a bad scenario is if there are n− 1 elements j∗1 , . . . , j∗n−1 such that
Si ∩ Si′ = {j∗1 , . . . , j∗n−1} for all pairs i 6= i′. Here, cost(s∗) = k since each player can
choose a distinct resource, but for any ε ∈ [ 2
n
, 1], we have E[cost(s∗ε)] = Ω(k
2/(n − 1)),
which is Ω(k2) for n = O(1). So, in both cases, the ratio cost(s∗ε)/cost(s
∗) = Ω(k).
However, in the average case (each Si consists of n random elements from R) the cost
of diversification is only O(1).
Theorem 9. For both (a) unit-demand cost-sharing and (b) unit-demand linear congestion
games, with n = O(1) strategies per player and random strategy sets Si, E[cost(s∗ε)] =
O(E[cost(s∗)]).
Proof. Let us first consider (a) unit-demand cost-sharing. One lower bound on cost(s∗)
is that it is at least the cardinality of the largest collection of disjoint strategy sets Si; for
n = 2 this is the statement that the smallest vertex cover in a graph is at least the size
of the maximum matching. Now consider selecting the random sets Si one at a time.
For i ≤ R/n2, the first i sets cover at most R/n resources, so set Si+1 has at least a
constant probability of being disjoint from the first i. This means that the expected size
of the largest collection of disjoint strategy sets is at least Ω(min{k,R/n2}). On the other
hand, a trivial upper bound on cost(s∗ε), even for ε = 1, is min{k,R}, since at worst each




Now let us consider (b) unit-demand linear congestion. In this case, a lower bound on
cost(s∗) is the best-case allocation of all resources equally divided. In this case we have
k/R usage per resource for a total cost of R × (k/R)2 = k2/R. Another lower bound is
simply k, so we have cost(s∗) ≥ max{k, k2/R}. On the other hand, we can notice that s∗ε
for a fully-diversified ε = 1 and random sets Si is equivalent to players choosing resources
independently at random. In this case, the social cost is identical to the analysis of random




j ] = k+ k(k− 1)/R. Thus, E[cost(s∗ε)] = O(E[cost(s∗)])
as desired.
6.4 Distributed Setting
We now consider a distributed setting where the actions of the row player are partitioned
among k entities, such as subdivisions within a company or machines in a distributed system.
At each time step, the row player asks for a number of actions from each entity, and plays a
mixed strategy over them. However, asking for actions requires communication, which we
would like to minimize.
Our aim is to obtain results similar to Theorem 3 with low communication complexity,
measured by the number of actions requested and any additional constant-sized words
communicated. Let d ≤ logm denote the VC-dimension or pseudo-dimension of the set of
columns H , viewing each row as an example and each column as a hypothesis. A baseline




) times, from the uniform multinomial
distribution over {1, . . . , k} and asks each entity to send the corresponding number of
actions to the row player. The row player can then use Algorithm 2 as in the centralized
setting over the sampled actions, and will lose only an additional ε in the value of its strategy.




) actions plus O(k) additional
words. Here, we provide an algorithm that reduces communication to O(d log(1/ε)). The
idea is to show that in Algorithm 2, each iteration of the multiplicative weight update can be
simulated in the distributed setting with O(d) communication. Then, since there are at most
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O(log(1/ε)) iterations, the desired result follows. More specifically, we show that in each
iteration, we can do the following two actions communication efficiently:
1. For any distribution P over the rows partitioned across k entities, obtain a column j
such that M(P, j) ≥ vε.
2. Update the distribution using the received column j.
To achieve the first statement, assume there is a centralized oracle, which for any ε-
diversified distribution P returns a column j such that M(P, j) ≥ vε. For any distribution P
partitioned across k entities, each agent first sends its sum of weights to the row player. Then,
the row player samples O( d
(1−α)2v2ε
) actions (0 < α < 1) across the k agents proportional
to their sum of weights, where d is the VC-dimension of H . By the standard VC-theory,
a mixed strategy P ′ of choosing a uniform distribution over the sampled actions is a
(1 − α)vε-approximation for H , i.e. M(P ′, j) ≥ M(P, j) − (1 − α)vε ≥ αvε for all
column j ∈ H . The communication complexity of this step is O( d
(1−α)2v2ε
) actions plus
O(k) additional words. For (2), we show steps 3 and 4 in Algorithm 2 can be simulated
with low communication. Step 3 is easy: just send column j to all entities, and each entity
then updates its own weights. What is left is to show that the projection step in Algorithm 2
can be simulated in the distributed setting. Fortunately, this projection step has been studied
before in the distributed machine learning literature [108], where an efficient algorithm
with O(k log2(d/ε)) words of comunication is proposed. We summarize our results for the
distributed setting with the following theorem.
Theorem 10. Given a centralized oracle, which for any ε-diversified distribution P returns
a column j such that M(P, j) ≥ vε. If the actions of the row players are distributed across
k entities, there is an algorithm that constructs a mixed strategy Q such that for all but an





) actions and uses an additional O( log(1/ε)





To better understand the benefit of diversified strategies, we give some empirical simulations
for both two-player zero-sum games and general-sum games. For all the experiments, we
fix γ = 0.2 and show the results of using different values of ε.
Two-player zero-sum games. The row player has n = 10 actions to choose from,
where each round, each action ai returns a uniformly random reward ri ∈ [i/n, 1]. The game
is played for T = 10, 000 rounds. Note that the n-th action has the highest expected reward.
We consider two scenarios in which a rare but catastrophic event occurs. The first
scenario is that at time T , the cumulative reward gained from choosing the n-th action
becomes zero. The second scenario is that the n-th action incurs a large negative reward
of −T in time step T . Both of these can be viewed as different ways of simulating a bad
event where, for instance, the shares of a company become worthless when the company
goes bankrupt.
The results for both scenarios, averaged over 10 independent trials, are shown in Fig-
ure 6.4. One can see that as expected, in the normal situation, the diversified strategy gains
less reward. However, when the rare event happens, the non-diversified strategy gains very
low reward. In both cases, a modest value of ε = 0.4 achieves a high reward whether the
bad event happens or not.
General-sum games. We play the routing game defined in Braess’ paradox (see Fig-
ure 6.2). Each player has three routes to choose from (s-a-b-t, s-a-t, and s-b-t) in each
round, so ε ∈ [1/3, 1]. As anlyzed in Section 6.3.1, without the diversified constraint (i.e.,
ε = 1/3), the game quickly converges to the Nash equilibrium where all players choose the
route s-a-b-t and incur a loss of 2. The best strategy in this case is to play the 1-diversified
strategy, which incur a lower loss of about 1.55. See Figure 6.3 for the results using other ε
values.
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Figure 6.3: Simulated resuls of Braess’ paradox after T = 10, 000 rounds. A more diversi-
















0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
ε









(a) Rare event removes all the reward gained
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(b) Rare event changes the reward of the n-th
action to −T in the last round.
Figure 6.4: Average reward over T = 10, 000 rounds with different values of ε. When the
rare event happens, the non-diversified strategy gains very low (even negative) reward.
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6.6 Conclusion
We consider games in which one wants to play well without choosing a mixed strategy
that is too concentrated. We show that such a diversification restriction has a number of
benefits, and give adaptive algorithms to find diversified strategies that are near-optimal, also
showing how taxes or fines can be used to keep a standard algorithm diversified. Further, our
algorithms are simple and efficient, and can be implemented in a distributed setting. We also
analyze properties of diversified strategies in both zero-sum and general-sum games, and




COMMUNICATION EFFICIENT DISTRIBUTED AGNOSTIC BOOSTING
In this chapter, we show how the online decision-making framework introduced in the previ-
ous chapter can also help train a robust and scalable machine learning model. Specifically,
we consider the problem of learning from distributed data in the agnostic setting, i.e., in
the presence of arbitrary forms of noise. Our main contribution is a general distributed
boosting-based procedure for learning an arbitrary concept space, that is simultaneously
noise tolerant, communication efficient, and computationally efficient. This improves signifi-
cantly over prior works that were either communication efficient only in noise-free scenarios
or computationally prohibitive. Empirical results on large synthetic and real-world datasets
demonstrate the effectiveness and scalability of the proposed approach.
7.1 Introduction
Distributed machine learning has received an increasing amount of attention in this “big data”
era [128]. The most common use case of distributed learning is when the data cannot fit into
a single machine, or when one wants to speed up the training process by utilizing parallel
computation of multiple machines [129, 130, 131]. In these cases, one can usually freely
distribute the data across entities, and an evenly distributed partition would be a natural
choice.
In this work, we consider a different setting where the data is inherently distributed
across different locations or entities. Examples of this scenario include scientific data
gathered by different teams, or customer information of a multinational corporation obtained
in different countries. The goal is to design an efficient learning algorithm with a low
generalization error over the union of the data. Note that the distribution of the data from
each source may be very different. Therefore, to deal with the worst-case situation, we
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assume the data can be adversarially partitioned. This scenario has been studied for different
tasks, such as supervised learning [118, 132, 117], unsupervised learning [133, 134], and
optimization [135, 136].
Traditional machine learning algorithms often only care about sample complexity and
computational complexity. However, since the bottleneck in the distributed setting is often
the communication between machines [118], the theoretical analysis in this work will focus
on communication complexity. A baseline approach in this setting would be to uniformly
sample examples from each entity and perform centralized learning at the center. By the




) is sufficient. The communication





More advanced algorithms with better communication complexities have been proposed
in recent works [118, 117]. For example, [118] proposes a generic distributed boosting
algorithm that achieves communication with only logarithmic dependence on 1/ε for any
concept class. Unfortunately, their method only works in the standard realizable PAC-
learning setting, where the data can be perfectly classified by a function in the hypothesis
set and is noiseless. This is because many boosting algorithms are vulnerable to noise [137,
138]. The realizable case is often unrealistic in real-world problems. Therefore, we consider
the more general agnostic learning setting [139], where there is no assumption on the target
function. Since it is impossible to achieve an arbitrary error rate ε, the goal in this setting
is to find a hypothesis with error rate close to opt(H), the minimum error rate achievable
within the hypothesis set H . The error bound is often in the form of O(opt(H)) + ε. Balcan
et al. [118] propose an algorithm based on the robust generalized halving algorithm with
communication complexity of Õ(k log(|H|) log(1/ε)) examples. However, the algorithm
works only for a finite hypothesis set H and is computationally inefficient.
We propose a new distributed boosting algorithm that works in the agnostic learning
setting. While our algorithm can handle this much more difficult and more realistic scenario,
it enjoys the same communication complexity as in [118] that is logarithmic in 1/ε and
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exponentially better than the natural baselines. The algorithm is computationally efficient
and works for any concept class with a finite VC-dimension. The key insight, inspired by
[118], is that a constant (independent of ε) number of examples suffice to learn a weak
hypothesis, and thus if the boosting algorithm only needs O(log 1
ε
) iterations, we obtain the
desired result.
A key challenge in this approach is that most agnostic boosting algorithms either have
poor error bound guarantees or require too many iterations. The first agnostic boosting
algorithm was proposed in [140]. Although the number of iterations is O(log 1
ε
) and is
asymptotically optimal, their bound on the final error rate is much weaker: instead of
O(opt(H)) + ε, the bound is O(opt(H)c(β)) + ε, where c(β) = 2(1/2− β)2/ ln(1/β − 1).
Some subsequent works [141, 111] significantly improve the bound on the error rate. How-
ever, their algorithms all require O(1/ε2) iterations, which can in turn result in O(1/ε2)
communication in the distributed setting. Fortunately, we identify a very special boosting
algorithm [142] that runs in O(log 1
ε
) iterations. This algorithm was analyzed in the realiz-
able case in the original paper, but has later been noted to be able to work in the agnostic
setting [143]. We show how to adapt it to the distributed setting and obtain a communication
efficient distributed learning algorithm with good agnostic learning error bound. Our main
contributions are summarized as follows.
• We identify a centralized agnostic boosting algorithm and show that it can be elegantly
adapted to the distributed setting. This results in the first algorithm that is both
computationally efficient and communication efficient to learn a general concept class
in the distributed agnostic learning setting.
• Our proposed algorithm, which is a boosting-based approach, is flexible in that it can
be used with various weak learners. Furthermore, the weak learner only needs to work
in the traditional centralized setting rather than in the more challenging distributed
setting. This makes it much easier to design new algorithms for different concept
classes in the distributed setting.
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• We confirm our theoretical results by empirically comparing our algorithm to the
existing distributed boosting algorithm [118]. It does much better on the synthetic
dataset and achieves promising results on real-world datasets as well.
7.2 Problem Setup
We first introduce agnostic learning as a special case of the general statistical learning
problem. Then, we discuss the extension of the problem to the distributed setting, where the
data is adversarially partitioned.
7.2.1 Statistical Learning Problem
In statistical learning, we have access to a sampling oracle according to some probability
distribution D over X × {−1, 1}. The goal of a learning algorithm is to output a hypothesis
h with a low error rate with respect to D, defined as errD(h) = E(x,y)∼D(h(x) 6= y). Often,
we compare the error rate to the minimum achievable value within a hypothesis set H ,
denoted by errD(H) = infh′∈H errD(h′). More precisely, a common error bound is in the
following form.
errD(h) ≤ c · errD(H) + ε, (7.1)
for some constant c ≥ 1 and an arbitrary error parameter ε > 0.
Many efficient learning algorithms have been proposed for the realizable case, where the
target function is in H and thus errD(H) = 0. In this work, we consider the more general
case where we do not have any assumption on the value of errD(H). This is often called
the agnostic learning setting [139] . Ideally, we want c in the bound to be as close to one as
possible. However, for some hypothesis set H , achieving such a bound with c = 1 is known
to be NP-hard [144].
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7.2.2 Extension to the Distributed Setting
In this work, we consider the agnostic learning problem in the distributed learning frame-
work proposed by [118]. In this framework, we have k entities. Each entity i ∈ [k] has
access to a sampling oracle according to a distribution Di over X × {−1, 1}. There is also
a center which can communicate with the k entities and acts as a coordinator. The goal is to




much communication among entities. It is convenient to calculate the communication by
words. For example, a d-dimensional vector counts as O(d) words.
Main goal. The problem we want to solve in this work is to design an algorithm that
achieves error bound (7.1) for a general concept class H . The communication complexity
should depend only logarithmically on 1/ε.
7.3 Distributed Agnostic Boosting
In this work, we show a distributed boosting algorithm for any concept class with a finite
VC-dimension d. In the realizable PAC setting, the boosting algorithm is assumed to have
access to a γ-weak learner that, under any distribution, finds a hypothesis with error rate
at most 1/2− γ. This assumption is unrealistic in the agnostic setting since even the best
hypothesis in the hypothesis set can perform poorly. Instead, following the setting of [140],
the boosting algorithm is assumed to have access to a β-weak agnostic learner defined as
follows.
Definition 5. A β-weak agnostic learner, given any probability distribution D, will return a
hypothesis h with error rate
errD(h) ≤ errD(H) + β.
Detailed discussion of the existence of such weak learners can be found in [140]. Since
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error of 1/2 can be trivially achieved, in order for the weak learner to convey meaningful
information, we assume errD(H) < 1/2− β. Some prior works use different definitions.
For example, [145] uses the definition of (α, γ)-weak learner. That definition is stronger
than ours, since an (α, γ)-weak learner in that paper implies a β-weak learner in our work
with β = α− γ. Therefore, our results still hold by using their definition. Below we show
an efficient agnostic boosting algorithm in the centralized setting.
7.3.1 Agnostic Boosting: Centralized Version
The main reason why many boosting algorithms (including AdaBoost [102] and weight-
based boosting [146, 147]) fail in the agnostic setting is that they tend to update the example
weights aggressively and may end up putting too much weight on noisy examples.
Inspired by the “diversified” distribution introduced in the previous chapter, we consider
a smoothed boosting algorithm [142], shown in Algorithm 4. This algorithm uses at most
O(log 1/ε) iterations and enjoys a nice “smoothness” property, which is shown to be helpful
in the agnostic setting [111]. The algorithm was originally analyzed in the realizable case but
has later been noted to be able to work in the agnostic setting [143]. Below, for completeness
we show the analyses of the algorithm in both the realizable and agnostic settings.
The boosting algorithm adjusts the example weights using the standard multiplicative
weight update rule. The main difference is that it performs an additional Bregman projection
step of the current example weight distribution into a convex set P after each boosting
iteration. The Bregman projection is a general projection technique that finds a point in
the feasible set with the smallest “distance” to the original point in terms of Bregman
divergence. Here we use a particular Bregman divergence called relative entropy RE(p ‖
q) =
∑
i pi ln(pi/qi) for two distributions p and q. To ensure that the boosting algorithm
always generates a “diversified” distribution, we set the feasible set P to be the set of all
ε-diversified distributions as defined in Definition 1.
The complete boosting algorithm is shown in Algorithm 4 and the theoretical guarantee
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Algorithm 4 Centralized Smooth Boosting algorithm [142]
Initialization: Fix a γ ≤ 1
2
. Let D(1) to be the uniform distribution over the dataset S.
For t = 1, 2, . . . , T :
1. Call the weak learner with distribution D(t) and obtain a hypothesis h(t)
2. Update the example weights
D̂(t+1)(i) = D(t)(i) · (1− γ)`
(t)
i /Z(t)
where `(t)i = 1[h





i is the normalization
factor.
3. Project D̂(t+1) into the feasible set P of ε-diversified distributions
D(t+1) = arg min
D∈P
RE(D ‖ D̂(t+1))








in Theorem 11. The proof is similar to the one in [142], except that they use real-valued
weak learners, whereas here we only consider binary hypotheses for simplicity.
Theorem 11. Given a sample S and access to a γ-weak learner, Algorithm 4 makes at most
T = O( log(1/ε)
γ2
) calls to the weak learner with ε-diversified distributions and achieves error
rate ε on S.
Note that in Theorem 11, it is not explicitly assumed to be in the realizable case. In
other words, If we have a γ-weak learner in the agnostic setting, we can achieve the same
guarantee. However, in the agnostic setting, we only have access to a β-weak agnostic
learner, which is a much weaker and more realistic assumption. The next theorem shows the
error bound we get under this usual assumption in the agnostic setting.
Theorem 12. Given a sample S and access to a β-weak agnostic learner, Algorithm 4 uses
at most O( log(1/ε)
(1/2−β)2 ) iterations and achieves an error rate
2errS(H)
1/2−β + ε on S, where errS(H)
is the optimal error rate on S achievable using the hypothesis class H .
Proof. We show that as long as the boosting algorithm always generates some ε′-diversified
distributions, the β-weak agnostic learner is actually a γ-weak learner for some γ > 0, i.e.,
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it achieves error rate 1/2 − γ for any ε′-diversified distributions. In each iteration t, the
β-weak agnostic learner, given S with distribution D(t), returns a hypothesis h(t) such that
errD(t)(h




The second inequality utilizes the ε′-diversifiedness property of D(t). The reason is that if h
is the optimal hypothesis on S, we have












errS(H) + β =
1
2
− γ, or equivalently γ = (1
2




1/2−β , we have γ ≥
1
2
(1/2 − β) > 0. Therefore, we can use Theorem 11, and
achieves error rate ε′ on S by using O( log(1/ε
′)
(1/2−β)2 ) iterations. Alternatively, it achieves error
rate 2errS(H)
1/2−β + ε by using O(
log(1/ε)
(1/2−β)2 ) iterations.
Next, we show how to adapt this algorithm to the distributed setting.
7.3.2 Agnostic Boosting: Distributed Version
The technique of adapting a boosting algorithm to the distributed setting is inspired by
[118]. They claim that any weight-based boosting algorithm can be turned into a distributed
boosting algorithm with communication complexity that depends linearly on the number of
iterations in the original boosting algorithm. However, their result is not directly applicable
to our boosting algorithm due to the additional projection step. We will describe our
distributed boosting algorithm by showing how to simulate the three steps in each iteration
of Algorithm 4 in the distributed setting with O(d) words of communication. Then, since
there are at most O(log(1/ε)) iterations, the desired result follows.
In step 1, in order to obtain a 2β-weak hypothesis (we use 2β instead of β for conve-
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nience, which only affects the constant terms), the center calls the β-weak agnostic learner





i . The sampling procedure is as follows. Each





examples in total across the k entities proportional to their sum of weights. By the standard
VC-theory, the error rate of any hypothesis on the sample is within β to the true error rate
with respect to the underlying distribution, with high probability. It is thus sufficient to find
a hypothesis with error within β to the best hypothesis, which can be done thanks to the
assumed β-weak learner.
Step 2 is relatively straightforward. The center broadcasts h(t) and each entity updates
its own internal weights independently. Each entity then sends the summation of internal
weights to the center for the calculation of the normalization factor. The communication
in this step is O(kd) for sending h(t) and some numbers. What is left is to show that the
projection in step 3 can be done in a communication efficient way. As shown in [123],
the projection using relative entropy as the distance into P , the set of all ε-diversified
distributions, can be done by the following simple algorithm.
For a fixed index m, we first clip the largest m coordinates of p to 1
εn
, and then rescale
the rest of the coordinates to sum up to 1 − m
εn
. We find the least index m such that the
resulting distribution is in P , i.e. all the coordinates are at most 1
εn
. A naive algorithm by
first sorting the coordinates takes O(n log n) time, but it is communicationally inefficient.
Fortunately, [123] also proposes a more advanced algorithm by recursively finding the
median. The idea is to use the median as the threshold, which corresponds to a potential
index m, i.e., m is the number of coordinates larger than the median. We then use a binary
search to find the least index m. The distributed version of the algorithm is shown in
Algorithm 5.
Theorem 13. Algorithm 5 projects a n-dimensional distribution into the set of all ε-
diversified distributions P with O(k log2(n)) words of total communication complexity.
Proof. Since Algorithm 5 is a direct adaptation of the centralized projection algorithm in
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Algorithm 5 Distributed Bregman projection algorithm
Input:
Center: n0 = n; C = 0; Cw = 0
Each entity i: a disjoint subsetWi ofW = {w1, . . . , wn}
While n0 6= 0:
Distributedly find the median θ of (W1, . . . ,Wk)
Each entity i:
Li = {w : w < θ,w ∈ Wi}; Lwi =
∑
w∈Li w
Mi = {w : w = θ, w ∈ Wi}; Mwi =
∑
w∈Mi w




























1−(Cw+Hw) and broadcasts it
if θm0 > 1εn then
C = C +H +M ; Cw = Cw +Hw +Mw
if L = 0 then θ = max(w : w < θ, w ∈ W)
set n0 = L
notify each entity i to setWi = Li
else
set n0 = H




1−Cw and broadcasts it





if wi > θ
wim0 if wi ≤ θ
[123], we omit the proof of its correctness. Because we use a binary search over possible
thresholds, the algorithm runs at most O(log(n)) iteration. Therefore, it suffices to show
that the communication complexity of finding the median is at most O(k log n). This can be
done by the iterative procedure shown in Algorithm 6. Each entity first sends its own median
to the center. The center identifies the maximum and minimum local medians, denoted
as m and m, respectively. The global median must be between m and m, and removing
the same number of elements larger than or equal to m and less than m will not change
the median. Therefore, the center can notify the two corresponding entities and let them
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Algorithm 6 Distributedly finding the median
Input:
Each entity i: a disjoint subsetWi ofW = {w1, . . . , wn}
Each entity i: Send the median mi ofWi to the center
While |Wi| > 1 for some i ∈ [k]:
Center:
Find the maximum and minimum of the k medians, denoted by m and m and
notify the corresponding entities, denoted by A and B.
Entity A : Send n = |i : wi ∈ WA, wi ≥ m| to the center
Entity B : Send n = |i : wi ∈ WB, wi < m| to the center
Center: Send r = min{n, n} to entity A and B
Entity A: Remove the largest r elements inWA
Entity B: Remove the smallest r elements inWB
Entity A and B: Send the new median to the center
remove the same number of elements. At least one entity will reduce its size by half, so
the algorithm stops after O(k log n) iterations. Note that except for the first round, we only
need to communicate the updated medians of two entities at each round, so the overall
communication complexity is O(k log n) words.
In practice, it is often easier and more efficient to use a quickselect-based distributed
algorithm to find the median. The idea is to randomly select and broadcast a weight at each
iteration. This, in expectation, can remove half of the possible median candidates. This
approach achieves the same communication complexity in expectation.
The complete distributed agnostic boosting algorithm is shown in Algorithm 7. We
summarize our theoretical results in the next Theorem.
Theorem 14. Given access to a β-weak agnostic learner, Algorithm 7 achieves error
rate 2errD(H)
1/2−β + ε by using at most O(
log(1/ε)
(1/2−β)2 ) rounds, each involving O((d/β
2) log(1/β))
examples and an additional O(kd log2(d log(1/ε)
(1/2−β)ε )) words of communication per round.
Proof. The boosting algorithm starts by drawing fromD a sample S of size n = Õ( log(1/ε)d
(1/2−β)2ε2 )
across the k entities without communicating them. If S is a centralized dataset, then by The-




on S using O( log(1/ε)
(1/2−β)2 )
iterations. We have shown that Algorithm 7 is a correct simulation of Algorithm 4 in
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Algorithm 7 Distributed agnostic boosting algorithm
Initialization:






Sample Si drawn from Di such that S = ∪iSi with size n = Õ( log(1/ε)d(1/2−β)2ε2 ))
Set weights v(1)i,x = 1/|Si| for each (x, y) ∈ Si
For t = 1, 2, . . . , T :




i,x to the center




i . Determine the number of examples n
(t)
i to request from








(t), and then send each number n(t)i to entity i.
Each entity i: sample n(t)i times from Si proportional to v
(t)
i,x; send them to center





examples, and then broadcast the returned hypothesis h(t)











Distributedly normalize and then project the weights by Algorithm 5








the distributed setting, and thus we achieve the same error bound on S. The number of
communication rounds is the same as the number of iterations of the boosting algorithm.
And in each round, the communication includes O(d/β2 log(1/β)) examples for finding the
β-weak hypothesis, O(kd) words for broadcasting the hypothesis and some numbers, and
O(k log2(n)) words for the distributed Bregman projection.




on S. To obtain the generalization
error bound, note that with n = Õ( log(1/ε)d
(1/2−β)2ε2 ) and by the standard VC-dimension argument,
we have that with high probability errS(H) ≤ errD(H) + (1/2−β)ε8 , and the generalization
error of our final hypothesis deviates from the empirical error by at most ε/4, which
completes the proof with the desired generalization error bound.
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7.4 Experiments
In this section, we compare the empirical performance of the proposed distributed boosting
algorithms with two other algorithms on synthetic and real-world datasets. The first one is
distributed AdaBoost [118], which is similar to our algorithm but without the projection step.
The second one is the distributed logistic regression algorithm available in the MPI imple-
mentation of the Liblinear package [148]. We choose it as a comparison to a non-boosting
approach. Note that Liblinear is a highly-optimized package while our implementation is
not, so the comparison in terms of speed is not absolutely fair. However, we show that
our approach, grounded in a rigorous framework, is comparable to this leading method in
practice.
7.4.1 Experiment Setup
All three algorithms are implemented in C using MPI, and all the experiments are run on
Amazon EC2 with 16 m3.large machines. The data is uniformly partitioned across 16
machines. All the results are averaged over 10 independent trials. Logistic regression is
a deterministic algorithm, so we do not show the standard deviation of the error rate. We
however still run it for 10 times to get the average running time. Since each algorithm has
different number of parameters, for fairness, we do not tune the parameters. For the two
boosting algorithms, we use T = 100 decision stumps as our weak learners and set β = 0.2
and ε = 0.1 in all experiments. For logistic regression, we use the default parameter C = 1.
7.4.2 Synthetic Dataset
We use the synthetic dataset from [138]. This dataset has an interesting theoretical property
that although it is linearly separable, by randomly flipping a tiny fraction of labels, all
convex potential boosting algorithms, including AdaBoost, fail to learn well. A random
example is generated as follows. The label y is randomly chosen from {−1,+1} with equal
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Table 7.1: Average (over 10 trials) error rate (%) and standard deviation on the synthetic
dataset
Noise Dist.AdaBoost Dist.SmoothBoost Liblinear-LR
0.1% 11.64 ± 3.82 4.28 ± 0.66 0.00
1% 25.97 ± 1.56 13.38 ± 4.66 0.00
10% 28.04 ± 0.94 27.07 ± 1.60 37.67
Table 7.2: Average (over 10 trials) error rate (%) and standard deviation on real-world
datasets
Dataset #examples # features Dist.AdaBoost Dist.SmoothBoost Liblinear-LR
Adult 48,842 123 15.71 ± 0.16 15.07 ± 2.32 15.36
Ijcnn1 141,691 22 5.90 ± 0.10 4.33 ± 0.18 7.57
Cod-RNA 488,565 8 6.12 ± 0.09 6.51 ± 0.11 11.79
Covtype 581,012 54 24.98 ± 0.22 24.68 ± 0.30 24.52
Yahoo 3,251,378 10 37.08 ± 0.15 36.86 ± 0.27 39.15
odds. The feature x = 〈x1, . . . , x21〉, where xi ∈ {−1,+1}, is sampled from a mixture
distribution: 1) With probability 1/4, set all xi to be equal to y. 2) With probability 1/4,
set x1 = x2 = · · · = x11 = y and x12 = x13 = · · · = x21 = −y. 3) With probability 1/2,
randomly set 5 coordinates from the first 11 and 6 coordinates from the last 10 to be equal
to y. Set the remaining coordinates to −y.
We generate 1,600,000 examples in total for training on 16 machines and test on a
separate set of size 100,000. The results are shown in Table 7.1. One can see that our
approach (Dist.SmoothBoost), is more resistant to noise than Dist.AdaBoost and significantly
outperforms it for having upto 1% noise. In high noise setting (10%), Liblinear performs
poorly, while our approach achieves the best error rate.
7.4.3 Real-world Datasets
We run the experiments on 5 real-world datasets with sizes ranging from 50 thousands
to over 3 millions: ADULT, IJCNN1, COD-RNA, and COVTYPE from the LibSVM data
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Table 7.3: Average run time (sec) on real-world datasets
Dataset Dist.AdaBoost Dist.SmoothBoost Liblinear-LR
Adult 5.02 15.54 0.06
Ijcnn1 0.76 9.19 0.10
Cod-RNA 1.08 10.11 0.12
Covtype 3.71 6.48 0.31
Yahoo 3.37 3.79 1.37
repository 1; YAHOO from the Yahoo! WebScope dataset [149]. The Yahoo dataset is used
for predicting whether a user will click the news article on their front page. It contains user
click logs and is extremely imbalanced. We trim down this dataset so that the number of
positive and negative examples are the same. The detailed information of the datasets are
summarized in Table 7.2. Each dataset is randomly split into 4/5 for the training set and 1/5
for the testing set.
The average error rate and the total running time are summarized in Table 7.2 and Ta-
ble 7.3, respectively. The bold entries indicates the best error rate. Our approach outperforms
the other two on 3 datasets and performs competitively on the other 2 datasets. In terms
of running time, Liblinear is the fastest on all datasets. However, the communication of
our algorithm only depends on the dimension d, so even for the largest dataset (YAHOO), it
can still finish within 4 seconds. Therefore, our algorithm is suitable for many real-world
situations where the number of examples is much larger than the dimension of the data. Fur-
thermore, our algorithm can be used with more advanced weak learners, such as distributed
logistic regression, to further reduce the running time.
7.5 Conclusions
We propose the first distributed boosting algorithm that enjoys strong performance guar-
antees, being simultaneously noise tolerant, communication efficient, and computationally
efficient; furthermore, it is quite flexible in that it can used with a variety of weak learners.
1http://www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/˜cjlin/libsvmtools/datasets.
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This improves over the prior work of [118, 117] that were either communication efficient
only in noise-free scenarios or computationally prohibitive. While enjoying nice theoretical
guarantees, our algorithm also shows promising empirical results on large synthetic and
real-world datasets.
Finally, we raise some related open questions. In this work we assumed a star topology,
i.e., the center can communicate with all players directly. An interesting open question is to
extend our results to general communication topologies. Another concrete open question is
reducing the constant in our error bound while maintaining good communication complexity.
Finally, our approach uses centralized weak learners for learning general concept classes, so
the computation is mostly done in the center. Are there efficient distributed weak learners for
some specific concept classes? That could provide a more computation balanced distributed
learning procedure that enjoys strong communication complexity as well.
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Part III




Part I and II of my thesis provide theories, algorithms, and insight of the capabilities and
limitations of AI. But how can we deploy AI in practice and utilize it to provide solutions
that solve real enterprise security problems and create positive societal impacts? I believe
the key to success is through deep communication and collaboration with domain experts.
In Part III of my thesis, I present two projects that utilize AI to help the security industry and
for broader social good through deep collaboration with industry and government partners.
• Virtual Product (Chapter 8) is a patented enterprise cyber threat detection method
developed with Symantec.
• Firebird (Chapter 9) is an open-source framework, developed with the Atlanta Fire
Rescue Department, to help municipal fire departments identify and prioritize com-
mercial property fire inspections.
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CHAPTER 8
PREDICTING CYBER THREATS WITH VIRTUAL SECURITY PRODUCTS
Cybersecurity analysts are often presented suspicious machine activity that does not conclu-
sively indicate compromise, resulting in undetected incidents or costly investigations into
the most appropriate remediation actions. There are many reasons for this: deficiencies in
the number and quality of security products that are deployed, poor configuration of those
security products, and incomplete reporting of product-security telemetry. Managed Security
Service Providers (MSSP’s), which are tasked with detecting security incidents on behalf of
multiple customers, are confronted with these data quality issues, but also possess a wealth
of cross-product security data that enables innovative solutions. We use MSSP data to
develop Virtual Product, which addresses the aforementioned data challenges by predicting
what security events would have been triggered by a security product if it had been present.
This benefits the analysts by providing more context into existing security incidents (albeit
probabilistic) and by making questionable security incidents more conclusive. We achieve
up to 99% AUC in predicting the incidents that some products would have detected had they
been present.
8.1 Introduction
Security products often are primed to detect certain threats extremely well. In other contexts,
they will generally provide less than conclusive or no evidence of attacks. This motivates a
defense in depth strategy that advocates for deploying multiple kinds of security devices
to provide the most robust defense. Clearly it is infeasible to deploy every single security
product to maximally protect every single device in an organization. Cybersecurity analysts,
therefore, must contend with suboptimal context regarding potential attacks because the
products that are providing telemetry are not well suited for a potential attack. Their
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Product Type Alert Description (Event)
Gateway TCP Urgent Data Enforcement
Gateway TCP anomaly
Gateway TCP Out of Sequence
Gateway ICMP Echo Request
Windows Cryptographic operation
Windows Attempt to unprotect auditable protected data
Windows Logon attempt using explicit credentials
Windows Key file operation
Windows Filter Manager Event 1
Windows Attempt to register a security event source
Windows Attempt to unregister a security event source
Windows Special privileges assigned to new logon
Windows A privileged service was called
Windows A network share object was accessed
Firewall TCP Connection
Firewall UDP Connection
Proxy TCP Cache Hit
Proxy TCP Cache Miss: Non-Cacheable Object
Table 8.1: A long list of inconclusive alerts generated in a real incident of a machine infected
by the infamous Zbot Trojan. These alerts overwhelm a cybersecurity analyst, and do not
help answer important questions such as: Is this machine compromised? How severe is the
attack? What actions should be taken? Our technique, Virtual Product, correctly predicts
the presence of the infamous Zbot Trojan, which would have been identified by an AV
product, had it been installed.
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confidence in either pursuing or ignoring a potential compromise is often less than ideal.
The key to improving detection rates in this environment is to learn from the vast
amounts of telemetry produced by the prevalent defense-in-depth approach to computer
security, wherein multiple security products are deployed alongside each other, producing
highly correlated alert data. By studying this data, we are able to accurately predict which
security alerts a product would have triggered in a particular situation, even though it was
not deployed. A representative example is shown in Table 8.1, wherein security alerts
produced by several products hint at the possibility of a security problem, but do not present
conclusive evidence. Our models, however, are able to correctly predict the presence of the
Zeus (also known as the Zbot) trojan, as the cause of the anomalous system and network
behavior on the machine.
We introduce and formulate the novel problem of Virtual Product, the first known attempt
to predict the security events and high-severity incidents that would have been identified by
a product if it had been deployed. Given sufficient data from many organizations deploying
different sets of security products, we posit it should be possible to predict the events that
would have been reported by additional security products that were not deployed. This
analysis benefits from the observations that many security products detect the same threats,
and that attacks are typically automated and therefore proceed in predictable sequences of
behavior.
Figure 8.1 shows how Virtual Product works. We formulate incident data as a large
matrix. Each row, called a machine-day, tracks all of the security events that were observed
on a particular machine, on a given date. Although many entries will be empty since
machines are at most protected by a handful of products, we can predict the likely events that
would have been triggered by those products that were not deployed. The security officers
can then hopefully make a more informed decision about the trade off of cost and value of
what other security products would provide. For the analyst, Virtual Product enriches each
incident (i.e., row) with more context to understand the severity of the threat posed by the
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Figure 8.1: Virtual Product helps our user Sam discover and understand cyber-threats, and
informs deployment decisions (e.g., add firewall?) through semi-supervised non-negative
matrix factorization on telemetry data from other users (with firewalls deployed). In the data
matrix, each row represents a machine-day, and each column a security event’s occurrences.
Missing events from undeployed products are shown as gray blocks. The last column
indicates if the firewall has detected an incident. Our virtual firewall serves as a proxy to the
actual product and predicts the output Sam may observe (dark green block) if he deploys it.
observed activity. Our work makes the following contributions:
• Novel Idea of Virtual Product. We introduce the problem of simulating a security
product’s individual security events and the security incidents that these events would
have raised, had it actually been deployed. We formulate techniques by which the security
data managed by Security Incident and Event Managers (SIEM’s) and Managed Security
Service Providers (MSSP’s) on behalf of multiple products can be used for this purpose
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(see Table 8.2 for definitions of these terms).
• Effective Approach. We provide a practical implementation for this problem by adapting
semi-supervised non-negative matrix factorization techniques, which simultaneously
addresses the problem of security incident and event prediction for the absent products,
with high accuracy.
• Impact to Security Industry. Our Virtual Product model will impact the security industry
by increasing company security at significantly reduced costs. We are working towards
making Virtual Product events and security incidents available to customers of an MSSP.
By deploying Virtual Product on behalf of customers, we provide a new way for them to
experience the potential benefits of security products without deploying them, allowing
them to make more informed purchasing decisions.
To enhance readability of this chapter, we have listed the terminology used in this chapter
in Table 8.2. The reader may want to return to this table throughout this chapter for technical
terms’ meanings and synonyms used in various contexts of discussion. We proceed by
discussing related work in Section 8.2, and present our proposed Virtual Product model in
Section 8.3. We evaluate the performance of our algorithm in Section 8.4. Next, we discuss
the expected impact of Virtual Product and concrete deployment plans studies in Section
8.5. Finally, we discuss our findings and conclude in Section 8.6.
8.2 Related Work
There has been growing interest in applying machine learning and data mining techniques
to detect cyber-threats, such as malicious files [45, 44], malicious websites [150, 151],
and online fraudulent behaviour [52], using approaches range from Naive Bayes [152], to
neural networks [153], decision trees [154], to large-scale graph-based inference [45, 44].
In contrast to prior work, instead of predicting cyber-threats directly, we formulate and
tackle the novel Virtual Product problem of predicting how a security product would work
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Technical term Meaning
Virtual product A machine learning model used to reconstruct a real security product’s
behavior
Machine-day A machine on a particular day
Security event A description of activity recorded by a security product, not necessarily
malicious, e.g., login failure
Incident A serious security threat, evidenced by one or more events, warranting
attention, e.g., unblocked malware
SIEM Security Incident and Event Managers, which manage security events
produced by products, that they analyze to detect and report security
incidents
MSSP Managed Security Service Providers, which run a SIEM on behalf of
multiple customers
Table 8.2: Terminology used in this chapter
in a customer’s specific environment, had it been deployed. Not only do we predict the
incident triggering behaviour of a product, but also reconstruct all the security events it
detects, tackling both tasks simultaneously using matrix factorization methods. To the best
of our knowledge, Virtual Product addresses a novel problem, one that provides additional
context and detection capabilities by predicting the incidents and individual security events
that would be provided by security products had they been deployed.
Matrix factorization [155, 156, 157] exploits latent features of a data matrix by decom-
posing the matrix into a series of low-rank factor matrices. These factor matrices, though
additional constraints can be enforced on them, are learned by minimizing a generalized
Bregman divergence [156, 158] between the original data matrix and the dot product of the
low-rank factor matrices. Matrix factorization has been popularly used in collaborative fil-
tering [159, 160, 161] of highly sparse user-item rating records to predict users’ preferences
and recommend unrated products. Document clustering is another well-studied research
domain that uses matrix factorization. A common approach is to apply non-negative matrix
factorization (NMF ) [162, 163] on sparse bag-of-words features of documents and group
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documents using the derived non-negative factors [162, 163, 164]. Supervision in the context
of matrix factorization introduces class separating structure into the factor matrices, which
enforces linear separation of classes in the linear projection of data [159, 165]. The objective
function of the factorization has been designed to enforce specific properties of the latent
projected data. Previous efforts on supervised and weakly supervised matrix factorization
can be found in [159, 166, 167, 168]. Most of them focus on decomposing densely valued
data matrices to improve clustering accuracy. Our algorithm extends and adapts prior work
to the classification problem of predicting attacks by reconstructing missing signals on
extremely sparse data.
8.3 Proposed Model: Virtual Product
Given a security product P , our Virtual Product model aims to detect and categorize
incidents for customers who have not deployed P . We formulate the construction of Virtual
Product as a classification problem, training it on machine-day observations collected from
machines that have deployed P . The training process learns the functional mapping between
the event occurrence patterns of other products and the incident class labels reported by
P . During testing, the Virtual Product model takes as input the observed event occurrence
patterns from products except P , and produces incident detection and categorization results.
A main challenge for Virtual Product is in training and applying it with incomplete event
occurrence patterns as input. Events may be missing either because their corresponding
products are not deployed, or due to data corruption at the telemetry data collection process.
To address this issue, we propose a semi-supervised non-negative matrix factorization
method (SSNMF ) as a core computation technique for Virtual Product. It extracts an
unified discriminative feature representation of the event occurrence records from both the
training and testing datasets. We conduct incident detection and categorization in Virtual
Product by feeding the learned feature representations as input to any standard supervised
classifiers. Virtual Product denotes the process of conducting SSNMF on event occurrence
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data, followed by training a supervised classifier on the output of SSNMF .
Another contribution of Virtual Product is to estimate event occurrence patterns that are
missing from the observed data. It is helpful for security analysts to understand relations
between event occurrence profiles and reported security incidents. The SSNMF well
matches this requirement, as it is intrinsically equipped with the capability of reconstructing
the missing event values through inner product of low-rank matrices.
8.3.1 Semi-Supervised Non-negative Matrix Factorization (SSNMF)
We use a non-negative data matrix X ∈ RN×M to denote the aggregation of both training
and testing event occurrence data. Each row in X , noted as Xi,: denotes occurrence counts
of different events around a machine-day. Without loss of generality, the first N1 rows of X
belong to the training event occurrence data. They are equipped with corresponding incident
class labels reported by the target product P . The remaining N − N1 rows of X are the
testing data corresponding to event occurrence data collected from customers’ machines
without P deployed.
Non-negative Matrix Factorization reconstructs a non-negative data matrix X ∈ RN×M
using the dot product of two non-negative factors U ∈ RN×k and V ∈ RM×k, where k is the
number of latent features that is often determined by cross-validation. As shown in Equation
(8.1), the latent factors are learned by minimizing the reconstruction error on the observed
events in our data.
U, V = argmin
U,V >0
‖X − UV T‖o
2
(8.1)
The norm ‖‖o indicates the aggregated reconstruction error on the observed entries of X .
Each row in U , Ui,: represents the linear projection of Xi,:, which formulates a new feature
representation of machine-day observations in a low-dimensional space. Column vectors of
V are the projection bases spanning the projection space.
To integrate supervision information into the matrix factorization process, we introduce
a class-sensitive loss into the objective function of matrix factorization, in order to force
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machine-day observations of different classes to be separated from each other in the projected
space. Equation (8.2) and Equation (8.3) give the formulation of the discriminative loss
functions defined for binary and multi-class classification scenarios, respectively.





1 + exp (−Ui,:W T )
+ (1− Ŷi) log
1
1 + exp (Ui,:W T )
(8.2)













where W ∈ R1×k stores the regression coefficients. Ŷi represents the class label of
each machine-day observation. For labeled machine-days, Ŷi it either 1 or 0, depending
on whether Xi,: belongs to positive or negative class. For unlabeled machine-days, Ŷi
represents any plug-in estimator of probabilistic confidence of Xi,: belonging to positive
class. In the multi-class version of the loss function, C denotes the number of classes in the
labeled dataset. As a result, W becomes a RC×k matrix. Each row in W corresponds to
the regression coefficients for each class. Ŷi,j of labeled data is defined following one-hot
encoding scheme. For unlabeled data, Ŷi,j represents the probabilistic class membership of
each Xi,:. U is the common factor shared by both matrix factorization in Equation (8.1) and
the class-sensitive loss function defined in Equation (8.2) and (8.3). This design guarantees
the feature representation U preserves the class separating structure of the training data.
Ŷ for unlabeled data can be initialized using external oracles with probabilistic output,
such as gradient boosting and logistic regression. In this work, we treat Ŷ as one variable
to learn and estimate it by jointly optimizing the objective function with respect to U , V ,
W and Ŷ . We assume that unlabeled data points with similar profiles are likely to share
similar soft class label Ŷ . By enforcing such assumption to the objective function design,
we explicitly inject supervised information into the projection of both labeled and unlabeled
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machine-day observations. The complete optimization problem of SSNMF is shown in
the following equation.
U, V,W, Ŷ = argmin
U,V≥0,W,1≥Ŷ≥0
‖X − UV T‖o
2
+ αF (Ŷ , U,W )
+ βTr(Ŷ TLŶ ) + γ(‖U‖2 + ‖V ‖2) + ρ‖W‖2
s.t. Ŷi = Yi if Xi,: is labeled
(8.4)
The constraint in the objective function requires strict consistency between Ŷ and the true
class labels on labeled machine-day observations. L is the graph laplacian matrix defined
based on K-nearest neighbor graph of the whole data matrix X . Minimizing the trace
function Tr(Ŷ TLŶ ) propagates the confidence of class membership from true class label
of labeled machine-days to unlabeled machine-days. It embeds class-separating information
into the projection U of unlabeled machine-days. Regularization terms γ(‖U‖2 + ‖V ‖2)
and ρ‖W‖2 are added to prevent over-fitting.
8.3.2 Optimization Algorithm
We use coordinate descent to optimize Equation 8.4. During each iteration, U , V , W and Ŷ
are updated alternatively. One of the four variables are updated while all the others are fixed.
Iterations continue until the objective value cannot be further improved. U , V are updated
using multiplicative update [163], which is a popular optimization technique for solving
many variants of NMF . Equation (8.5) gives the formulations of multiplicative update of
U and V
U t+1 = U t  [(X M)V ]
+ + [(UV T M)V ]− + α[Ŷ W ]+ + α[RW ]−
[(X M)V ]− + [(UV T M)V ]+ + α[Ŷ W ]− + α[RW ]+ + γU
V t+1 = V t  (X M)
TU
(UV T M)TU + γV
(8.5)
where [A]+ = (|A|+ A)/2 and [A]− = (|A| − A)/2. R is the output from the sigmoid
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. The operation  indicates Hadamard product
between matrices. M is a entry-wise weight matrix. Mi,j = 1 if the entry Xi,j is observed,
and Mi,j = 0 otherwise.
Updating Ŷ consists of two components. For one aspect, the learning of Ŷ is based
on supervision information propagation. For the other aspect, estimates of Ŷ depends on
the output from the sigmoid or softmax function, which encodes the retraction from data
reconstruction penalty in the objective function. Equation (8.6) and Equation (8.7) define
how to estimate Ŷ in binary and multi-class classification scenarios:
Ŷi = Yi if Xi,: is labeled
Ŷ t+1 = Ŷ t  α log (1 + exp (UW
T )) + 2βSŶ
α log (1 + exp (−UW T )) + 2βDŶ
(8.6)
Ŷi = Yi if Xi,: is labeled










. S is weight matrix of K-nearest neighbor graph. D is a
diagonal matrix with Di,i defined as
∑N
i=1 Si,j .
By removing terms without W in Equation (8.4), the left terms of the objective function
formulate a L2-penalised logistic regression with soft class labels Ŷ and training data points
in the projected space U . Therefore, learning W given U and Ŷ fixed can be performed
through iterative gradient descent until convergence. We found that the number of iterations






FW1: Firewall 1 4506 770 1011 98% 10
FW2: Firewall 2 9254 3093 1927 99% 12
FW3: Firewall 3 4477 1274 2019 98% 10
EP1: Endpoint Protection 1 18983 4128 2409 99% 30
EP2: Endpoint Protection 2 8006 904 988 97% 5
Table 8.3: Summary of the training datasets (Jul-Sept) for the top five products that detect
the most incidents.
AdaGrad [169], as shown below:







where GW is the gradient of Equation (8.4) with respect to W .
When U , V and W converge, U1:N1,: and UN1:N,: are used as low-dimensional feature
representations of the training and testing data, respectively. We then train a logistic
regression on the row vector space of U to conduct incident detection and categorization
in Virtual Product. Note that we are not restricted to logistic regression. We choose it due
to its simplicity and probabilistic decision output. Despite its simplicity, it shows superior




Our evaluation uses telemetry data sent from a leading Managed Security Service Provider
(MSSP), which supports roughly 80 security products from different vendors. Customers
send telemetry from their deployed products to the MSSP, which analyzes the telemetry to
identify and report incidents. Due to space constraints, we show the results of the top five
products that detect the most incidents: three firewalls (FW1, FW2, FW3) and two endpoint
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protection products (EP1, EP2).
To evaluate our approach’s prediction performance for a specific product P , we derived
an anonymized dataset from the telemetry data. This derived dataset consists of data
contributed by the machines that have deployed P , which allows us to extract ground truth
labels. When performing prediction, we do not use any events from P . In other words, we
pretend that product P is not deployed and hide all its events.
The dataset is represented as a N -by-M matrix X (see Figure 8.1). Each row Xi,: is an
instance that represents a machine-day. Each column X:,j is a feature that corresponds to the
number of occurrences of a event from different products except P . To prevent numerical
overflow during computation, we take the logarithm of each event occurrence count in X .
Since events relevant to an incident may not appear within a single machine-day, when
counting occurrences, we consider the period that spans three days before and after the
machine-day. Note that our task is not to predict an incident before it happens, so we also
collect events observed after the machine-day. To prevent duplicate and similar instances,
we only use machine-days from the same machine that are at least one week apart from
other machine-days.
The matrix is extremely sparse, and each machine-day typically only has a few observed
events. Events may be missing if their corresponding products are not deployed. They may
also be caused by data corruption when the products report them. To avoid machine-days
with zero or very few observed events, which are nearly impossible to perform prediction,
we filter out all machine-days with fewer than 20 observed events.
There are two sets of labels associated with each machine-day, one for binary classi-
fication of whether there is an incident, and the other one for multi-class classification of
the incident type. The positive and negative machine-days are collected as follows. For
each incident reported in our system, we label a machine-day as positive if an incident is
detected by product P . For negative machine-days, we use the same set of machines (as






FW1 3090 355 98%
FW2 6515 2830 98%
FW3 2660 253 97%
EP1 8222 2377 98%
EP2 2275 754 98%
Table 8.4: Summary of validation datasets (Oct-Dec).
been detected by any products within a one-month period (15 days before to 15 days after).
This binary label definition is used in experiments, in order to evaluate the capability of the
proposed method for detecting malicious incidents. We also include a multi-class definition
of incident labels. The multi-class incident label denotes multiple categories of detected
incidents, valued as {−1, 1, 2, ...C}, where C is the number of incident categories, and −1
means “no incident”.
The same data collection process is performed over two independent time periods.
The first dataset was collected from July to September in 2016 — we call this the training
dataset (summarized in Table 8.3), on which we conduct cross-validation to verify theoretical
validity of the algorithmic design in Section 8.4.4 and evaluate reconstruction performances
in Section 8.4.3. The second dataset was collected from October to December in 2016 —
we call this the validation dataset (summarized in Table 8.4). We use the training dataset to
tune the parameters of our model, then apply it on the validation dataset to evaluate incident
classification accuracy in real-world applications
In Table 8.3, we also show the sparsity level of each product’s dataset, to highlight how
sparse the data matrices are in our study. The sparsity level of a given data matrix is defined
as the fraction of unobserved entries in the matrix.
8.4.2 Experiment Setup and Overview
Our experiment consists of three parts.
1. In Section 8.4.3, benefiting from matrix factorization, the proposed method estimates
139
count values of security events produced by those products whose events were withheld
from the dataset. The reconstructed event counts will later help us determine whether a
security incident would have been raised by the events produced by the withheld product.
Since security incident are formulated as collections of relevant events, reconstructing
the missing events is essential for incident reproduction based on the occurrence pattern
of the corresponding incident. Furthermore, the individual events provide important
insights and context into the nature of the security incident, which frequently enable
improved triage and remediation of the incident. We evaluate our proposed event-
reconstruction model by measuring reconstruction error between ground truth event
counts and our estimated values.
2. In Section 8.4.4, we evaluate the performance of our proposed method for detecting
security incidents. This output of Virtual Product’s methods allows us to build a incident
detector based on incomplete event information. The test is conducted on the training
data matrices and the incident labels of all five products. Both binary and multi-class
incident labels are produced for this test.
3. In Section 8.4.5, we investigate the computational complexity and empirical scalability
of our proposed Virtual Product model, noted as VP.
8.4.3 Evaluation on Reconstruction Accuracy
We validate in this section that the proposed model can compensate for missing events. We
investigate the reconstruction performance of Virtual Product with respect to the occurrence
counts of withheld event observations. Reconstruction capability is a key function of the
proposed model, since knowing which events were responsible for triggering a predicted
security incidents is essential to the understanding of that incident, and to its remediation.
Accordingly, we evaluate the reconstruction capability of the proposed method. We randomly
select 50% of the observed entries and take the event count of these entries as ground truth.
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R-squared Score Percentage
Dataset Mean Std Mean Std
FW1 0.8493 0.0036 0.9819 0.0009
FW2 0.7300 0.0032 0.9834 0.0002
FW3 0.8408 0.0023 0.9858 0.0007
EP1 0.7356 0.0013 0.9801 0.0001
EP2 0.8193 0.0014 0.9832 0.0004
Table 8.5: Performance of reconstruction on all five datasets
After that, we hold out the ground truth counts and apply our matrix factorization method to
derive the estimated count values of the masked entries. To measure reconstruction accuracy
we use the R-squared score between the ground truth and the estimated values. To remove
randomness introduced by sampling, we repeatedly sample the observe entries 10 times.
The average and standard deviation of the derived R-squared scores from different sampling
rounds are used as a comprehensive evaluation metric of the reconstruction performance.
The average and standard deviation of R-squared scores derived on the five datasets are
shown in Table 8.5. We also provide a statistical summary of our reconstruction results in
Table 8.5. In addition, for each dataset, we count the percentage of the entries in which the
reconstructed event occurrence counts are larger than 50% of the corresponding ground truth
occurrence count values, as noted as Percentage in Table 8.5. This statistical summary
provides an intuitive understanding on the reported reconstruction accuracy. In practice,
if the reconstructed occurrence count of a given event is close enough to its ground truth,
the reconstruction is precise enough to estimate whether this event was triggered by the
corresponding product. The results show that Virtual Product is able to reconstruct event
occurrence patterns with precision for the security products. As seen in the results, almost
all masked event occurrence patterns are perfectly recovered through the matrix factorization
process embedded using our proposed method. As we will see in Section 8.4.6, these
recovered security events enable machine learning models to perform improved incident
detection. The true value of this work, however, is perhaps best illustrated by the case
studies shown in Section 8.5.1.
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8.4.4 Evaluation: Incident Detection and Categorization
We perform 10-fold Monte Carlo cross-validation, where each randomly samples 70% of
the machine-days from the training dataset collected from July to September in 2016. The
remaining 30% is left for testing.
We set up a baseline model (shorthand: LR) by training a logistic regression classifier
directly on the event count matrix X , with missing entries filled with zeros. In our approach
(shorthand: VP), we train a logistic regression classifier on the low-dimensional feature
representation of X produced by Virtual Product model.
The purpose of introducing the baseline model is two-folds. Firstly, we use the results
from the baseline model to further validate our initial assumption: it is possible to predict
the events that would have been reported by additional security products that were not
deployed. The baseline model conducts classification using only the observed events from
the deployed products. No reconstructed event information is embedded. Therefore, if the
baseline method can detect or categorize incidents with an acceptable accuracy, we have
strong reason to believe the proposed Virtual Product model can perform even better by
incorporating the reconstructed event counts into the classifier design. Secondly, we aim to
conduct a fair comparative study for our proposed methodology, though we note that the
baseline model is not a comparison to prior art, as Virtual Product addresses a novel problem
of not only predicting the incidents but also recovering the associated security events. The
objective function of SSNMF , used in Virtual Product, can be roughly understood as
construction of a logistic regression classifier on the projected space of the original data.
This comparative study aims to verify the benefits gained from the algorithmic design of
Virtual Product for classification with missing features.
To allow fine-grained comparison, we compute the mean and standard deviation of the
Area-Under-Curve (AUC) and the True Positive Rate (TPR) across 10 folds, and display them
in Table 8.6 and Table 8.7, respectively. As we can see in the two tables, both the baseline and
the proposed Virtual Product method present good classification performances over training
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VP AUC LR AUC
Dataset Mean Std Mean Std
FW1 0.9831 0.0041 0.9695 0.0055
FW2 0.9900 0.0018 0.9810 0.0029
FW3 0.9200 0.0070 0.8761 0.0131
EP1 0.8218 0.0066 0.8076 0.0072
EP2 0.8962 0.0083 0.8306 0.0164
Table 8.6: Our approach (VP) detects security incidents with high accuracies (AUCs) across
all five datasets, outperforming the baseline model (LR).
VP TPR LR TPR
Dataset Mean Std Mean Std
FW1 0.9724 0.0114 0.9661 0.0078
FW2 0.9820 0.0057 0.9810 0.0074
FW3 0.7879 0.0157 0.7608 0.0228
EP1 0.5200 0.0175 0.5016 0.0268
EP2 0.5897 0.0293 0.5663 0.0399
Table 8.7: True positive rate (TPR) of incident detection on all five data sets at 10% false
positive rate (FPR). Our approach (VP) outperforms the baseline (LR)
datasets of all five security products. It indicates that counts of events collected from different
organizations are able to predict occurrence of incidents that would have been reported by
undeployed products. Furthermore, the result unveils consistently superior incident detection
precision of the proposed Virtual Product model over the baseline method across the training
datasets of different products. Figure 8.2 shows the average ROC curve and AUC derived
from the cross-validation test, offering a global and intuitive view of incident detection
performances over training datasets of different products using the proposed Virtual Product
model. All obtained results support the design of the proposed Virtual Product method.
Embedding matrix completion into classification helps extract correlation among observed
events of different products, which increases available information to boost classification
precision.
Additionally, test on the validation datasets follows a standard training-testing process
of machine learning models in real-world applications. Classification model built with the
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Figure 8.2: Averaged ROC curves from 10-fold cross-validation of Virtual Product on our
top five product datasets.
training dataset collected within the precedent time period is used to detect incidents on the
validation dataset formulated within the current time slot.
Interestingly, as shown in Figure 8.3, incident detection result using the proposed Virtual
Product model presents consistent high detection accuracy over validation datasets of
different products. The reported detection accuracy confirms the robustness of the proposed
Virtual Product model.
As described in Section 8.3, the proposed Virtual Product can be seamlessly extended
for incident categorization, which classifies detected incident at a finer scale. Without major
modification, the proposed Virtual Product is able to achieve both incident detection and
categorization (multi-class classification) at the same time. Table 8.8 shows the average
F1-score of incident categorization on training datasets of different products using Virtual
Product. As we can see, Virtual Product can achieve almost perfect incident categorization
on the FW1 and FW2 datasets. In the EP2 dataset, over 99% of detected incidents belong
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Figure 8.3: ROC curves of the Virtual Product model evaluated using the validation datasets
of the five products.
to a single incident type. Severe class imbalance makes any classifier built on the dataset
statistically unstable, so we chose not to include the EP2 dataset in the experimental study
of incident categorization. The categorization precisions on EP1 and FW3 are relatively
lower. This is mainly due to class imbalance among different incident categories in these
two datasets, particularly in the case of the EP1 training dataset, for which nearly half of the
30 incident types are minority classes. Each of these minority classes contains fewer than
10 machine-day observations, which increases the difficulty of categorization. The impact
of class imbalance is also confirmed by the baseline LR method. Nevertheless, even in this
extreme situation, the proposed Virtual Product still obtains improvements compared to the
baseline model.
In general, all experimental results in this section verify the effectiveness of Virtual
Product. By jointly conducting matrix factorization and discriminative model learning, the







Table 8.8: Average F1 scores of incident categorization on our datasets. We do not include
EP2 because over 99% of the detected incidents belong to one single incident type.
due to the extremely sparse data structure. As a result, it provides a good reconstruction of
the classification boundary from highly incomplete event occurrence data.
8.4.5 Evaluation of Computational Cost
Time Complexity Analysis. The training of Virtual Product’s model consists of two parts.
First, we construct a k-nearest neighbor (K-NN) graph in an offline manner. Nearest
neighbor searching generally requires a cost of O(N2M), which is quadratic to the size of
the dataset. Since the machine-day event count data is high-dimensional and highly sparse,
we use an approximate K-NN method [170] tailored for sparse data. This reduces the cost
of K-NN searching to O(DNlogN) in the worst case, where D is the number of feature
dimensions. Next, we perform multiplicative updates in O(TNMk) + O(TNCk) time,
where T is the number of iterations and k is the dimension of the projected representation
U . The total cost of the proposed model is therefore at most O(DNlogN) +O(TNMk) +
O(TNCk). For all five datasets, we observed that 200 iterations (T = 200) were sufficient
to achieve convergence.
Empirical Scalability. We conducted experiments to study how our proposed model
scales with increasing volumes of data. We report the average training runtime of the
proposed Virtual Product model on EP1 and FW2 (across 10 runs). Our machine is a 64-bit
Linux laptop (Ubuntu 14.0) with an Intel Core i7 quad-core CPU running at 2.5GHz, 16GB
RAM and 500GB disk. The Virtual Product model is implemented in Python 2.7, with
API provided in python scientific computing packages, numpy 1.13 and scikit-learn 0.18.1.
146
Dataset #Machine-days Runtime (minutes)
FW2 9,254 10
EP1 18,983 25
Large FW2 92,540 45
Large EP1 189,830 57
Table 8.9: Average virtual product training times (over 10 runs).
EP1 and FW2 datasets contain approximately 19k and 9k machine-days, representing real-
world medium-scale applications. To study large-scale scenarios, we enlarge EP1 and FW2
datasets by 10 folds by replicating real machine-days contained in the original datasets. The
enlarged EP1 and FW2 datasets (we call them Large EP1 and Large FW2) contain 190k
and 90k machine-days respectively. Table 8.9 shows the average runtimes of our proposed
model across the datasets.
Our MSS service currently monitors about 80 products. Since each virtual product can be
trained independently from each other, we can easily speed up overall computation through
parallelization (e.g., distributed computation using Spark; more discussion in Section 8.5.2).
For the evaluation in this section, we were able to train Virtual Product in under an hour, even
on a commodity computer of modest power with an unoptimized software implementation.
8.4.6 Improvement in Analyst Response Predictions
As additional evidence to support the utility of Virtual Product, we measure event reconstruc-
tion’s ability to improve the accuracy of a model that the internal Managed Security Services
analysts use in determining whether to publish incidents to customers or suppress them as
false positives. We use a recent version of this model that is trained with no interaction or
influence from Virtual Product, and whose primary task is to recommend whether incidents
should be published to customers, or suppressed.
We took the FW1 dataset and removed all events from FW1, while keeping the events
of other devices. We call this dataset Xnone. We take Xnone and create a new dataset Xtop2
from it, for which we include the top two predicted events for FW1. We choose the two
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events with the highest predicted instance count, normalized by the average instance count
for that event. Although we could expand the number of predicted events beyond two, we
believe that the simplicity afforded by this heuristic will include the most salient missing
context versus the complexity of determining which predicted events to include.
Our model achieved 94.7% accuracy on Xnone and 97.6% on Xtop2. The 2.9% improve-
ment in accuracy results in halving the error rate. Although the accuracy on Xnone is quite
good already, we must consider that the model is used to increase the productivity of security
analysts. The median salary for an analyst is $90.1K US dollars [171] and therefore making
them individually more efficient is desirable.
8.5 Impact and Deployment
This section will illustrate how Virtual Product empowers MSSP customers to identify
security incidents by adding additional context to make more confident incident response
decisions. To provide concrete illustrations of this, we present two case studies and discuss
other areas of expected impact. We then proceed to a discussion of our current efforts,
and future plans to integrate Virtual Product into the infrastructure used by our Managed
Security Services.
8.5.1 Case Studies and Impact
As in Table 8.1, in this section we present two additional real-world incidents and the event
predictions identified by Virtual Product for these incidents as examples of its positive
impact on the incident response process.
Example 1. One of our customers, whom we will call Alice, has an important server
that is protected by many network security products, as shown in Table 8.10. What value
is FirewallB providing? Let us imagine that FirewallB is not deployed. Alice observes
several suspicious events output from the deployed products. FirewallA detects an HTTP
beacon from the HiKit exploit kit and the proxy also detects visits to suspicious websites.
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Product Event Description
Seen Indicators (security events)
Proxy Suspicious connection
FirewallA WebVPN Authentication Rejected
FirewallA WebVPN session created
FirewallA WebVPN session terminated
FirewallA WebVPN session deleted
FirewallA WebVPN session started
FirewallA WebVPN Authentication success
FirewallA SSL handshake completed
FirewallA Teardown TCP connection
FirewallA TCP connection
FirewallA Session disconnected
IPS SQL Query in HTTP Request
IPS RookIE/1.0 malicious user-agent string
IPS Angler exploit kit exploit download attempt
IPS Known malicious user agent - mozilla
IPS HiKit initial HTTP beacon
IPS TeamViewer remote administration tool outbound connection attempt
Router Flow session close
Top Predicted Primary Indicators
FirewallB Windows Executable
FirewallB Malicious File
FirewallB SQL Injection Attempt
FirewallB Phishing Webpage
FirewallB RIG Exploit Kit
FirewallB Windows DLL
FirewallB Heartbleed Malformed OpenSSL Heartbeat
FirewallB Microsoft Indexing Service UTF-7 Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability
FirewallB Microsoft IIS HTR Request Parsing Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
FirewallB /etc/passwd Access Attempt
Table 8.10: Virtual Product correctly predicts that FirewallB would have detected an incident,
and 10 of its top 11 predicted alerts coincide with the one that actually occurred, yielding
a clearer picture of the artifacts involved in the attack and the vulnerabilities used. The
incorrect prediction is shown in strikeout font.
149
Product Event Description
Seen Indicators (security events)
Firewall Bad TCP Header length
Firewall P2P Outbound GNUTella client request
Firewall wu-ftp bad file completion attempt
Firewall DNS zone transfer via TCP detected
Firewall SNMP possible reconnaissance, private access udp
Firewall ICMP PATH MTU denial of service attempt
Firewall FTP format string attempt
Firewall SMTP expn root
Firewall SMTP vrfy root
Firewall Server netcat (nc.exe) attempt
Firewall philboard admin.asp auth bypass attempt
Firewall SSLv2 Challenge Length overflow attempt
Firewall OpenSSL KEY ARG buffer overflow attempt
Firewall proxystylesheet arbitrary arbitrary command attempt
Firewall Oracle ONE JSP src-code disclosure attempt
Firewall JBoss admin-console access
Firewall RevSlider information disclosure attempt
Firewall Accellion FTA arbitrary file read attempt
Firewall Apache Tomcat directory traversal attempt
Firewall Apache non-SSL conn. to SSL port DoS attempt
Firewall Windows NAT helper components tcp DoS attempt
Firewall Multiple SQL injection attempts
Firewall Bash CGI environment variable inject attempt
Firewall Suspicious .tk dns query
Firewall Suspicious .pw dns query
Firewall ColdFusion admin interface access attempt
Firewall Windows Terminal server RDP attempt
Firewall Suspicious DNS request for 360safe.com
Gateway Connectra Request Accepted
Gateway ICMP: Timestamp Request
Gateway Possible IP spoof
Router Admin Authentication Failed
Top Predicted Primary Indicators
AV CVE-2012-4933 ZENWorks Asset Mgmt Exploit
AV Post-Compromise PHP Shell Command Execution
AV CVE-2015-1635 OS attack, HTTP.sys Remote Code Execution Exploit
Table 8.11: An attack on a webserver is obviously underway, but was it successful? Virtual
Product correctly predicts, with 99.9% confidence, that not only a deployed AV product
would detect attacks on the machine, but predict successful infection of the system.
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Product Event Description
Seen Indicators (security events)
Firewall Microsoft Windows 98 User-Agent string
Firewall SMTP: Attempted response buffer overflow
Windows Encrypted data recovery policy was changed.
Windows A cryptographic self test was performed.
Windows Cryptographic operation.
Windows MSI Installer
Windows Key file operation.
Windows A logon was attempted using explicit credentials.
Windows An attempt was made to reset an account’s password.
Windows Special privileges assigned to new logon.
Windows System audit policy was changed.
Windows A user account was changed.
Windows A security-enabled local group was changed.
Windows An account failed to logon
Proxy TCP Cache Miss: Non-Cacheable Object
Gateway Connectra Request Accepted
Top Predicted Primary Indicators
AV Bloodhound.Exploit.170
Table 8.12: There are indications of possible ransomware activity, but how did the attack
appear on the machine in the first place? Virtual Product correctly indicates that a malicious
spreadsheet (detected as Bloodhound.Exploit.170) was at fault, a method by which the
Locky RansomWare has been known to propagate.
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No incident was generated by these security products, indicating that without the evidence
from FirewallB, the remaining events are insufficiently threatening to warrant attention.
Based on evidence from the “virtual” FirewallB, however, Alice finds that there is likely an
incident, with 95% confidence.
To further understand the cause of the potential incident, Alice takes a deeper look at
FirewallB’s predicted events, which include malicious Windows executables, SQL injection
attempts, a visit to a phishing webpage, and attacks on several recognized vulnerabilities.
This additional telemetry gives Alice clarity on the used avenues of attack, which she can
use to prioritize patching updates to prevent a recurrence of the attack. It also suggests
possible data leaks through SQL injection and visits to phishing websites, enabling Alice to
take action that could prevent a serious data breach.
For this particular incident, 11 events were triggered by the actual FirewallB product,
and we list the top 11 reconstructed events identified by Virtual Product. These predictions
are prioritized by dividing the events’ reconstructed instance count by the average instance
count for that event, which is akin to TF-IDF normalization in statistical language model. In
actual deployment, Virtual Product users can customize its confidence thresholds based on
whether they wish Virtual Product to provide only highly confident event reconstructions
or a broader list that is more likely to include erroneous predictions, but that may include
valuable information that would otherwise have been suppressed.
Example 2. In some cases, while existing security events may make it quite obvious
that an attack has taken place, they may leave a vital question unanswered, Was the attack
successful?. This is a vital question, since most webservers are constantly exposed to
attacks, and yet most attacks do not succeed in compromising the machine, both because the
machine is often not vulnerable to the attempted attack, and because the network devices
that report attack events are often able to block them. Table 8.11 illustrates such an example,
in which Virtual Product is able to determine that an AV product would have detected a
serious incident with 99.9% probability. The reconstructed AV events further indicate that
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the attack is very likely to have been successful, and they give further insight into the nature
of the predicted attack.
Example 3. Virtual Product is often able to provide context that outlines appropriate
remediative and preventative actions. In the product events seen in Table 8.12, an observant
analyst may see hints of a possible Ransomware attack, but the initial method of attack
is not clear. Virtual Product correctly indicates that a malicious spreadsheet was at fault,
a method by which the Locky Ransomware has been known to propagate, and therefore,
reveals a possible social engineering campaign that the company’s security department
should investigate.
As is evident in these three case studies, and in the case study shown in Table 8.1, Virtual
Product helps security analyst by providing context that helps them answer vital questions,
such as: Is this machine compromised or just displaying unusual behavior? Was the attack
that I see on this machine successful? How should I go about cleaning up this infected
machine? How can I prevent a recurrence of a similar attack on this or other machines
in my environment? By answering these questions for MSSP customers, Virtual Product
significantly facilitates the security analyst’s core tasks.
8.5.2 Deployment
We are currently working towards delivering an initial version of this technology to our
Managed Security Services Product (MSSP), which will run on the Amazon Web Services
platform. At present, we process data in batches, because telemetry data is uploaded every
15 minutes from our Security Operations Centers.
To integrate virtual product into the existing customer interface, we both introduce
entirely new security incidents that are identified on the basis of Virtual Product’s missing
signal detection, and enrich existing incidents with additional context from virtual products.
Our current system is a hybrid of components that are coupled with services that publish and
subscribe to various streaming pipelines. Because of the flexibility that will be afforded by
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cloud platforms, we will schedule and provision resources to perform matrix completion and
will leverage the existing pipelines for incident generation and enrichment. The interactions
that customers and MSS analysts have with Virtual Product will be fully captured, as at
present, allowing us to tune the parameters of our algorithm.
8.6 Conclusions and Discussion
We have presented Virtual Product, a novel technology that allows us to predict events
from devices that are not currently deployed. Our evaluation shows that Virtual Product
can significantly improve our ability to detect incidents. The business value of Virtual
Product affects multiple levels of the enterprise. Cybersecurity analysts can leverage Virtual
Product to enrich events coming from machines to make a better determination if and what
kind of attack is being conducted. For security officers, Virtual Product empowers these
decision makers to make informed purchasing decisions based on the additive value of
potential products. If this technology is broadly adopted, it could create pressure on security
product vendors to focus more on differentiation through actual capability and not through
naming conventions. Future applications of this technology include providing product
recommendations to our customers, particularly if we can perform “attack forecasting” to
identify the likely attacks a customer would experience and how well they are defended and
detected by existing products.
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CHAPTER 9
FIREBIRD: PREDICTING FIRE RISK AND PRIORITIZING FIRE
INSPECTIONS IN ATLANTA
The Atlanta Fire Rescue Department (AFRD), like many municipal fire departments, actively
works to reduce fire risk by inspecting commercial properties for potential hazards and
fire code violations. However, AFRD’s fire inspection practices relied on tradition and
intuition, with no existing data-driven process for prioritizing fire inspections or identifying
new properties requiring inspection. In collaboration with AFRD, we developed the Firebird
framework to help municipal fire departments identify and prioritize commercial property
fire inspections, using machine learning, geocoding, and information visualization. Firebird
computes fire risk scores for over 5,000 buildings in the city, with true positive rates of
up to 71% in predicting fires. It has identified 6,096 new potential commercial properties
to inspect, based on AFRD’s criteria for inspection. Furthermore, through an interactive
map, Firebird integrates and visualizes fire incidents, property information and risk scores
to help AFRD make informed decisions about fire inspections. Firebird has already begun
to make positive impact at both local and national levels. It is improving AFRD’s inspection
processes and Atlanta residents’ safety, and was highlighted by National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) as a best practice for using data to inform fire inspections.
9.1 Introduction
In 2014 alone, there were 494,000 structure fires in the United States, causing 2,800 civilian
deaths and $9.8 billion in property damage [172]. Municipal fire departments, as the
Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ), are responsible for enforcing applicable fire codes to
reduce the risk of structure fires. The City of Atlanta Fire Rescue Department (AFRD), like
many other fire departments, conducts regular commercial property inspections to ensure that
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Figure 9.1: Firebird Framework Overview. By combining 8 datasets, Firebird identifies
new commercial properties for fire inspections. Its fire risk predictive models (SVM, random
forest) and interactive map help AFRD prioritize fire inspections and personnel allocation.
they comply with the city’s Code of Ordinances [173] for fire prevention and safety. With an
annual average of nearly 650 structure fires and 2,573 annual commercial inspections, the
AFRD Community Risk Reduction Section wanted to both identify uninspected properties
and ensure that the properties being inspected were those at greatest risk of fire. Through
a partnership between the City of Atlanta and the Data Science for Social Good (Atlanta)
program, our research team developed the Firebird framework for identifying and prioritizing
property fire inspections, based on fire department criteria and historical fire risk, tackling
two important challenges:
Challenge 1: Property Identification. The AFRD Community Risk Reduction Section
knew that the 2,573 annually inspected commercial properties were not all of the commercial
properties in the city of Atlanta, but they did not have a way to obtain a more complete
list of commercial properties that potentially needed inspection. The existing process for
AFRD’s property inspections involved a legacy system of paper file records and inspections
conducted on the basis of pre-existing permits, without a robust process for identification,
selection, and prioritization of new properties to inspect. In addition, the variety of data
sources AFRD had compiled to inform their inspections were inconsistent, incomplete,
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and were often at different levels of granularity. Thus, cleaning and merging the datasets
to identify which inspectable properties in the city had fallen through the cracks required
significant effort. By integrating data from a variety of government and commercial sources,
we discovered 19,397 potential new commercial properties to inspect, based on the property
usage types that the Atlanta Code of Ordinances specifies require inspection.
Challenge 2: Fire Risk Prediction. Because 19,397 new commercial property inspec-
tions is far greater than the current number of annual commercial property inspections, and
far more than AFRD’s current staff of fire inspectors can reasonably inspect, we developed
a method to prioritize those inspections based on their fire risk. First, we created a joined
dataset of building- and parcel-level information variables, for 8,223 commercial properties1.
Then, we built predictive models of fire risk using machine learning approaches, including
Support Vector Machine (SVM) [174] and Random Forest [175]. These models achieve true
positive rates (TPRs) of up to 71.36% (in predicting fires) at a false positive rate (FPR) of
20%. As our most important goal is to save lives, a higher TPR outweighs the increase in
FPR. The resulting fire risk scores were then assigned to over 5,000 commercial properties
to help ARFD prioritize inspections.
Contributions & Impact. With Firebird, AFRD can now use data about historical
fires to inform their fire inspections and more efficiently utilize their inspection personnel
capacity. The challenges that Firebird addresses are not unique to AFRD or the City of
Atlanta; many municipal agencies across the country work to integrate a variety of data
sources to inform decision-making at all levels of governance. Specifically, many fire safety
departments are seeking effective prioritization of property inspections and allocation of
inspection resources, given limited inspection personnel and large numbers of inspectable
properties. Firebird has already begun to improve AFRD’s inspection processes. Its major
1We will be referring to buildings and properties as two distinct concepts throughout this chapter. The
AFRD conducts property inspections and issues permits to the owners of those “inspectable spaces,” which are
properties. However, it is the physical structure of buildings that catch fire, and thus, when we built predictive
models, we did so with information about the buildings themselves. This is significant because one property
may contain multiple buildings, while another building may contain multiple properties.
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contributions include:
• Discovering new properties. Firebird improves the safety of Atlanta residents and
visitors by identifying 19,397 previously unidentified inspectable commercial proper-
ties.
• Predictive fire risk model. Firebird correctly predicts more than 70% of commercial
fires (at 20% FPR), and applies the resulting fire risk scores to over 5,000 properties
to help ARFD prioritize inspections.
• Impact to Atlanta: Firebird at work. Through an interactive map, Firebird inte-
grates and visualizes fire incidents, property information and inspections, and risk
scores to inform the decision-making processes of AFRD fire inspectors, executive
staff, and their Community Risk Reduction Section for inspection prioritization and
inspection personnel allocation.
• National impact: reusable end-to-end framework for inspection prioritization.
Firebird provides an explicated model for other municipalities and agencies to use
to identify new properties and prioritize commercial property inspections based on
fire risk. This project was highlighted by the National Fire Protection Association
(NFPA) at the Smart Enforcement Workshop for fire service professionals across North
America as a best practice for using data to inform fire inspections.
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Risk prediction models have been widely used in many domains, including health care [176],
student performance evaluation [177], and accounting fraud detection [178]. However, urban
fire risk prediction has received relatively less attention, despite its obvious importance.
Forest fire prediction. Much of the prior work on data-driven fire risk prediction has
targeted woodland and forest fires, such as in Italy [179], Greece [180], and Portugal [181].
They used different methods, such as neural networks [181], fuzzy algebra [180], and
decision trees [179] to support the allocation of firefighting, fire prevention, and foliage
recuperation resources to the areas of highest fire risk. The features they used, such as soil
type and topography, are very different from the ones typically used in urban fire prediction
like construction material and property usage type.
Community-level urban fire prediction. Prior work in data-driven urban fire risk
prediction tends to work at the region or community level [182, 183], rather than the
property- or building-level, which is the unit that the Atlanta fire inspectors are assigned to
inspect. For instance, [182] undertook a randomized controlled trial of community fire risk
education efforts, targeting high-risk residential communities. However, their method for
identifying the high-risk areas was to create a point-distribution map of residential structure
fires and draw ellipses to capture the areas of densest concentration of fire incidents. A
more methodologically rigorous approach, as seen in [183]’s work on optimizing smoke-
alarm inspections, joins data from the American Community Survey and American Housing
Survey to predict municipal blocks most likely to have homes without functioning smoke
alarms, using a Random Forest. Our work similarly uses publicly available datasets to
predict properties most likely to be in need of inspection, but differs in that we offer a fire
risk prediction score for individual commercial properties, rather than municipal residential
blocks.
Property-level urban fire prediction. There is limited work on predicting fire risk at
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the property or building level. In British Columbia, [184] developed a risk-based model for
determining the frequency of commercial property fire inspections, using static and dynamic
building-level characteristics. They scored each property by its level of compliance on prior
inspections and by a set of risk metric components such as building classification, age, and
presence of sprinklers. However, as they acknowledge, the weights and selection of those
components were based on their fire code, and not on historical data on features that were
highly predictive of fire, such as we utilize in our work.
The nearest precedent for our research with AFRD is the recent work from the New York
Mayor’s Office of Data Analytics (MODA) with the Fire Department of New York (FDNY)
to build a “Risk-Based Inspection System” (RBIS) [185]. They built a data-driven model
to identify structures at greatest fire risk, to better prioritize FDNY’s inspection process,
using a set of structural and behavioral information about those properties. However, due to
a lack of detailed information on their technical approach, it is unclear how it may apply to
AFRD’s scenario.
In both the FDNY RBIS initiative and our work with AFRD, a key challenge emerged:
the difficulty of joining disparate datasets about commercial properties, gathered from
various city departments without a shared convention for building ID numbers, consistent
address formats, or strict internal quality control practices to ensure the datasets are accurate
and up-to-date. We differ from [185] and [184] by providing a clear method for identifying
new inspectable commercial properties that the fire department is not already aware of.
Further, our work goes beyond [185] by presenting a detailed comparison of the performance
of several machine learning algorithms for predicting the fire risk of commercial properties,
and by incorporating them into an interactive GIS visualization for use by the AFRD fire
inspectors and Community Risk Reduction Section, following [186].
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9.3 Data Description
An essential step before identifying and prioritizing potential properties to inspect is to join
the data about commercial properties from multiple sources. This was done to construct as
complete a picture as possible for the properties in Atlanta needing inspection, as required by
the Atlanta Code of Ordinances. After the data joining, we identified 19,397 new potential
commercial properties to inspect, through a process of property discovery that utilized
AFRD and City of Atlanta fire code criteria. See Table 9.1 for a summary of the different
lists of total commercial property inspections and commercial buildings we will be referring
to throughout this chapter.
Name Count
Current annual inspections 2,573
Long list of potential new inspections2 19,397
Short list of potential new inspections 6,096
Current + short list inspections 8,669
Current + short list inspections with risk score 5,022
Properties for building predictive model 8,223
Table 9.1: Summary of inspection and building lists
9.3.1 Data Sources
Firebird uses data from multiple sources, as tabulated in Table 9.2. AFRD provided us with
a dataset of 2, 543 historical fire incidents from July 2011 to March 2015, of which 34.3%
were commercial fires. This includes information about fire incidents, such as time, location,
type, and cause of fire. AFRD also provided a dataset of fire inspections, with 32, 488
inspection permit records from 2012 to 2015. The inspection data includes information such
as inspected property types, address, and time of inspections. We also obtained structural
information about commercial properties from a dataset purchased by AFRD from the
2We provided AFRD with two lists of potential properties: one longer list that was the most extensive that
we could provide, and another shorter list that was more manageable to display on a map, refined using the
most frequently inspected property usage types.
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Source Name Description
Atlanta Fire Rescue Department
Fire Incidents Fire incidents
from 2011 - 201
Fire Permits All permits filed by
AFRD in 2012-2015
City of Atlanta
Parcel Basic information for





Business Licenses All the business licenses
issued in Atlanta
Atlanta Police Department
Crime 2014 crime in Atlanta










population by race and age
Socioeconomic Household median income
CoStar Group, Inc CoStar Properties Commercial property
information
Google Place APIs Google Place Information regarding
places from Google Maps
Table 9.2: Firebird Data Sources Summary
CoStar Group, a commercial real estate agency. This dataset includes building-level features
such as year built, building material, number of floors and units, building condition and
other information. A total of 8,223 commercial properties are documented by the CoStar
Group in the City of Atlanta.
While CoStar offers building-level information, parcel data from Atlanta’s Office of
Buildings provides parcel-level information, such as property value, square footage, address,
and other information about each parcel (a unit of land surrounding building(s)). The
business license dataset obtained from the City of Atlanta’s Office of Revenue provides
information about businesses that own commercial properties. The business licenses dataset
has 20,020 records with over 20 features including business type, business name, address,
owner, etc. For non-business commercial properties (e.g., schools, churches, daycare
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centers), we obtained such data from Google Places API and State of Georgia Government.
To offer more information about properties for building a predictive risk model, we also
obtained socioeconomic and demographic data from the U.S. Census Bureau, liquor license
and 2014 crime data from the Atlanta Police Department, and Certificate of Occupancy
(CO) data from the Atlanta Office of Buildings. All of these data sources contributed to
discovering new inspections and developing our predictive model for commercial fire risk
estimation.
9.3.2 Data Joining
A critical step of this study was to join different datasets together so that data from different
sources about the same building or property could be unified to create the most complete
picture of a given property. For instance, by joining fire incident and commercial property
data together, we can obtain a general idea regarding which commercial properties caught
fire in the past five years. Furthermore, by joining commercial property data with data
from the commercial real estate reports like the CoStar Group or the SCI Report, we can
generate a more comprehensive view regarding specific characteristics of buildings, such as
the structure and parcel condition, and even vacancy information.
We joined the datasets together based primarily on spatial location information. There are
three types of spatial or location information in our datasets: longitude and latitude, address
information, and the parcel identification number, which is a unique ID number created by
Fulton and DeKalb county3 for tax purposes. We then performed a location join based on the
above three types of location information. The variety of spatial information types, and our
method for joining them is illustrated in Figure 9.2. One obstacle we encountered was that
spatial information had different formatting standards across the datasets. For example, the
addresses from the CoStar Group were all in lowercase, with road names abbreviated instead
3The City of Atlanta is comprised of two separate counties, Fulton and Dekalb. Although both county
governments provided building information, their parcel ID numbering schemes were not consistent. Thus,
building information had to joined using addresses and coordinates.
163
of fully spelled out, while datasets from the multiple departments of the City of Atlanta tend
to use a more consistent address format. Therefore, a spatial information cleaning process
was conducted before joining the datasets directly. The address location information from
different datasets was first validated using Google Geocoding API. The API can auto-correct
some misspellings of address information. After validation, addresses were then reformatted
using US Postal Service’s address validation API. The coordinate information was processed
in ESRI ArcGIS software to filter out data points falling outside of the City of Atlanta. The
cleaned datasets were then joined together based on the formatted addresses from the USPS
API and the coordinate information from ArcGIS.
9.4 Identifying New Properties Needing Inspection
To discover new properties, we first needed to understand what types of properties currently
required fire inspections according to the Fire Code [173], and we then identified other
similar properties. In the current fire inspection permit dataset, we found more than 100
unique occupancy usage types, such as restaurants, motor vehicle repair facilities, textile
storage, schools, children’s day care centers, etc. To identify other similar commercial
properties, we joined the list of currently inspected properties with the Atlanta Business
License data by matching both the spatial location (identified through the joining process
explained in Section 3.2) and the business name.
We discovered that, in addition to the 2,573 currently inspected properties, there were
approximately 19,397 properties of the same occupancy usage types as the city’s current
inspections. For instance, the Fire Code of Ordinances [173] stipulates that motor vehicle
repair facilities require inspection, due to the presence of flammable or combustible materials.
However, only 186 of a total of 507 of those facilities in the city were on the list of current
annual property inspections, suggesting that many or all of 321 remaining facilities should
be inspected. However, because some occupancy types, such as “miscellaneous business
service,” may have many properties that are not actually required for inspection, we created
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a shorter, more refined list of 6,096 new potential property inspections (instead of the 19,397
mentioned above), including only the top 100 most frequently inspected property usage
types. We discovered these properties from a variety of data sources, including the Atlanta
Department of Revenue’s Business License dataset, the liquor license dataset from the
Atlanta Police Department, the Georgia Department of Education’s child care and preschool
database, and Google Places API. We used the Google Places API to supplement the other
datasets primarily because it provided more up-to-date information about some of our most
commonly inspected property types, such as restaurants, bars, nightclubs, schools, churches,
gas stations, etc, and because it proved especially useful for discovering properties that
required inspection, but were not in the Business License dataset as they did not belong
to any “business” category (e.g., churches). Google Places API served as a “bridge” to
cross-check properties from different datasets, increasing the accuracy of our property
discovery process.
In identifying new properties needing inspection, the most challenging part was to
determine how buildings with different names (or IDs, or address formats) in various
datasets actually refer to the same building. We had to ensure that properties on our new
inspectable property list were unique and not already on the list of currently inspected
properties, after the aforementioned datasets were joined together. Different approaches
were attempted to ensure the uniqueness and novelty of properties on our potential list. The
most reliable and efficient method was found to be joining different datasets in pairs using
geocoding and approximate (“fuzzy”) string matching to approximately match both the
business name and the address. We used Google Maps Geocoding API for geocoding and a
Python library [187] to match the strings based on the edit distance. From the joined dataset,
a final property list was extracted that contained information from all the available data
sources.
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9.5 Predictive Model of Fire Risk
However, 19,397 new properties (or even the shorter list of 6,096) is far more than AFRD is
able to add to their annual property inspections, and not all of those properties are likely to
need inspection at the same priority. We therefore created a predictive model to generate
a fire risk score based on the building- and parcel-level characteristics of properties that
had fire incidents in the last five years. This model was built using the scikit-learn machine
learning package in Python [188]. The model uses 58 independent variables to predict fire
as an outcome variable for each property.
9.5.1 Data Cleaning
After joining various datasets together to obtain building- and parcel-level information,
significant data cleaning still needed to occur. The bulk of the data cleaning process involved
finding the extent of the missing data and deciding how to deal with that missingness. Our
missingness procedures were designed to minimize deletion of properties with missing data,
because a significant number of the properties in our model had NA values (not available)
for many variables (such as the structure condition of a building, which is only known if
the building was inspected by the CoStar Group before). For each property with missing
data for a particular feature, we replaced missing values with 0 when appropriate. We also
included a binary feature indicating whether each property had missing data for each feature.
We used log transformation for variables with a large numerical range, such as the “for sale”
price of properties.
9.5.2 Feature Selection
After merging datasets, we had a total of 252 variables for each property. We manually
examined each variable to determine whether it may be relevant to fire prediction, and
excluded many obviously non-predictive variables in this initial process (such as the phone
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number of the property owner, or property ID numbers). We then used forward and backward
feature selection processes to determine each variable’s contribution to the model, and
removed the variables that did not contribute to higher predictive accuracy. Our final model
includes only 58 variables. We then expanded categorical variables into binary features. For
example, the zip code variable was expanded into 37 binary features, and for each property
only one zip code was coded as 1 (all zip codes were designated as 0 if a property’s zip code
data was missing). After expansion, we had 1127 features in total.
9.5.3 Evaluation of the Models
We chose to validate our model using a time-partitioned approach. A fire risk model would
ideally be tested in practice by predicting which properties would have a fire incident in the
following year, and then waiting a year to verify which properties actually did catch fire.
Because we wanted to effectively evaluate the accuracy of our model without waiting a year
to collect data on new fires, we simulated this approach by using data from fire incidents in
July 2011 to March 2014 as training data to predict fires in the last year of our data, April
2014 to March 2015.
We used grid search with 10-fold cross validation on the training dataset to select the best
models and parameters. The models we tried included Logistic Regression [189], Gradient
Boosting [190], Support Vector Machine (SVM) [174], and Random Forest [175]. SVM
and Random Forest performed the best, with comparable performances (see Table 9.3).
For SVM, the best configuration is using RBF kernel with C = 0.5 and γ = 10
#features .
For Random Forest, restricting the maximum depth of each tree to be 10 gave the best
performance. Increasing the number of trees in general improves the performance, but we
only used 200 trees since adding more trees only obtained insignificant improvement.
We then trained SVM and Random Forest on the whole training set using the best
parameters and generated predictions on the testing set. Note that training and testing sets
include the same set of properties, but different labels correspond to fires in different periods
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(b) SVM
Figure 9.3: ROC curves of Random Forest and SVM
of time. This is a valid approach because we didn’t use information that we would only
know after the training period, i.e., fires in 2015.
The ROC curves for the training and testing performances are shown in Figure 9.3. All
the results are averaged over 10 trials. The most important metric in this case is the true
positive rate (TPR), i.e., how many fires were correctly predicted as positive in our model.
The SVM model was able to predict 71.36% of the fires in 2014-2015, at a false positive
rate (FPR) of 20%, which was deemed practically useful for AFRD — potential to save
lives (by achieving a higher TPR) significantly outweighs the increase in FPR. At the same
time, a high FPR facilitates more inspections of risky buildings, which is also beneficial. In
practice, AFRD can adjust the TPR/FPR ratio to match their risk aversity and inspection
capacity. The Random Forest model achieved a slightly lower TPR of 69.28% at the same
FPR, but had a higher area under the ROC curve (AUC). Considering how few fires occur
(only about 6% of the properties in our total dataset had fires), these results are much more
predictive than guessing by chance.
False positives (FPs) provide important information to AFRD. As our testing period was
the final year in our dataset, it is possible that some of those FP properties may actually
catch fire in the near future. These properties share many characteristics with those that did
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catch fire, and should likely be inspected by AFRD.
9.5.4 Further Discussion of the Models
In this section, we discuss some insight we obtained while conducting the experiments.
First, there is a mismatch between the meaning of labels in the training and testing datasets.
The training labels represent fires that happened in a relatively long period of time, whereas
the testing labels represent fires in a single year. One way to address this issue would be
to expand each properties into multiple examples, one for each year. Each example is then
a properties for a particular year, and the corresponding label indicates whether there was
a fire in that year. Using this approach, however, did not improve the performance in our
experiments. The reason is that most of our variables are static, such as floor size and zip
code, and only a few variables are time-dependent, such as the age of the building and
the time since last inspection. Therefore, expanding the properties only gives us many
similar examples. However, this approach would potentially be helpful after collecting other
dynamic information in the future, such as violations of health codes, sanitation ordinances,
or other information from relevant city agencies.
Another important issue is whether the performance of predicting fires is consistent in
different testing time periods. To test this, we tried different time windows for training,
and for each window, we evaluated its prediction performance for the subsequent year.
For each time window, we repeated the process described in Section 9.5.3, including grid
search and cross validation, and finally used the best model to predict fires in the following
year. The results are shown in Table 9.3. The performances decrease slightly for shorter
training periods. This is due to fewer positive training examples, especially in the period
of 2011-2012, which only consists of eight months of data (July 2011 to March 2012).
However, this is still significantly better than guessing by chance, which demonstrates that
we were not just “lucky” in predicting fires for a particular year.
Finally, it is helpful for us and for AFRD to know which features are the most effective
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Testing AUC of the following year




Table 9.3: Testing AUC of each year
predictors. The Random Forest model presents a natural way to evaluate feature importance:
for each decision tree in the Random Forest, the importance of a feature is calculated by
the ratio of examples split by it. The final importance is then averaged among all trees.
The top ten most predictive features are displayed in Table 9.4. Collectively, they capture
the intuitive insight that buildings of a larger size or those containing more units (thus
more people) would have higher probability of catching fire, and those of higher appraised
value and higher taxes would have a lower probability of catching fire. The impact of
higher appraised property value may be due to more developed fire prevention practices or
infrastructure, but this hypothesis has not been empirically validated.
We also tried logistic regression, a linear model, to estimate each feature’s importance
based on the corresponding weight coefficient in the model. We found that the top features in
the logistic regression were very different from the ones in Random Forest. All were binary
features indicating either a particular neighborhood or property owner. Some neighborhoods
have either very high or low fire rates, and logistic regression tends to assign large positive
or negative weights to them, respectively. However, since each of these features is only good
at predicting a small number of properties within a certain area but does not predict well on
the overall data, they are not chosen in the first few iterations of a decision tree.
9.5.5 Assignment of Risk Scores
After we built the predictive model, we then applied the fire risk scores of each property
to the list of current and potential inspectable properties, so that AFRD could focus on





3 number of units
4 appraised value
5 number of buildings
6 total taxes
7 property type is multi-family
8 lot size
9 number of living units
10 percent leased
Table 9.4: Top-10 features in Random Forest
of our predictive model for the list of properties we used to train and test the model. This
generated a score between 0 and 1, which we then mapped to the discrete range of 1 to 10 that
is easier for our AFRD colleagues to work with. Then, based on visual examination of the
clustering of risk scores, we categorized the scores into low risk (1), medium risk (2-5), and
high risk (6-10). These risk categorizations were intended to assign a manageable amount
of medium risk (N = 402) and high risk properties (N = 69) for AFRD to prioritize.
We then needed to find out which of the properties with risk scores were in the lists of
2,573 current annually inspected properties and 6,096 potentially inspectable properties.
Because of the lack of a consistent property ID across the various datasets used to develop
the risk model, the currently inspected and potentially inspectable properties were spatially
joined with the properties in the risk model, based on their geo-coordinates or addresses.
After joining, we were able to assign risk scores to 5,022 of the 8,669 total commercial
properties on the inspection list (both currently inspected [2,573] and potentially inspectable
[6,096]).
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9.6 Impact On AFRD and Atlanta
9.6.1 Previous Inspection Process
Our goal in developing the Firebird framework was to help the Atlanta Fire Rescue De-
partment (AFRD) and other municipal fire departments improve their identification and
prioritization of commercial property inspections. Before considering the impact our work
had on that process, it is important to first describe the previous process of commercial fire
inspections in Atlanta. First, fire inspectors at AFRD received a list of properties to inspect
every month, which had been inspected during that same month in the previous year. The
existing process for adding new commercial properties to the list of required inspections
was extremely ad hoc, without a formal notification process from other city departments
when new buildings were built or occupied, or new businesses registered. It was largely
the responsibility of individual fire inspectors to notice new inspectable properties and
initiate an inspection process while driving to another inspection site. Moreover, there was
no formal process used by the inspectors to prioritize their monthly inspections based on
risk, or even to schedule their daily inspections based on proximity to other inspections. In
other words, it is very possible that an inspector could return to the same business complex
multiple times throughout the year conducting inspections on adjacent properties, which is
not the most effective use of municipal resources. In addition, at present, the City of Atlanta
Code of Ordinances does not specify the frequency of inspections based upon risk or other
factors. As a result, inspections are effectively binary; regardless of potential fire risk, a
property either gets an annual inspection in the same month every year, or it is unlikely to
be inspected at all.
9.6.2 Technology Transfer to AFRD
After developing the Firebird framework, we first provided AFRD’s executive staff and
Community Risk Reduction Section with a dataset of all commercial properties in Atlanta
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Figure 9.4: Interactive map of fires and inspections. The colored circles on the map
represent fire incidents, currently inspected properties, and potentially inspectable properties
in red, green, and blue, respectively. Inspectors can filter the displayed properties based
on property usage type, date of fire or inspection, and fire risk score. Callout: activating
the Neighborhood Planning Unit overlay allows an inspector to mouse-over a political
subdivision of the city to view its aggregate and percentage of the fires, inspections, and
potential inspections.
that fit their criteria for inspection. This included a shorter list of 6,096 new inspectable
properties which are of the top 100 currently inspected property usage types (e.g., restaurants,
motor vehicle repair facilities, etc), and a longer list of all commercial properties (19,397)
that fit any property usage type that had been previously inspected. This dataset included the
associated building- and parcel-level information for those properties in the form of a CSV
file, with a subset of those properties (5,022) assigned a fire risk score. We then provided
AFRD with an interactive map-based visualization tool, as part of the Firebird framework,
for the fire inspectors and AFRD executive staff to use to augment their policy and decision-
making processes. The map in Figure 9.4 was made using the open source map-making tools
Mapbox and Leaflet to create the base map layer. Then, using the Javascript visualization
library D3.js, we displayed differently colored circles on the map to represent fire incidents,
currently inspected properties, and potentially inspectable properties in red, green, and blue,
respectively, using their longitude and latitude coordinates.
We also built a user interface for the Firebird map developed through discussions with the
AFRD Assessment and Planning Section, and refined by incorporating feedback from fire
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inspectors and AFRD executive staff. The map includes an information panel for displaying
property information when hovering over a property on the map, such as its business name,
address, occupancy usage type, date since fire incident or inspection, and fire risk score,
if available. The map also includes a user interface panel with the ability to filter the fire
incidents, the currently inspected, and the potentially inspectable properties according to
their property usage type, the date of fire incident or inspection, and their risk score. Finally,
we incorporated a set of regional overlays requested by the AFRD executive staff, including
the AFRD battalions, and the Atlanta Neighborhood Planning Units (NPU) and Council
Districts, which are both political subdivisions of the city. We included dynamically updated
counts and percentages for the displayed fire incidents, current inspections, and potential
inspections for each regional overlay (Figure 4), so the AFRD executive staff could make
decisions at a battalion, NPU, or Council District level.
This map, and the Firebird framework in general, could be used as a powerful tool for
supporting data-driven conversations about personnel and resource allocation and inspection
decisions, and may even be used to inform decisions regarding community education
programs for fire safety and prevention. To ensure AFRD could update the risk model and
property visualization as new fire incident and inspection data becomes available, we shared
our source code and process with AFRD’s Assessment and Planning Section, and made it
publicly available on Github.4
9.6.3 Impact on AFRD Processes
After receiving the dataset of properties needing inspection, prioritized according to their fire
risk score, AFRD has begun integrating the results of the analytics into their fire inspection
process. Increasing the number of annual inspections by 6,096 (237%) overnight was
not feasible without significant changes in organizational processes, local ordinances, or
increased staffing. As an initial effort, AFRD assigned the 69 high-risk properties to the
4https://github.com/DSSG-Firebird
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inspectors covering those respective areas. Of those, 27 had current or out-of-date fire safety
permits that required re-inspection, 13 properties required new permits, and 15 properties
recently went out of business. The remaining properties were found to not require a fire
safety permit. Most significantly, the inspectors assigned to review these properties found a
total of 48 violations that needed to be addressed to meet the Fire Code. As AFRD continues
working through the list of potentially inspectable properties in descending risk order,
the sheer number of additional inspections (increased workload) and potential violations
identified and mitigated (positive outcomes) has already had a transformative impact on the
daily operations of AFRD’s fire inspection process.
In addition to the immediate impact on the daily property inspections, the results of this
work have stimulated important conversations within the executive leadership of AFRD and
the Assessment and Planning Section about 1) how to more effectively allocate inspection
personnel; 2) how to update and utilize the model to provide dynamic risk data in real time
(e.g., on a monthly basis when new inspection assignments are given to the inspectors); 3)
how to motivate increased data sharing between various government departments such as
the Office of Buildings and AFRD; 4) how to give teams of firefighters access to fire safety
permit and violation information when they respond to a fire emergency at that commercial
property; and 5) how to extend the risk prioritization to residential properties using more
behavioral data such as noise or sanitation ordinance violations, and consumer data from
companies like Experian or ESRI.
Though there are many more inspectable properties than AFRD currently has the person-
nel capacity to handle, AFRD has already begun to take steps toward a more efficient use
of their existing personnel, by discussing how to assign inspectors to regions with a higher
proportion of properties requiring inspection, rather than by the geographical assignment to
fire battalions currently in use. In addition, they have begun to discuss altering properties’
inspection frequencies to reflect their fire risk levels. By prioritizing future inspections and
more efficiently allocating inspection personnel to target the commercial properties most at
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risk of fire, we hope this work will lead to a reduction in the frequency and severity of fire
incidents in Atlanta. We also hope that this framework can be instructive for other municipal
fire departments to improve their fire inspection processes.
9.7 Challenges
As fire departments in many municipalities embark on more data-driven fire risk inspection
policies and practices, several challenges we encountered could prove instructive for others.
As with many governmental data science initiatives, the practical application of the predictive
model has been contingent on local politics, organizational inertia, and existing policies, or
what [191] calls the “politics of place.’ While AFRD was an active and engaged partner
throughout this project, securing access to clean and usable data proved a challenge. At the
time of this writing, the City of Atlanta’s Office of Buildings, Office of Housing, and AFRD
do not share a unified database of buildings or a shared building identification numbering
convention, and thus, the process of joining various datasets was more technologically
difficult than it might otherwise have been. Even the seemingly simple task of discovering
which properties in the Office of Building’s dataset were also in the AFRD dataset required
a rather elaborate process of fuzzy text-matching and address verification. In addition, our
ability to leverage regularly updated dynamic data was similarly hindered by the difficulty
of data sharing among city departments. For instance, the Office of Building’s Business
License database may very well be updated regularly, but without a pipeline in place for
those updated data to be used by AFRD, businesses may close without AFRD knowing,
causing inspectors to waste time attempting to inspect closed businesses. These challenges
could be mitigated if each department with a vested interest in municipal commercial
properties and structures worked more closely to share their data and information.
Entrenched organizational processes may similarly hinder the adoption of new methods
of identifying properties to inspect. While, in theory, the fire inspection process targets
properties that are required by city ordinance to have a fire safety permit (e.g., restaurants
176
over a certain capacity, auto repair facilities, etc.), in practice there is no existing organiza-
tional procedure at AFRD and in many other cities to systematically add properties to the
list of regular inspections, or to determine their frequency of inspection [184]. In this work,
while we have created and employed an innovative method of identifying new properties
to inspect, until inter-departmental data-sharing becomes widespread, this process would
need to be redone on a regular basis as new businesses open, close, or change usage type.
Further, though we created an interactive map for visualization of various types of property
inspections, such a tool has not previously been part of AFRD fire inspectors’ regular
workflow, and this novelty presents a barrier for adoption, as seen in [186]. Finally, with the
number of inspectable properties increasing by up to 237%, there is no clear incentive for
the fire inspectors to work more efficiently to increase their individual number of property
inspections per month.
From a policy standpoint, the existing municipal Fire Code in Atlanta [173] requires
that inspections occur regularly for a specified set of commercial property types, but it is
not clear that those property types require inspection with equal priority or frequency, or
that these property types are the most in need of inspection. After using the results of this
work for determining individual property fire risk, the AFRD should begin a conversation
about how best to revise their municipal fire code to reflect differences in inspection type,
priority, and frequency due to the fire risk associated with various property types. Prior work
in [184] has similarly suggested revisions of the British Columbian fire code from being a
reactive, inflexible document based on tradition and intuition to a data-driven, responsive,
and pro-active document that incorporates information about fire risk. Finally, AFRD’s
policies for property fire inspections are primarily geared towards commercial properties,
yet the majority of the fires in Atlanta occur in residential properties. This will require
additional rethinking of their residential community fire safety and prevention education
programs.
As in many municipalities, fully leveraging the power of analytics to improve fire
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safety in Atlanta will require a significant rethinking of how to approach and manage city
operations such as fire inspections, and how to best facilitate data sharing practices between
different city agencies.
9.8 Conclusions and Future Research Directions
Due to the large number of commercial properties in Atlanta potentially requiring inspection
and the limited inspection personnel capacity of the Atlanta Fire Rescue Department (AFRD),
as in many other municipalities, there is a need for a data-driven prioritization of commercial
property inspections. In this work, we provide the Firebird framework: a re-usable method
for municipal fire departments to identify and prioritize their commercial property fire
inspections based on each property’s fire risk. Our work first provides a clear process for
joining disparate data sources from multiple municipal departments and private sources
to identify new inspectable properties based on currently inspected property types. We
were able to identify 6,096 new inspectable properties, comprised of the top 100 property
types currently inspected by the AFRD, and a total of 19,397 new inspectable properties
comprised of all currently inspected property types by AFRD.
We next present a method for predicting fire risk for each commercial property. Our
models used 58 building- and parcel-level variables to predict fires in 8,223 properties, 5,022
of which are on the list of properties requiring inspection. Specifically, we trained SVM
and Random Forest models using data from 2011-2014 to predict fires in 2015. At a false
positive rate of 20%, the SVM and Random Forest models were able to predict 71.36% and
69.28% of the fires in that year, respectively. Furthermore, even the false positives provided
valuable insight, since they represent properties with high risk of catching fire, that likely
should be inspected by AFRD. We also identified features that are highly related to fires.
From the Random Forest model, we learned that features related to building size, number
or units, and value were most predictive. On the other hand, the logistic regression model
revealed certain neighborhoods and property owners that associate with very high or low
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fire rates. We then converted these results to a risk score for each property, and were able
to apply these scores to 5,022 currently inspected and potentially inspectable properties
(1,975 currently annually inspected and 3,047 potentially inspectable), with 454 of those
properties having a medium or high risk score (188 currently inspected and 266 potentially
inspectable properties). Finally, we incorporated those scores into our joined dataset of
property inspections and visualized each of the properties on an interactive map, with their
associated property information and risk score, for use by AFRD to augment their inspection
decision processes.
Research Directions. Future research should seek to refine, expand, and further validate
our prediction model. Due to missing or erroneous entries in the data sources, we could
only to incorporate 8,223 properties into our predictive fire risk model, out of the more than
20,000 commercial properties in the city. In addition, because of the lack of integration
across city department datasets and a lack of completeness in many of our datasets, we
could only provide risk scores for 5,022 of the 8,669 current and potentially inspectable
properties in the dataset we provided to AFRD. Researchers working with other municipal
fire departments might train their models on a dataset that has fewer building- or parcel-
level information variables, but may be applicable to more properties. Other work could
improve the accuracy of the model by incorporating additional dynamic sources of data,
such as violations of prior fire inspections, data from the Department of Health and Wellness
inspections, information from the Certificates of Occupancy, or other, more behavioral
sources, such as sanitation or noise violations, as seen in [185], rather than the largely static
building- and parcel-level data that we used. In addition, more research needs to be done
on the usefulness and usability of an interactive map to display inspection, and how the
inspectors or executive staff of a fire department could use it in different ways to inform
their day-to-day planning, decisions, and operations. One step that municipal government
agencies can take towards implementing this framework is to generate a unique Building
Identification Number (BIN), used by all stakeholders, such as the Office of Buildings,
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Office of Housing or city planning departments, as well as the Fire and Police Departments.
This would allow for easier joining of disparate sources of data, without the need for address
validation, text matching, and other complex and potentially error-generating processes for
joining datasets.
Identification, selection, and prioritization of risky properties for fire inspection can be
difficult for cities that do not have an integrated data platform, because some municipal
agencies may have relevant property and structure information that is isolated from other
local data sources, and which may not have a regular, timely process for updating. Our
framework outlined here can be a model for improving the complex process of property
inspection, identification, and prioritization. Additionally, our experience joining isolated
datasets from different government departments, commercial data, and open data sources
could be invaluable for many cities that want to begin utilizing data science for a smarter
city, without requiring a significant financial investment. We hope the impact from our work





While Artificial Intelligence has tremendous potential as a defense against real-world cyber-
security threats, understanding the capabilities and robustness of AI remains a fundamental
challenge. This dissertation tackles problems essential to successful deployment of AI in
security settings.
10.1 Contributions
We contribute at the intersection of AI, cybersecurity, algorithmic game theory:
• New Algorithms: We developed ShapeShifter (Chapter 3), the first targeted physical
adversarial attack that fools state-of-the-art object detectors. We also developed practi-
cal defenses including SHIELD (Chapter 4), an efficient defense leveraging stochastic
image compression, and UnMask (Chapter 5), a knowledge-based adversarial detec-
tion and defense framework. Both ShapeShifter and SHIELD are open-source and
have been integrated into an Intel AI Academy course. Our distributed boosting algo-
rithm is simultaneously noise tolerant, communication efficient, and computationally
efficient (Chapter 3).
• New Theories: We introduce a new online decision-making setting in game theory
where players are compelled to play “diversified” strategies, and give strong guarantees
on both the price of anarchy and the social welfare in this setting. (Chapter 6). Our
distributed boosting algorithm requires exponentially less communication complexity
in the agnostic setting, solving an open problem in distributed learning [9]. (Chapter 7)
• New Applications: Our Virtual Product framework has led to two patents and is the
first method to predict security events and high-severity incidents identifiable by a
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security product as if it had been deployed. Our Firebird framework computes fire
risk scores for over 5,000 buildings in the city, with true positive rates of up to 71% in
predicting fires. Firebird open sourced and has been used by the Atlanta Fire Rescue
Department to prioritize fire inspections. Firebird won the Best Student Paper Award
Runner-up at KDD 2016 and was highlighted by National Fire Protection Association
as a best practice for using data to inform fire inspections.
10.2 Future Research Directions
This thesis takes an important step in designing practical, robust ML algorithms with strong
theoretical guarantees, to reliably solve high-stakes societal problems, such as safe-guarding
security-critical systems. Moving forward, I hope to broaden and deepen this investigation,
extending my work to more theoretical frameworks and applications. Initially, I will focus
on the following three interrelated research directions.
Physical Attacks against Real ML Systems and Countermeasures. To the best of
our knowledge, there is no reported physical attack yet that affects ML systems in the
real-world. This is because all the existing physical attacks, including ShapeShifter, only
work in the white-box setting, where the attacker has full access to the ML model and all
the deployed defensive techniques. To raise the awareness of the security issues in ML,
I would like to design black-box physical attacks that break real ML systems, such as a
security surveillance system or a smart home system. Depending on the applications, the
perturbations may not need to be imperceptible and can be arbitrarily large. For example,
the attacker can wear a t-shirt with a large color perturbation to fool an object detection
system [192]. There are many possible methods to defend against such attacks in practice.
One way is by utilizing multi-modal sensing, such as using RGB and depth sensing at the
same time. How to efficiently incorporate multi-modal information is a challenging and
important research problem.
Fraud Detection with ML and Game Theory. I believe AI has the potential to protect
182
people from a wide range of cyber harms that affect our everyday lives. For example, fraud
detection is an important adversarial ML application, where the fraudster creates a benign
facade to evade detection. I have worked on detecting fraudulent users and reviews on
Yelp by using graph mining techniques like dense graph extraction [50]. However, there is
much more information to be utilized to improve detection. I plan to combine techniques
in ML, graph mining, natural language processing, and time series analysis to incorporate
information from different data sources. I also plan to better understand how and why
fraudsters work in particular ways, by using game theory, and ultimately design a framework
that discourages people to conduct fraud by better mechanism design.
Model and Data Privacy. Keeping an ML model secret is crucial for defending against
black-box adversarial attacks. I plan to design practical ML algorithms that are hard to
reverse-engineer, such as dynamic random ensemble using online boosting [112]. I will also
formalize the benefit of randomization as a defense to adversarial attacks by incorporating
the techniques in cryptography. Besides model privacy, I also aim to study the problem
of data privacy, which has been receiving an increasing amount of attention in the past
few years, due to some high-profile data leaks in industry. Differential privacy is the most
popular theoretical framework for data privacy, wherein a typical method is by adding
random noise to the original data. I believe our diversified strategy concept (Chapter 6) is
also helpful to preserving differential privacy.
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